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1Introduction and Overview
Labor has been a part of childhood for all but short times in the development of hu-
mankind. In ancient Greece and Rome, for example, children were often born or sold
into slavery. Although they were sometimes protected by laws which prevented excessive
abuse, few of them enjoyed education, and many had to work in appalling conditions,
e.g. in mines. In Europe in the middle ages, when formal education was a privilege of
the rich, virtually all children worked, helping their parents with the fieldwork, tending
livestock or doing household chores. Apart from monasteries, where future monks learned
how to read and write, the only form of education open to most non-noble boys was an
apprenticeship with a craftsman. This started when the child was still very young, by
the age of 7, and ended up to 10 years later. Formal education became available in large
towns during the 15th century. However, as schooling was neither free nor compulsory,
many poor families could not afford to educate their children, who had to work to support
their parents. At the time of the industrial revolution, child labor in its worst forms was
common in the new factories and mills. As many families moved from the land to town
in order to work in the new industries, labor was cheap, and all family members had to
work to make a living. Orphans, however, were even worse off, as they had no parents to
protect them from abuse, and sometimes had to work without pay. Great Britain was the
first country in modern history to pass a child labor act, the Factory Act of 1833, which
limited working hours and prohibited children younger than 9 years of age from working
at all. Child labor, however, was still a problem in Europe and the United States well
into the 20th century.
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Figure 1: Economically active children aged 10-14: participation rates. Source: ILO
At present, child labor is insignificant in most industrial countries, with less than one
out of 3000 children younger than 14 working in Europe, according to the International
Labor Office (ILO). The situation is much worse in other countries and regions, partic-
ularly Africa and Asia. About 40% of all children between 10 and 14 years of age were
economically active in Eastern Africa in 2000, the number being somewhat lower for the
whole continent, where about than one in four children worked. As can be seen from figure
1, the percentage of economically active children is highest in Africa, and about half as
high in Asia and Latin America. During the whole period for which data is available, labor
market participation rates were falling, on average, by 3 percentage points per decade.
While it is clear that working in hazardous conditions for long hours with little pay is
undesirable, not all forms of economic activity captured by the numbers in figure 1 are to
be condemned. The ILO defines economic activity as ”all market production (paid work)
and certain types of non-market production (unpaid work), including production for own
use. [...] paid or unpaid, the activity or occupation could be in the formal or informal
sector in urban or rural areas”1. While this includes ”child labor”, ”children in hazardous
work” and ”children in unconditional worst forms of child labor”, it does not include chil-
dren who perform household chores, which are non-economic activities according to the
1Source: Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour, International Labour Office,
Geneva, April 2002
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ILO’s definition, and therefore do not appear in the its statistics. Note that some forms
of economic activity, such as light work for a few hours a week, can provide families with
the income they need to afford schooling, and can even be part of the education, e.g. in
apprenticeships. On the other hand, the non-economic activities which are not captured
by the ILO’s estimates are often considerable, and can prevent children from attending
school.
This distinction is not normally made in the theoretical literature on child labor. Most
authors assume that children can either work, and therefore contribute to the household’s
income, or go to school, thereby foregoing wages. Non-wage work, such as caring for the
siblings and households chores, is ignored, as is paid work which is part of the child’s
education.
The literature on child labor has been reviewed by Basu (1999) and by Brown, Dear-
dorff and Stern (2003). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the literature departed from
the analysis of unitary models to consider issues of household bargaining, especially on
an intra-household level (Moehling (1995), Basu and Ray (2002)).
More recent literature addresses the possibility of multiple equilibria. Basu and Van
(1998), for example, assume that child and adult labor are substitutes, and that parents
only send children to work if the household income lies below some exogenous threshold.
They consider an economy with inhomogeneous households, which differ with respect to
the wage levels for which they send all their children to work, so that the total amount of
child labor in an economy will depend on the adult’s wage. The authors then show that
multiple stable equilibria can exist: in one, all children work and wages are low, and in
the other wages are high and children do not work at all. If indeed two such equilibria
exist, a governmental ban on child labor, if enforced, will result in the economy switching
from the low-wage to the high-wage equilibrium, if the former ruled before the ban.
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While the early literature condemned child labor as an evil in itself, the more recent
literature focuses on the formation of human capital through education, and on the long-
term adverse effects of child labor on the whole economy. Child labor, as opposed to
education, is assumed to have negative external effects on the whole society, as children
who are not educated will themselves be too poor to educate their own children, thereby
impeding economic growth. Baland and Robinson (2000) and Ranjan (1999) show that in
the absence of perfect capital markets in which parents can borrow to finance education,
child labor will be (inefficiently) high. Both papers focus on bans of child labor as policy
interventions, and Baland and Robinson show that, in some cases, a ban can be Pareto
improving.
As bans on child labor are often hard to enforce, other, fiscal, measures might be more
effective. Bell and Gersbach (2001) use an OLG framework in which individuals live for
two periods, where the level of human capital of an adult determines his or her output
and income, and human capital is formed through a process involving child-rearing and
formal education. Parents are altruistic towards their children, but there are no bequests.
Multiple stable steady states are possible in such a setting, such as a poverty trap in which
all children work full-time, and human capital is at its minimum at all times. Another
steady state is one in which continuous growth is possible. Escaping the poverty trap
is possible, even without outside aid, through policy programs consisting of taxes and
subsidies. However, all such programs will lead to inequality, at least temporarily.
With few exceptions (notably Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and Baland and Robinson
(2000)), the literature on child labor has assumed the number of children to be exogenous.
However, in his overview article Basu (1999) notes that: ”In reality, the number of children
is partly volitional, and the decision may well depend on whether children can find work.
[...] There is need for such a model [...].”When deciding about schooling, parents must, in
general, choose between current consumption, which is financed in part by child labor, and
future consumption, financed by an investment in education. When fertility and schooling
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decisions are both endogenous, there is an additional tradeoff between quantity (i.e. high
fertility, but low schooling) and quality (i.e. low fertility and more schooling). The aim
of the present dissertation is to analyze household decisions and their long-term effects
on the dynamics of an economy, as well as potential policy options, when families decide
both about the number of children they intend to raise and level of schooling these are to
enjoy. Before turning to an outline of the work before us, however, a brief discussion of
the existing literature on fertility, particularly in the context of child labor, is needed.
One of the first articles to address the issue of endogenous fertility and the dynamics
of such a model is Raut and Srinivasan (1994). The authors consider an OLG model in
which individuals live for three periods. Parents have an incentive to raise many children
as a means of financing their old age. However, as raising children is costly, the number
of children a family can afford to raise is limited. The dynamics of the system depend
on the costs of raising children, and the authors show that steady states with exponential
growth of population and constant per capita income are possible. Raut and Srinivasan,
however, do not consider child labor and human capital formation.
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) consider a setting with endogenous fertility, where
economic growth stems from human capital accumulation. The authors model human
capital accumulation through investment of human capital itself, and do not consider
child labor. This investment exhibits increasing returns at least for some (low) levels of
human capital. The authors show that investing in children is less profitable than invest-
ing in human capital if human capital is abundant, and vice versa. Consequently, two
stable steady states exist: if the initial level of human capital in a society is low, families
will have many children and invest little in their education, whereas families whose initial
level of human capital is high will tend to be smaller and their members better-educated.
Dessy (2000) is among the first to analyze the dynamics of a system in which parents
decide both about child labor and fertility. He considers an infinitely lived dynasty in
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which the dynasty head derives utility from the levels of consumption and population
sizes in all future periods. Parents need to invest some of their time to raise children, but
there are no further child-rearing costs. Education is assumed to be free. If the parents’
wage is low, fertility and child labor will be high, as the relative costs of raising children
are low. If, however, the parents’ wage lies above some threshold, children enjoy full-time
schooling. Note that this result resembles the one obtained by Basu and Van (1998).
An economy starting from a sufficiently low adult wage will always end up in the child
labor trap. The author argues that escaping this trap is possible if there is compulsory
schooling and the legislation on education is at least partially enforceable. In this case,
both fertility and the incidence of child labor will fall, while the adults’ consumption will
remain unchanged.
Hazan and Berdugo (2002) focus on the effects of technological progress on the dynamics
of child labor, fertility and human capital over time. They assume that parents decide
about their children’s allocation of time between working and schooling, that the incomes
of all household members are pooled, that parents care about the future earnings of their
children, and that they need to devote a fraction of their own adulthood to child-rearing.
To model technological progress, the authors assume there are two sectors, one a tradi-
tional sector which employs raw labor only, and the other a modern sector, employing
both raw and efficiency labor, as well as physical capital. The level of technology in the
modern sector can be increased through investment. As long as the level of technology
in the modern sector is low, fertility and child labor are high. Technological progress
decreases the relative wage of child labor and therefore encourages education. Even if the
economy is initially in the low steady state it can escape to sustained growth, with rising
education and decreasing fertility.
Another strand of literature focuses on the impact of mortality on household decisions
regarding children. Chakraborty and Das (2005) consider a three-period OLG setting
in which adults can die prematurely at the end of the second period of adult life, be-
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fore reaching the third. An individuals’ likelihood of dying depends on her spending on
health. Young parents decide about fertility, child labor and schooling, consumption and
investment in health. There are no capital markets, and individuals in the last age group
cannot work, so they must rely on transfers from their children to finance old-age con-
sumption. If the parents are sufficiently wealthy (i.e. productive), investment in health
can significantly reduce the probability of premature mortality. As a consequence, old-
age consumption becomes more important, and investing in education is profitable. Rich
parents, therefore, will have few but well-educated children and invest in health. If, on
the other hand, parents are poor, they will have more children than rich families, but
these children will have to work full-time, rather than go to school. Chakraborty and Das
assume that the individual’s mortality rate is endogenous, and depends on her spending
on health. While this is certainly true with respect to some diseases, such as malaria,
where private investment can reduce the likelihood of infection (for instance by buying
mosquito nets), there are other diseases where private spending is unlikely to influence
the survival probability. One such disease is AIDS. Particularly in developing countries,
individuals often do not know how the HIV virus is transmitted, and therefore cannot
invest efficiently in protecting themselves from infection. And with medical treatment be-
ing very expensive, families in developing countries cannot afford to pay for it when one
of their members is HIV positive. Therefore mortality is generally treated as exogenous
when analyzing the effects of HIV/AIDS on developing countries, their individuals and
economies.
In 2001, AIDS was the fourth-biggest cause of death worldwide, and had lead to a sharp
surge in premature adult mortality in some countries. The disease affects mostly young
people, who are among the most productive in society. They are responsible for bearing
and rearing children, so that their premature death is likely to have a deep impact on the
population and economy of the affected country. When the parents are ill, the household’s
income is reduced and children might have to work more to support their parents and
siblings. Similarly, if the survival probability is low, parents could decide to invest less in
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their children, to reduce fertility or both. As the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates differ sub-
stantially among different countries, the economic effects of the disease must be assessed
separately for each country. In general, the literature on the economy of HIV/AIDS does
not consider the epidemic’s effects on human capital. We will review this literature in the
third part of the present work, and focus here on articles which analyze human capital in
connection with HIV/AIDS.
Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) consider a 2-period OLG setting, in which either
or both of the parents can die prematurely due to HIV/AIDS. Premature death occurs
after individuals give birth to their children and before the children reach school-going
age; fertility is exogenous. Human capital is formed through formal education at school
at the expense of child labor. There are no bequests, and no capital markets. Parents,
who are altruistic toward their children, are the sole decision-makers in the economy, and
they decide about their own consumption and the level of schooling of their children. As
a consequence, the level of human capital attained by a young adult depends on whether
her parents survive. The economy has several equilibria, among them a poverty trap
where children work full-time and a growth equilibrium if the education technology is suf-
ficiently productive and mortality is sufficiently low. The theoretical model is calibrated
to South African data for the years 1960 – 2000. The calibration and its results are
used to compute projections of the South African economy until 2080. The authors ana-
lyze two different social models: first, the pooling case, where surviving individuals form
new couples and all orphans are taken in by relatives. In the second, there are nuclear
families, surviving individuals do not form new couples, and full orphans are left to be
taken care of by the state. They also analyze different governmental interventions aimed
at combating the disease, such as spending on health or school-attendance subsidies. If
there had been no HIV/AIDS epidemic, the economy would have grown sustainably, with
all children enjoying full-time schooling after 2020. With the outbreak of the epidemic,
however, the economy collapses into the poverty trap. Governmental interventions in the
health sector combined with support for orphans and poor families can avert this outcome.
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Ferreira and Pessoa (2003) consider a continuous-time model with premature mortal-
ity due to HIV/AIDS where an individual’s decision about schooling depends on her life
expectancy. Human capital is formed through formal education. Individuals decide about
the point of time when they leave school and enter the labor market, and about consump-
tion. Thus children themselves can decide about their level of schooling, and the parents
play no active role in making that decision. In making this assumption, the authors depart
from the setting used generally in the child labor literature. They arrive at the conclusion
that HIV/AIDS has a strong impact on long-term growth, as individuals reduce formal
education when their life expectancy falls. The model is applied to several African coun-
tries. The authors show that schooling falls, on average, by half, while income falls by
about a quarter in the presence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2004) consider a 2-generation OLG model where indi-
viduals can die prematurely before the start of the last period of life. An individual’s
level of human capital does not depend on formal education directly, but only on whether
her parent survived or not. Child labor, therefore, plays no role. To finance old-age con-
sumption, individuals save some of their labor income while young. They also work while
old, and enjoy the returns from their savings. The authors undertake projections of the
economies of several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They consider several scenarios,
depending on the duration and strength of HIV/AIDS mortality shock. Growth rates in
all scenarios fall when the epidemic breaks out, and recover if the shock is not permanent,
that is, if morality rates subsequently return to their pre-epidemic level. The authors pro-
vide an extended version of their initial model in Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005),
where individuals live for up to three periods. The process of human capital formation
is not only dependent on the parents’ survival, but also on the time the child spends
pursuing formal education rather than working. In addition to deciding about their own
consumption and savings, parents, who are assumed to be altruistic, now also decide
about their offsprings’ schooling and consumption. If an individual is infected with the
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HIV virus, he also decides about spending on medical treatment. Sick individuals do not
save for old-age consumption. The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are large, reducing
the current income after 10 generations by 5-45% of potential NO-AIDS income, depend-
ing of the scenario.
Bell et al. (2004) analyze the long-run effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the Kenyan
economy. They employ an OLG model with three generations, where children can either
work or go to school, while parents and grandparents work full-time. Parents are altruistic
toward their children and decide about consumption and education. All orphans are taken
in by relatives, that is, there is pooling. As a consequence, an individual’s level of human
capital is independent of the health status of his parents but it does depend on schooling
and on the parents’ expectations about mortality rates, which influence their decisions
about education. As in Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003), it is assumed that there
are no capital markets. The authors find that GDP in the AIDS case is lower by 40%
compared to the NO AIDS case. They identify three major reasons for this effect: the first
is a deterioration in the educational system, which was significantly less productive after
the 1980s than before. Second, there is a fall in the general productivity in the economy,
which took place in the 1990s, and, third, there is the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
As noted previously, the formation of human capital through education and the im-
plications of child labor on the dynamics of a system where fertility and schooling are
endogenous have been explored in the literature (Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
Dessy (2000), Baland and Robinson (2000), Hazan and Berdugo (2002)). In the area of
policy intervention, if taken up at all, these authors discuss regulatory measures – such as
bans on child labor or compulsory education (Dessy (2000), Hazan and Berdugo (2002)) –
only. Evidence from developing countries, however, suggests that such measures are hard
to enforce.
The present dissertation has three aims. The first aim is to construct a setting in which
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families decide simultaneously about fertility and child labor, and analyze the effects of
these decisions on economic growth. In doing so, we will draw upon the framework devel-
oped by Raut and Srinivasan (1994) for the analysis of endogenous fertility, and by Bell
and Gersbach (2001) for the analysis of child labor. We will develop an OLG model in
which parents raise and educate children to finance old-age consumption, while human
capital, which is an input in production, is built up through formal education and child
rearing. The second aim of the dissertation is to analyze in detail fiscal measures and
policy programs aimed at reducing child labor, or fertility, or both. Such measures can
be school-attendance subsidies, lump-sum transfers or taxes and subsidies influencing the
child-raising costs.
In the first two chapters, we consider a setting in which altruistic parents decide about
their own consumption, fertility and the level of schooling their children are to enjoy. We
analyze the dynamics of an economy in which growth stems from human capital accumu-
lation and population growth, and find that several steady-states are possible, depending
on the underlying educational technology. We also analyze several forms of governmental
interventions, such as taxes and subsidies, and construct a policy program which can lead
to an escape from the poverty trap. In the first chapter, there is no limiting, fixed factor
in production, so that the total population can grow beyond any finite bound. As a con-
sequence, the model presented in the first chapter is extended in the second to include a
limiting factor in production, namely, land. In that case, it can be shown that popula-
tion cannot grow beyond some finite bound in any steady-state process. As in the first
chapter, both backward and growth steady-states can exist. In contrast to chapter one,
however, alternating steady states (in the sense of fluctuations with a fixed periodicity)
are feasible if land ownership plays a role in production. Governmental interventions can
lead to sustained economic growth.
In the light of the results of the first two chapters, and the recent literature on human
capital and the long-run effects of HIV/AIDS, it seems interesting to analyze the effects
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of changes in (premature) mortality on household decisions concerning fertility, education
and, consequently, economic growth. This is the third aim of the present dissertation,
and an application of the framework developed in the first two chapters. In the third
chapter, therefore, we extend the basic model, and apply it to Kenya. As we employ the
same data as Bell et al. (2004), who assume fertility to be exogenous, the results derived
in chapter 3 can usefully be compared to theirs, so that the effects of endogenous fertility
decisions can be assessed. We also examine the effects of a governmental program aimed
at reducing mortality rates through spending in the health sector, and find it to be highly
profitable.
To summarize, we analyze the economic development of societies in which parents de-
cide about not only education but also fertility. The parents’ decisions are motivated by
both financial and altruistic reasons. We focus on human capital formation and population
growth as the determinants of economic development, and find that multiple steady-states
can exist. In the first two chapters, the focus of the analysis is on the effects of fiscal in-
terventions on both the household decisions and the dynamic of the system. In the third
chapter, we examine the households’ reaction to mortality shocks and their long-run eco-
nomic effects when certain government interventions are financed from sources outside
the system.
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Chapter 1
Child Labor and Fertility
Abstract
This essay analyzes the economic causes and effects of household decisions concerning fer-
tility, education and child labor when children can supplement family income early in life
and must support their parents in old age as adults. Parents, who raise and educate chil-
dren for both financial and altruistic reasons, will typically choose too little schooling for
the economy to grow when all are poor. High child-raising costs or an educational process
which is not sufficiently productive are the main reasons for the existence of a poverty
trap with a high population growth rate and little or no schooling. Interventions such
as taxes and subsidies can lead to sustained long-term economic growth, with full-time
schooling and a low population growth rate, even without outside aid, if the child-raising
costs are not too high and the educational process is at least moderately productive.
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1.1 Introduction
With more than 250 million children working worldwide, the overwhelming majority of
them in poor countries, child labor is a major problem. At the same time, fertility is still
well above replacement levels, even though it has started to fall from the very high levels
that prevailed for most of the 20th century. As population growth rates in most develop-
ing countries have started to fall within the last 10 years, perhaps as a delayed response to
improved health conditions and an increase in life expectancy, it seems clear that families
can influence the number of children they have. This is confirmed by statistics on the use
of contraception (contraceptive prevalence), which has increased from 18% in 1990 to 32%
in 2000 in the least developed countries, and data on the total fertility rate, which has
decreased from 5.9 children in 1990 to 5.4 in the year 2000 in the least developed countries.1
Families have several reasons for raising and educating children – altruistic, social and
financial. Some religious groups are known to encourage their adherents to have children,
and stigmatize families who do not. Parents in highly developed countries do not raise
children for financial reasons, as consumption in all stages of adult life is ensured either
by their own income or through savings for retirement and social insurance. With access
to capital markets being limited in most developing countries, saving for retirement is not
a viable option, so that parents have to ensure consumption in old-age by having enough
children to support them. Raising children is costly, however, especially when they are
very young and cannot earn, and it can even prevent one parent from working. When
they become old enough to earn or help in running the family enterprise, educating them
involves opportunity costs, at the very least. Therefore, financial reasons will play a major
role in fertility decisions.
There is a growing literature on child labor, earlier contributions to which have been
surveyed by Basu (1999). When parents decide about their children’s education, multiple
equilibria can arise, even when fertility is exogenous. Basu and Van (1998) and Swinner-
1Source: http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/fertility/index.htm, UNICEF and UN
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ton and Rogers (1999) were the first to analyze such a setting. Ranjan (1999) focusses on
the connection between capital markets and child labor: without access to credit, parents
have to send their children to work. If borrowing were possible, parents could finance the
(opportunity) costs of their children’s education; for the loans could be paid back through
the additional income of well-educated children. Baland and Robinson (2000) were the
first to analyze child labor and fertility simultaneously. Inefficiency arises, as parents fail
to internalize the negative effects of child labor. The setting in Dessy (2000), who also
analyzes both fertility and child labor, also exhibits multiple equilibria: a poverty trap
with high population growth and little education, and a steady state with low fertility
and high productivity. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) focus on the effects of technological
progress, which decreases the relative wage of child labor and therefore encourages ed-
ucation. Even if the economy is initially in the low-level steady state, it can escape to
sustained growth, with rising education and decreasing fertility.
This paper will analyze the combined problem of child labor, fertility and provision for old
age when the accumulation of human capital can lead to sustained growth. Parents edu-
cate children for both altruistic reasons and as a means of financing consumption during
retirement. The framework draws on Raut and Srinivasan (1994) and Bell and Gersbach
(2001). The former analyze the effects of endogenous fertility on economic growth in
the absence of altruism. As capital markets are such that saving in the form of physical
capital is possible while borrowing is not, parents have children solely as a means of fi-
nancing consumption during retirement. Various growth paths are possible: convergence
to a steady state, chaotic, and divergent. Bell and Gersbach (2001) examine the interplay
between child labor, education and growth when an intergenerational transmission mech-
anism plays a vital role in the accumulation of human capital. They do not, however,
concern themselves with fertility and provision for old age.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 presents the basic model, which
is an OLG structure with three generations. Section 1.3 analyzes the different solutions
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to the household’s maximization problem, both interior and at the corner as well as the
household decision. Economic growth and possible steady states are examined in section
1.4. Section 1.5 explores governmental interventions, with a focus on financial measures
such as taxes and subsidies, and it compares the results derived with those of a model
with exogenous fertility. A conclusion is given in section 1.6.
1.2 The model framework
A household consists of three generations: children, parents and grandparents. Each gen-
eration is endowed with one unit of time. Children divide their time between working
and learning, parents work full-time and grandparents do not work at all. The fraction of
childhood assigned to education will be denoted by e ∈ [0, 1].
For simplicity, assume that only parents with identical labor efficiencies form families
(assortative mating). It is assumed that parents raise and educate children in part to
increase their own current consumption and to finance their old age. They decide how
many children to have (denoted by n) and how well to educate them. Except for the op-
portunity costs of the children’s labor, education is free. Raising children involves direct
costs, and well-educated parents normally spend more on their children out of a sense for
what is proper and for altruistic reasons. All children are treated identically.
As the grandparents do not work and investment in physical capital is ruled out by
assumption, their consumption is financed solely through a grant from their adult chil-
dren. It is assumed that there is a fixed social norm, under which the young adults must
transfer a fixed fraction χ ∈ (0, 1) of their income to their parents. Grandparents make
no bequests.
Each generation of parents is therefore linked with the two adjoining generations, but
there is no direct link between generations more than one period apart. Grandparents
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cannot influence their children’s decisions concerning fertility and education, and these
decisions, in turn, do not affect the grandparents’ consumption.
Income is generated through the production of a single, non-storable good. Labor –
measured in efficiency units – is the only input in production. Let the efficiency of a
child be fixed at µ, and denote each parent’s endowment of labor in efficiency units by λ.
Hence, the total labor supplied by the household in period t, measured in efficiency units,
is:
Lt = 2λt + (1− et)µnt. (1)
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to
labor:
yt = αLt = α [2λt + (1− et)µnt], α > 0, (2)
where α(> 0) denotes the output produced with one unit of human capital.
Turning to preferences, the only active decision makers are the parents, whose decisions
determine the levels of their consumption in the last two periods of life and the effi-
ciency their offspring will attain in adulthood. Consider a household in period t. The
parents’ current consumption, C1t, is related to their income (2αλt), that of the children
(αµnt(1− et)), the costs of raising the children (ntbλt, b > 0)2 and the required transfer
to the grandparents (χ · 2αλt) as follows:
C1t = 2αλt(1− χ) + αµnt(1− et)− ntbλt (3)
Their old-age consumption is given by the number of children, the efficiency each attains
in adulthood in period t+ 1, and the social rule:
C2t = nt(χαλt+1) (4)
2Alternatively, the child-raising costs could be defined as a fraction of the parent’s income, ntb′(2αλt)
where b′ = b/(2α). We will return to this specification later on.
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We assume that there is no uncertainty in the model in the sense that parents can per-
fectly foresee all relevant future values of the parameters. To keep matters simple, we will
assume that χ does not change over time.
The parents’ altruism expresses itself not only through the expenditures on educating
and raising children but also in their concern for the children’s future income. In contrast
to Barro (1974), we do not assume a nested utility function. Instead, parents consider
their children’s ability to purchase consumption and education for their own children, an
ability which is largely determined by the children’s efficiency in adulthood. It is further
assumed that the utility function is additively separable and has the following form:
U(C1t, C2t, λt+1) = ln(C1t) + β ln(C2t) + β1 ln(λt+1) (5)
The level of fertility nt does not appear in connection with altruism in order to avoid a
tradeoff between quantity, i.e. having many children with little education, and quality,
i.e. having few but well-educated children in this context. It is assumed that parents care
about the future well-being of each their children, and these are better-off the higher λt+1
is. Note that if child-raising costs were expressed as a fraction of the parents’ income, that
is, if they took the form nt · b′(2αtλ), where b′ = b/(2α), the labor productivity α would
disappear from the household maximization problem as the utility function is logarithmic
in form, a consequence which does not seem reasonable.
To summarize thus far: Parents are the sole decision makers in a household. They deter-
mine the number of children and their education, and therefore implicitly the amount of
child labor and the future efficiency of the children, and the consumption vector (C1t, C2t).
Turning to human capital formation, it is assumed that the efficiency of a grown-up
depends on the time she spent at school, the average efficiency of her parents and the
productivity of the education process, where it is plausible that these factors are com-
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plementary [see Bell and Gersbach (2001)]. If an individual does not spend any time at
school, she will attain the minimum level of efficiency λ = 1. We choose the simplest
form:
λt+1 = zetλt + 1, (6)
where z(> 0) can be thought of as the strength of the inter-generational transmission
mechanism. Consider a highly developed economy without child labor (et = 1). In this
case, the growth rate of the parents’ level of efficiency is given by:
gλ ≡ λt+1
λt
− 1 = (z − 1) + 1/λt
If z > 1, then gλ > 0 ∀λ, so that unbounded long-term economic growth is possible. If, on
the other hand, z < 1, such growth is impossible. In this case, the maximal efficiency an
individual can reach is limited, the upper bound for λ being 1/(1 − z) > 1.3 In the case
z = 1, long-term economic growth of efficiency beyond any bound is possible, as in the
case z > 1. The two cases differ only as far as the asymptotic rate of growth is concerned:
for z = 1, gλ → 0 for very high levels of efficiency.
Using equations (3), (4) and (6), the utility function can be rewritten such that it contains
only the decision variables nt and et and the various constants:
U(C1t, C2t, λt+1) = U(nt, et;λt) = ln
[
2αλt(1− χ) + αµnt(1− et)− ntbλt
]
+ βln
[
αχ(zetλt + 1)nt
]
(7)
+ β1ln
[
zetλt + 1
]
Note that the utility function U(nt, et;λt) is not necessarily concave everywhere. The
function ntet, for example, is neither concave nor convex in (nt, et), as is ln
[
2αλt(1−χ)+
αµnt(1− et)− ntbλt
]
.
3This is not necessarily the highest level of efficiency a society will actually reach, as this upper limit
is computed assuming that e = 1. If the schooling parents choose at the upper limit of λ is e < 1, then
the maximal efficiency will be lower, namely, 1/(1− ze) ≤ 1/(1− z).
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1.3 The Household’s Optimum
The solution to the households’ maximization problem is a tuple (nt(λt), et(λt)) that maxi-
mizes (7) for the given level of efficiency λt. For the solution to be relevant economically, it
has to fulfill four conditions, with both nt and et being bounded in all periods. The number
of children a family can have is bounded above by biological constraints (nt ≤ nmax <∞).
The total fertility rate of the Hutterites (a religious group in North America) – the highest
ever measured historically – was about 9.5 children per woman, suggesting that nmax < 10.
A lower bound might be applicable for social reasons (0 < nmin ≤ nt).4 For the classical
family with two parents, nt = 0 can never be optimal, as C2t = 0 in this case. In order to
skirt this problem, the paper will deal with an extended family instead: pooling plays a
major role in this case, as in Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003), so that nt < 1 becomes
possible. The household’s problem, therefore, is to
max
nt,et
U(nt, et;λt) s.t nt ∈ [nmin, nmax] and et ∈ [0, 1]. (8)
1.3.1 The unrestricted solution
The first-order conditions associated with the household’s maximization problem (8) above
have a unique (unrestricted) solution.5 Unfortunately, this does not describe a maximum,
but rather a saddle point, the utility function being neither convex nor concave in (nt, et),
so that the determinant of the hessian of the function is negative for all values of the
parameters for the unrestricted solution of the first-order conditions:
det(H) = − β1 (1 + β)
3 µ2
4λt
2 (β1 + β) (−1 + χ)2
< 0
If the educational technology were non-linear in schooling, that is, if it took the form
λt+1 = ze
²
tλt + 1 with ² < 1, at least one of the unrestricted solutions would be a maxi-
4One can allow nmin to be exactly zero if one introduces the assumption that output is storable or
that credit contracts can be entered into by members of adjacent generations.
5Note that the tuple (nt, et) solving the first-order conditions does not necessarily satisfy the conditions
nt ∈ [nmin, nmax] and et ∈ [0, 1]
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mum.6 However, if ² is less then one, then choosing et = 0 can never be optimal, as can be
seen by deriving the utility function with respect to education and evaluating this deriva-
tive for et = 0 : limet→0 ∂u/∂et =∞. As a consequence, choosing et > 0 is always optimal,
and steady-states with full-time child labor are excluded by construction if ² < 1. As one
of the aims of the essay is to analyze policy programs which lead to sustained long-term
economic growth with full-time schooling, excluding a steady-state of backwardness, that
is, one of the main situations in which a policy program is needed, would be a strong
limitation. If ² = 1 is chosen instead, steady-states with full-time child labor can exist,7
but steady-states where both schooling and fertility are interior are excluded, as full un-
restricted solutions are never optimal. Note, however, that steady-states where either et
or nt (but not both) is interior can exist. As a consequence, we choose ² = 1 for the
remainder of the essay, so as not to exclude steady-states with full-time child labor by
construction.
Choosing a Ramsey specification for the subutility function of altruism, that is, U(·) =
ln(C1t) + βln(C2t) + β1(1 − 1/λt+1), will not change the sign of the determinant of the
hessian, so that the unrestricted solution will describe a saddle point in this case too.
Unrestricted solutions describing a maximum do exist if one chooses a more general iso-
elastic form: U(·) = ln(C1t) + βln(C2t) + β1(1 − η/ληt+1) with η < 1. However, in this
case it is only possible to derive the unrestricted solutions analytically for η = 1/2, and
even then the solutions are very complex, and hard to analyze. We will return to such
a specification in the third chapter, where the existence of analytical solutions does not
play major role.
As the full unrestricted solution is not relevant in the present case, corner solutions need
to be computed. The following sections will present the three corner solutions and analyze
the areas where they are relevant economically, that is, where they satisfy the conditions
stated above. Both corner solutions with respect to one variable alone are maxima, with
6If ² > 1, unrestricted solutions are saddle points.
7In this case, limet→0 ∂u/∂et <∞, so that choosing et = 0 can be optimal.
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their respective second derivatives being negative.
1.3.2 Unrestricted solutions w.r.t. one variable
Whether an unrestricted solution with respect to either fertility or education (but not
both) exists and makes sense economically (i.e. e ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ [nmin, nmax]) depends
on the child-raising costs and the parents’ efficiency. A detailed discussion of the solutions
is given in the appendix. Unrestricted solutions will be denoted by n∗ and e∗ respectively,
while n¯ and e¯ denote corner values. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and tables 1.1 and 1.2 outline the
results.
Figure 1.1: The unrestricted solution with respect to fertility for e¯ = 0, for low and high child-raising
costs.
nmax
 
 low costs
 high costs
 Economically relevant areaFertility n
Efficiency 
nmin
Table 1.1: Unrestricted solution w.r.t fertility for e¯ = 0 and e¯ = 1
b ∈
[
2αβ(1−χ)
nmax(1+β)
, 2αβ(1−χ)
nmin(1+β)
]
b /∈
[
2αβ(1−χ)
nmax(1+β)
, 2αβ(1−χ)
nmin(1+β)
]
e¯ = 1 n∗(·) relevant for all λ n∗(·) is never relevant
e¯ = 0 n∗(·) is relevant for high levels of
efficiency λ > αµnmax(1+β)
2α(1−χ)β−nmaxb(1+β)
n∗(·) is never relevant
n∗ denotes an unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility.
If the child-raising costs are very low, the unrestricted solution w.r.t n is either negative
or too large (n > nmax) for all levels of efficiency. It is always negative for low levels of
λ, and can only be feasible economically if the child-raising costs and the adults’ level of
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Figure 1.2: Unrestricted solution with respect to education for different costs.
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Table 1.2: Unrestricted solution w.r.t education
Child-raising costs unrestricted solution w.r.t. education
b < 2α(1−χ)
n¯
e∗(·) relevant for moderate levels of efficiency
b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
e∗(·) relevant for moderate levels of efficiency λ ∈
[λa, λb]
b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
+ αzn¯µ(β+β1)
4n¯
e∗(·) is never relevant
e∗ denotes an unrestricted solution w.r.t. education.
human capital are sufficiently large. Depending on the parameters, the unrestricted solu-
tion w.r.t. education could exist for low levels of efficiency and be feasible economically.
Therefore, parents will choose e = e∗(n¯, λ) or e = 0 for low levels of efficiency and low
costs, where n¯ still needs to be determined. For very small and high levels of efficiency,
the unrestricted solutions will be economically feasible with respect to neither variable
when child-raising costs are low.
For moderate child-raising costs and low levels of efficiency, the unrestricted solution
w.r.t. fertility is not feasible. The unrestricted solution e = e∗(n¯, λ) will be feasible for
low and moderate levels of efficiency, but not available for large λ, where n∗(e¯, λ) could
be feasible. The values for e¯ and n¯ as well as the optima in the cases where neither or
both of the unrestricted solutions are feasible, still need to be computed.
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If the child-raising costs are high, the solution n∗(e¯, λ) is available for low levels of ef-
ficiency only if e¯ = 1, while the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education is negative for all
levels of efficiency. The optimum for small λ might, therefore, be either a corner solution
w.r.t both variables or n∗(e¯ = 1, λ). For high levels of efficiency, consumption in the first
period needs to be financed by child labor, as the child-raising costs are relatively high.
Therefore, the solution n∗(e¯ = 0, λ) will be optimal, if biologically feasible.
1.3.3 The corner solutions w.r.t. both variables
As established above, the unrestricted solutions w.r.t. one variable are not optimal for all
levels of efficiency. Therefore, full corner solutions need to be analyzed. In order to find
the optimum, it is necessary to compare the utilities generated by any combination of n
and e at the boundary of the feasible set. It suffices to consider the following two cases
(nmin 6= 0) :
(i)4Un : = U(nmax, e¯)− U(nmin, e¯)
(ii)4Ue : = U(n¯, e = 0)− U(n¯, e = 1)
Table 1.3: 4Un as a function of efficiency and child-raising costs
b ≤ 2α(1+χ)(nβmax−nβmin)
n1+βmax−n1+βmin
U(nmax, e¯) > U(nmin, e¯) for all levels of efficiency
b >
2α(1+χ)(nβmax−nβmin)
n1+βmax−n1+βmin
U(nmax, e¯) > U(nmin, e¯) for sufficiently low levels of efficiency
A detailed analysis of 4Un and 4Ue is given in the appendix. It can be shown that
if both variables are at the corner and schooling is fixed (e = e¯), well-educated parents
will be better off choosing the minimum number of children if the child-raising costs are
sufficiently large. Otherwise – that is, for low levels of efficiency or low costs – choosing
n = nmax will be optimal. If nmin is sufficiently close to zero, then choosing n = nmax will
always be optimal if the unrestricted solution w.r.t n is not economically feasible. The
results and critical values are derived in the appendix.
Analyzing 4Ue for n¯ 6= 0 yields an inequality involving a transcendental expression. It
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Table 1.4: 4Ue as a function of efficiency and child-raising costs
b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
U(e = 0, n¯) > U(e = 1, n¯) for all levels of efficiency
b ≤ 2α(1−χ)
n¯
U(e = 0, n¯) > U(e = 1, n¯) for sufficiently low levels of efficiency
is not possible to express this condition analytically for the critical efficiency. As was
the case for 4Un, the sign of 4Ue depends on the child-raising costs and the parents’
level of efficiency. If the unrestricted solution w.r.t education is not feasible economically,
choosing e = 0 will be optimal for all levels of efficiency if the child-raising costs are
large. If, on the other hand, b is small, well-educated parents will be better off choosing
full-time schooling, while poor parents need child labor and will choose e = 0. Although
it is not possible to compute the critical efficiency analytically, it can be shown that it is
single-valued.
1.3.4 The household’s decision
Having identified and characterized all solutions, it is now possible to outline how the
household’s decision depends on the parameters that govern its preferences and feasible
choices.
If b < 2α(1−χ)
nmax
, and the parents’ efficiency is very low, they will choose n = nmax
8
and either e = 0 or e = e∗(n¯, λ). For large levels of efficiency and small costs, neither of
the unrestricted solutions will be feasible, as both variables exceed their maximal values.
Parents will therefore choose n = nmax and e = 1.
If b ∈ [2α(1−χ)
nmax
, 2α(1−χ)
nmin
], and λ is small, the result is the same as above. For moderate
levels of efficiency, the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education is feasible, so that parents
choose e = e∗(n¯, λ) and n = nmax. For large levels of efficiency, 4Ue will be negative while
the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education is not feasible. As the unrestricted solution
w.r.t. fertility might be feasible, the household’s optimum for high levels of efficiency will
8With the parents’ efficiency being small, the term zλ in the educational technology is small while the
child-raising costs are relatively large. Therefore, education is not productive, so that full-time schooling
cannot be optimal, and parents finance old-age consumption by having numerous children.
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be n = max[nmin, n
∗(e¯, λ)] and e = 1.
If b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
, choosing full-time schooling always leads to C1t ≤ 0. As none of the
two unrestricted solutions is feasible for low levels of efficiency when 4Ue < 0 and
4Un > 0, parents will choose n = nmax and e = 0 for low λ. With increasing levels
of efficiency, as the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility becomes feasible, parents will
choose n = max[nmin, n
∗(e¯, λ)] and e = 0.9 For still higher levels of efficiency, the unre-
stricted solution w.r.t education is feasible, so that choosing n = nmin and e = e
∗(n¯, λ)
will be optimal. For sufficiently high levels of efficiency, none of the unrestricted solutions
will be feasible, while 4Ue < 0 and 4Un < 0, so that choosing e = 0 and n = nmin is op-
timal. Note that for very high levels of efficiency, even full-time child labor cannot ensure
C1t > 0, so that this case is of mathematical interest only. Extremely high costs will be
analyzed in the context of taxes, as societies cannot carry the burden of such costs for long.
The optimal choice when λ = 1 is of particular interest, as it determines whether the
economy will be trapped at λ = 1 (if households choose e(λ = 1) = 0) or not. As the un-
restricted solution w.r.t. fertility is generally not feasible for low levels of human capital,
and parents choose n = nmax, we can confine the analysis for λ = 1 to the unrestricted
solution w.r.t. education: e∗(λ = 1) will only be positive if the child-raising costs are
sufficiently low:
b ≤ 2α(1− χ)
nmax
+ α µ− αµ
z(β + β1)
. (9)
Note that the condition is more easily satisfied if z is large, in which case the term on
the right hand side of (9) is large, and approaches 2α(1−χ)
nmax
+ αµ from below. If, on the
other hand, z is very low (z → 0), the last term of the condition will be infinitely large, in
which case the condition can never be satisfied. Therefore, parents will generally choose
e(λ = 1) > 0 if raising children is sufficiently cheap while the educational technology is
productive, and e(λ = 1) = 0 otherwise.
9As can be seen from figure 1.1, the range of efficiency for which this solution is optimal is very narrow.
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1.4 Economic Growth
The next step is to examine the factors influencing economic growth, whereby ’growth’ can
be measured according to three indices: the parents’ efficiency (λt), the family’s income
yt and the lifetime utility of a generation (Ut). The second index is also the social product
of the household, and therefore corresponds to GDP. Finding the growth rate of income
or utility is complicated by the fact that efficiency, the number of children and schooling
could all change simultaneously within periods, so that 4yt and 4Ut might have either
sign. Given the fact that it is not possible to find explicit functions for the schooling and
fertility for all λ, as critical efficiencies cannot be computed, technical problems arise when
trying to compute growth rates for yt or Ut. Hence, we restrict ourselves to efficiency as
a measure of economic growth. A big difference in efficiency will always lead to a big
difference in income and utility, and limλ→∞U = limλ→∞y = ∞.10 Hence, an economic
policy aimed at increasing a family’s utility or income through an increase in efficiency
will be efficacious if increasing λ is at all possible.11
1.4.1 The critical level of schooling
The efficiency of a lineage will grow over time only if children spend sufficient time at
school. The critical level of schooling depends on the parents’ efficiency and the educa-
tional technology. It is obvious from (6) that efficiency cannot fall below its minimum
λ = 1, independently of z and e. The critical level of schooling can easily be computed
from the following condition for a stationary state in efficiency λ∗ :12
λt+1 = λt ∀t ⇔ ze(λt)λt + 1 = λt ∀t ⇔ zeλ∗ + 1 = λ∗
10If λ→∞ is feasible so that Cit > 0, i = 1, 2.
11Sustained growth is only possible if b < 2α(1−χ)nmin . In this case, parents will choose n = max[nmin, n
∗]
and e = 1 when λ is large. Computing income and utility, and then differentiating the results
w.r.t. efficiency immediately yields that income grows with efficiency, ∂y/∂λ = α > 0 and ∂U/∂λ =
1+zλ(1+β+β1)
λ(zλ+1) > 0. Therefore, growth of efficiency is equivalent to growth of utility and total income,
when λ is large, although the growth rates differ.
12Note that a stationary state in λ as defined here is not necessarily stable. The issue of stability will
be taken up later on.
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where λ∗ is a stationary value of the system. Therefore, the value of e that induces a
stationary state is:
ecrit :=
1
z
− 1
zλ∗
(10)
The higher the initial efficiency, the higher the level of schooling required to attain it. For
very high levels of efficiency, the critical level of schooling will approach 1/z asymptotically
from below. As parents who already are highly efficient choose e = 1 automatically if pos-
sible,13 the speed and direction of economic growth depend on z only. For the remainder
of the essay, only steady-states with respect to λ will be considered. Steady-states where
population is constant will exist only by chance. Note that in all steady-states where λ is
constant over time, fertility will be likewise.
If parents choose et > ecrit for some level of λt, the economy will grow. If, however,
et < ecrit, the level of human capital will fall with time.
1.4.2 Low and moderate levels of efficiency
If parents are not well educated, they will decide to have as may children as possible
(n = nmax) and to send their children out to work. The exact amount of schooling de-
pends on b and z, with ∂e/∂z > 0 and ∂e/∂b < 0, and can be computed using equation
(16) in the appendix. For low costs and λ = 1, the critical level of schooling is zero,
while parents choose et = 0 if raising children is not cheap. As a consequence, a low-level,
stable stationary state with respect to λ with full-time child labor can exist if b does not
satisfy condition (9). If, however, b satisfies condition (9), a stationary state with λ = 1
and e = 0 will not exist. For slightly higher levels of efficiency, the existence of stationary
states depends on b and z. Parents will usually choose e > ecrit if z is sufficiently high and
the child-raising costs are sufficiently low. For larger costs, e∗(n¯, λ) and ecrit will intersect
at most twice. A mathematical analysis of potential points of intersection is given in the
appendix.
13Choosing e = 1 is always possible if b < 2α(1− χ)/nmin.
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A point of intersection of the two functions is a stationary state with respect to effi-
ciency, provided parents choose the unrestricted solution w.r.t education. It is obvious,
therefore, that not all points of intersection (which are computed in the appendix) will
yield a steady state if the parents prefer choosing the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility
rather than the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education for the relevant level of efficiency.
As it is not possible to derive the household’s choice analytically, the stationary states
will also have to be computed numerically. Calculations14 show that there is only a very
limited range of parameters in which two steady-states exist. In most cases, there will be
either no steady state (for very low costs) or a single steady-state (for moderate costs) if
the parents’ efficiency is not too large.
Before turning to the analysis of high levels of efficiency, the stability of the poten-
tial stationary states with respect to λ where e = e∗(n¯, λ) needs to be analyzed. As
limλ→0(e− ecrit) =∞, the level of schooling parents choose will be higher than the criti-
cal level of schooling for levels of efficiency lower than the first steady-state and lower for
higher levels of efficiency. As both functions are continuous for low and moderate levels
of efficiency, it follows that the first point of intersection will yield a stable steady state,
while the second steady state, if it exists, will be unstable.
Recall from section 1.3.4 that parents always choose e(λ = 1) = 0 if the child-raising
costs exceed the value in (9). As the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education is continuous
in λ, it is likely that e = 0 will still be the optimal choice even if the parents’ human cap-
ital is slightly higher than λ = 1, in which case the steady-state with λt = 1, et = 0 ∀t,
and nt = nmax ∀t is stable.
14For these calculation, we choose some fixed values for α, µ, χ, β, β1 and nmin and nmax, and compute
the dynamics of the system for different values of z and b. One set of values for the parameters and the
ensuing household decisions and phase diagrams can be seen in the appendix.
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1.4.3 High levels of efficiency
If the parents’ efficiency is large, households will always choose full-time education if they
can afford it.15 Whether the economy will grow, stagnate or contract then depends on z
alone. The possible outcomes have been presented in section 1.2. Long-term economic
growth is not possible if z < 1; in this case, a high-level stationary state will be reached
asymptotically if parents always choose e = 1.
1.4.4 Conclusion: Economic growth and steady states
As stated earlier, the economic prospects of a society depend on the child-raising costs,
the productivity of the education function, z, the social parameter χ and the initial state
of the economy, that is, the parents’ efficiency in the first period of the analysis.
If b < 2α(1−χ)
nmax
, parents usually choose n = nmax and either e = 0 or e = e
∗(n¯, λ) for
low and moderate levels of efficiency. If z < 1 there will be a single steady-state in λ
for low or moderate levels of efficiency. If b does not satisfy condition (9), the stationary
state will be at λ = 1 with e = 0, and at some higher level of λ otherwise. If z = 1, there
will be at least one steady-state, and up to two for moderate costs. If z > 1, the parents
will always choose e > ecrit if b is very small. For high levels of efficiency, parents choose
e = 1. The economy will grow if z ≥ 1, and will contract otherwise.
If 2α(1−χ)
nmax
≤ b ≤ 2α(1−χ)
nmin
, the result for low and moderate levels of efficiency will be
the same as above, and there will be at least a single stationary state. This steady-state
is likely to be at λ = 1 if b does not satisfy condition (9). For a limited range of parame-
ters, up to three steady states will exist. For high levels of efficiency parents will choose
e = 1 and n = max[nmin, n
∗(e¯, λ)]. The economy will always grow if z ≥ 1.
As noted above, the case b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
is implausible and only of interest in the context of
taxes. It is reported here for the sake of completeness. If the parents’ efficiency is small,
15Parent can always afford e = 1 for high levels of efficiency if b < 2α(1−χ)nmin .
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choosing e = 0 and n = nmax will be optimal, as long as the unrestricted solution w.r.t.
fertility is not feasible.16 Again, a steady state could exist for λ = 1. If the efficiency
of the parents is large parents will have to reduce schooling as soon as the unrestricted
solution w.r.t fertility falls below nmin. As C1t will be negative for high levels of efficiency
for any schooling and any n ≥ nmin, an economy where b > 2α(1 − χ)/nmin can never
reach high levels of efficiency. A steady-state will exist for λ ≥ 1. For z > 1, there will
be up to two steady-states, with the second one always being unstable and the first one
stable.
Table 1.5: Conclusion: Steady-States
b < 2α(1−χ)
nmax
• At least a single, low level stationary state if z ≤ 1 either at λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t > t¯,
or at λt = 1/(1− ze¯) and et = e¯ ∀t > t¯.
• A growth or high-level stationary state with et = 1∀t > t¯ and gλ > 0 ∀t > t¯ if z > 1
and gλ ≥ 0 ∀t > t¯ if z = 1.
• If b and z satisfy condition (24) there will be no low stationary steady-state for
z > 1.
b ∈ [2α(1−χ)
nmax
, 2α(1−χ)
nmin
]
• At least a single, low level stationary state if z ≤ 1 either at λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t > t¯,
or at λt = 1/(1− ze¯) and et = e¯ ∀t > t¯.
• A growth or high-level stationary state with et = 1∀t > t¯ and gλ > 0∀t > t¯ if z > 1
and gλ ≥ 0 ∀t > t¯ if z = 1.
• As b and z can never satisfy (24) if b ∈ [2α(1−χ)
nmax
, 2α(1−χ)
nmin
].
b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
• At least a single, low level stationary state if z ≤ 1 either at λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t > t¯,
or at λt = 1/(1− ze¯) and et = e¯ ∀t > t¯.
• A growth or high-level stationary state with et = 1∀t > t¯ cannot exist, as C1t is
negative if et = 1 for all but low levels of efficiency.
16The unrestricted solution w.r.t. education always yields a negative e for very large costs.
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An economy will therefore grow forever if z is large while the child-raising costs are
very low.17 In all other cases, stable steady states with low, stationary values of λ, that
is, ’poverty traps’, will exist. If the initial level of efficiency is sufficiently high, sustained
growth in λ is possible for all but very high levels of child-raising costs if z ≥ 1. If z < 1,
unbounded growth is not possible for any b and any initial level of efficiency.
Before turning to the analysis of governmental interventions, however, it is of interest
to find parameters such that the economy grows by itself. As this can only be the case if
the child-raising costs are sufficiently low and z ≥ 1, the household’s decision can be easily
modeled: for low levels of efficiency, parents will choose the unrestricted solution w.r.t.
education. With the child-raising costs being low, parents will always choose n = nmax.
For high levels of efficiency, e = 1 and n = min[nmax,
2α(1−χ)β
(1+β)b
] will be optimal. As z is
large, it follows immediately that the economy will grow if the initial level of efficiency
is sufficiently large. If the level of efficiency in the first period is low, but one can show
that the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education always yields e > ecrit it follows that the
economy will grow independently of its initial state. The upper bound for the costs such
that the economy always grows, i.e. e > ecrit ∀λ has been computed in the appendix: if b
does not satisfy condition (24), then e > ecrit ∀λ, and therefore the economy will always
grow for z ≥ 1. For economies with extremely productive education functions, sustained
growth will be possible for a very broad range of costs. On the other hand, if the education
function is not very productive, long-term growth will only be possible for very low costs.
The paths of education and fertility for different costs, efficiencies and z are depicted in
figures 1.6a to 1.6i at the end of the essay. Table 1.5 gives an overview over all possible
steady-states.
17That is, the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education is feasible for λ = 1.
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1.5 Governmental Intervention
Assuming an economy starts with a low initial level of efficiency, three outcomes are possi-
ble: first, if z ≥ 1 and b is sufficiently low, the economy will eventually attain steady-state
growth. Second, if b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
, the economy will reach a low-level stationary state, and
no growth steady-state exists. Third, there is the case where, starting from a low level
of λ the economy reaches a low-level stationary state, but a growth steady-state exists.
In that case, the economy will be ’stuck’ after some periods in a low-level, stable poverty
trap, from which it cannot escape without outside intervention. It is assumed that the
government’s major goal is to induce sustained economic growth, and that it tries to do
so by measures designed to promote higher levels of efficiency. This is only possible in
the last of the three cases named above. As sustained economic growth is only possible
if z > 1 and b < 2α(1 − χ)/nmin, the analysis will be confined to the cases where these
conditions are satisfied: there will always exist some level of efficiency, λ′ say, such that for
all λ ≥ λ′, parents will choose e ≥ ecrit. As soon as the government manages to increase
the parents’ efficiency to just above λ′, it will have accomplished its aim. If this is not
possible in one period on account of zλt + 1 < λ
′, intervention will have to stretch over
more than one period. Without the introduction of a social welfare function encompass-
ing more than one generation, it is not possible to describe the optimal path to sustained
growth in detail. For reasons of simplicity, it is assumed that the government will try
to induce parents to choose full-time schooling as long as zλt + 1 < λ
′ and to choose at
least the necessary schooling such that zeλt + 1 = λ
′ in the last period of intervention.
This simplification makes the analysis relatively tractable, and the policy program that
emerges from it is plausibly a ’good’ one, in the sense that the goal is sensible.
In the present setting, the government can implement both fiscal and regulatory mea-
sures: the classical policy is to reduce child labor and increase school attendance through
the introduction and enforcement of compulsory education. Another regulatory measure
would be to limit the number of children a family may have, China being the most promi-
nent example. There is a broad range of fiscal measures, all of which can be divided into
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two groups, namely, taxes and subsidies. Governmental measures will usually include a
combination of instruments from both classes, with taxes being used to finance subsidies.
1.5.1 Regulatory measures
The impact of a prescribed level of either schooling or fertility has already been analyzed,
implicitly, in the sections before. If n or e is fixed, parents will choose the remaining
variable using equations (16) and (18), respectively in the Appendix. If the resulting
variables are outside their natural ranges, the corner solutions w.r.t. both variables, as
discussed in section 1.3.3, will yield the optimum. This class of measures will not be
analyzed further in this context: historical evidence shows that compulsory schooling is
hard to enforce when the family would experience a heavy loss in income and there are
often not enough schools or teachers. Limiting n by decree would also lead to an increase
in schooling, but this measure would be very unpopular in most countries, and therefore
hard to implement, so we will not consider it here.
1.5.2 Fiscal Measures
Fiscal measures are designed to induce families voluntarily to choose the schooling and/or
fertility the government wishes. It is clear that this class of policies is not without its own
problems: taxes are sometimes hard to collect, they can lead to social unrest, especially
if they impose a heavy burden or if they are perceived to be unfair, and subsidies can
fail to reach the needy through corruption and mismanagement. Some of the measures
analyzed in the following are not free of these problems, but it will be assumed that these
difficulties can be solved. It will also be assumed that the subsidies paid to some families
are financed through the taxation of other families or through grants from international
organizations: a household is either taxed or subsidized, but not both. Therefore the
issue of financing the subsidies and the use of the revenues from taxation, respectively,
will be irrelevant for the analysis of the individual household’s decision. The following
three measures will be dealt with in detail:
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• Lump-sum transfers T f , where T f > 0 denotes a lump-sum tax, and T f < 0 a
lump-sum subsidy.
• Taxation/subsidization of the expenditures on raising children, T b = τbnλ, where
both T b > 0 (tax) and T b < 0 (subsidy) are possible.
• Subsidization of school attendance, Se = sne, where s > 0. School fees (s < 0) will
be ignored.
For simplicity, it will be assumed that only parents pay taxes and receive subsidies, while
the grandparents’ income remains untouched. It is possible to rewrite consumption in the
first period of adult life in the following form, which allows the analysis of each of the
measures enumerated above:
C1t = 2αλt(1− χ) + αntµ(1− et)− (1 + τ)ntbλ+ sntet − T f , (11)
where at most one of the variables τ, s and T f is non-zero. Note that none of these taxes
alters the obligation to pay αλtχ to the grandparents.
18 The impact of these different
fiscal measures on the household’s decision will be examined in section 1.5.2. As the total
revenues which can be raised through each measure and the total costs of subsidizing a
household play an important role in the setup of a program, the different measures will
also be compared with respect to their benefits and costs in the following sections. An
integrated analysis of a program comprising both taxes and subsidies will be developed
in sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4.
Lump-sum transfers
Note first that, the adults’ level of efficiency being fixed, a lump-sum transfer T f will
be equivalent to taxing/subsidizing the parents’ income (τ · (2αλ)), with τ = T f/(2αλ).
Therefore, the following analysis of a lump-sum transfer will also hold for a tax on the
18The normal procedure in analyzing such problems is to write down the lifetime budget constraint,
and then to appeal to the normalcy of goods in consumption to obtain comparative static results. This
is not possible in the present cases, as output is not storable, no capital markets exist and there are two
separate budget constraints which cannot be combined.
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adults’ income.
If a family transfers a fixed amount of money T f to the government, or receives such
a transfer, it will in general change its desired level of fertility or the children’s education
or both. As we have seen, if parents are poor (λ low), they will typically choose e < 1
and n = nmax. If the budget set is sufficiently enlarged through a lump-sum subsidy, par-
ents will increase the children’s education, as a further increase in n is not possible. The
lump-sum subsidy in the first period is partially transferred to the second period through
investment in additional education, and lifetime consumption is smoothed somewhat.
If parents are rich, they choose n ≤ nmax and e = 1. Since a lump-sum subsidy can-
not increase education in this case, parents will ’invest’ part of it in raising more children.
The higher the parents’ efficiency, the lower will be the impact of the transfer. If parents
chose n = nmax and e = 1 before receiving the transfer, all subsidies will be fully consumed
in the first period of adult life.
The impact of a lump-sum tax will be similar: poor parents will rather increase child
labor than reduce fertility, as the returns from education are limited if the parents’ ef-
ficiency is low. Again, this leads to a smoothing of income over the life cycle. If the
parents are rich, educating children is highly productive, so that rich parents will leave
e(= 1) unchanged and reduce fertility, unless raising children is extremely cheap (b ≈ 0).
In that case, parents will maintain fertility and decrease e instead. The impact of the
transfer decreases as the parents’ efficiency increases. If the tax is so large that a further
reduction of fertility is not possible, parents will have to reduce education to finance their
tax obligations. The maximal tax a rich family can pay depends on nmin and b as follows.
If b < αµ/λ (or λ < αµ/b), parents will reduce schooling rather than fertility, until
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reaching et = 0.
T fmax = 2αλ(1− χ) + nmax(αµ− bλ) > 2αλ(1− χ).
Raising higher taxes from such poor families is not possible, as they will start to reduce
fertility in that case, and 2αλ(1 − χ) + nmax(αµ − bλ) > 2αλ(1 − χ) + n(αµ − bλ) if
n < nmax and b < αµ/λ.
For b > αµ/λ, parents will always reduce fertility, if possible, before reducing school-
ing. If nmin > 0, large taxes will force families to reduce schooling, as child labor will be
used to finance the tax and to ensure C1t > 0. The maximal tax they can pay in this case
is
T fmax = 2αλ(1− χ) + nmin(αµ− bλ) < 2αλ(1− χ).
If fertility is given exogenously (nex), the total tax such families can pay is
Tex = 2αλ(1− χ) + nex(αµ− bλ).
As the condition b > αµ/λ is always satisfied for sufficiently large levels of efficiency, it
follows that T fmax ≥ Tex if nex ≥ nmin for high levels of efficiency. Therefore, the total tax
revenues in the case where fertility is exogenous will be no higher than the revenues in
the case where fertility is endogenous if λ is high. In the case with endogenous fertility
and nmin sufficiently close to zero, large taxes will only lead to a strong reduction of fer-
tility, while education remains unchanged, being highly productive: T fmax = 2αλ(1− χ).
Similarly, if λ is low (λ < αµ/b or b < αµ/λ), Tex will be lower than T
f
max if nmax > nex.
If the parents’ efficiency is sufficiently high, they will be able to pay any lump-sum tax.
Ignoring the case where b < αµ/λ, as it is irrelevant for high levels of efficiency, a society
without constraints on nmin will be able to afford higher taxes than a society where nmin
is appreciably different from zero. The ’price’ such a society pays is still very high: rich
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families could virtually die out when confronted with extremely high taxes. Although a
community with nmin > 0 will pay less in taxes, there is still a danger in requiring rich
families to pay the maximum they can afford: as they will finance their tax payments by
sending their children to work, it is future generations who will bear the burden of the
measure. As education can fall to e = 0, efficiency in the next period can be as low as
λ = 1, leading the economy in the poverty trap. It is highly probable that families con-
fronted with such taxes will try to avoid paying them independently of nmin. Therefore,
these cases are mainly of mathematical interest.
Taxes and subsidies on child-raising costs
A tax on raising children can be interpreted as an increase of the expenditures on rais-
ing children b. Its impact on the household’s decision can be derived by analyzing (16)
for n = n¯, (18) for e = e¯ and (19) and (22) for the full corner solutions, while taking
into account that switching between solutions is possible. As in the previous case, it is
necessary to differentiate between poor and rich families, and low and high taxes/subsidies.
Poor parents – who usually choose n = nmax and either et = 0 or the unrestricted
solution with respect to education – will reduce schooling and leave fertility unchanged,
if possible, as ∂e∗(·)/∂b < 0. Rich parents – who choose the corner solution with respect
to education – will reduce fertility (∂n∗(·)/∂b < 0). If the child-raising costs are larger,
the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility will become feasible for lower levels of efficiency
than in the case where b is low, as depicted in figure 1.1. Therefore, even a small tax
on the expenditures on raising children can change the solution dramatically for some λt.
In this case, parents confronted with low costs will choose e ≤ 1 and n = nmax while
parents confronted with a tax will reduce fertility and select full-time schooling e = 1 and
n < nmax.
When confronted with a very high tax on the expenditures on raising children, even
those poor parents who would have chosen n = nmax and e = 0 will reduce the number
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of children. In order to maintain consumption in the last period of life, they will also
increase schooling, to e = 1 if possible. Therefore, a very high tax on child-raising ex-
penditures will lead to full-time schooling, while reducing consumption in all periods of
life and population growth significantly. As in the above cases, it is very improbable that
such a tax can be enforced.
If the tax is not too high and parents do not reduce fertility, the maximal revenue to
be gained from such a measure will be τbnmaxλ, where τ is the tax rate defined in (11).
In this case, the total tax revenue will be identical to the case where a lump-sum tax was
raised, as all variables have identical values for both taxes. The critical level of τ so that
parents do not reduce fertility – that is, U(e = 0, n = nmax; τ) > U(e = 1, n = n
∗; τ),
which means that the unrestricted solution w.r.t. n becomes feasible – cannot be com-
puted analytically. As soon as τ exceeds this level, n will decrease with e = 1, and the
total tax revenue will approach β (2αλ(1−χ))
1+β
< 2αλ(1 − χ) asymptotically as τ grows if
nmin is sufficiently close to zero.
19 If nmin > 0, it is not possible to impose an unlimited
tax on the child-raising costs, so that τ is limited. The maximal tax revenue will be
2αλ(1− χ) + nmin(αµ− bλ). It depends on parameters whether the total tax revenue in
the case where n is reduced is higher or lower than in the case where e is reduced. In any
case, if the parents are poor the total tax revenue raised through a lump-sum tax will be
at least as high as the revenue from a tax on the child-raising costs.
Rich parents confronted with a tax will reduce fertility first. If nmin is very low (nmin ≈ 0),
families will respond to any increase in b by reducing n while leaving e = 1 unchanged.
The maximal tax revenue is β (2αλ(1−χ))
1+β
< 2αλ(1 − χ), as in the case where parents are
poor. If, on the other hand, nmin > 0, parents will reduce e if the child-raising costs exceed
some level. The result for fertility, education and total tax revenue and its consequences
19The term is computed as follows:
lim
τ→∞ τbλn = limτ→∞ τbλ
2αλ(1− χ)
((1 + τ)b)λ
β
1 + β
=
β
1 + β
2αλ(1− χ) lim
t→∞
τ
1 + τ
=
β
1 + β
2αλ(1− χ)
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for future generations will be the same as in the case where a lump-sum tax was raised;
the comparison with the case where fertility is exogenous will also yield similar results.
As soon as parents decide to reduce fertility in order to finance the tax, total govern-
ment revenues will be reduced. Therefore, this form of taxing is not very efficient as a
means of raising public revenue.
If raising children is sufficiently subsidized (τ < 0), poor parents20 will choose e = 1.
Therefore, such a subsidy will yield the result desired by the government. The amount of
subsidy needed to raise e to the level e′ can easily be computed using (16) for the case
where no switching between solutions takes place:
τ =
2α(1− χ)
nb
− αnµ{1 + zλ[e
′ + (e′ − 1)(β + β1)]}
z n¯ λ2 (β + β1)b
− 1
School-attendance subsidies
The subsidy to promote education takes the form of a fixed cash transfer s ≥ 0 for each
unit of time each child spends at school. Therefore the total subsidy a family receives will
be Se = sne. School fees (i.e. s < 0) will be ruled out.
As in the previous section, the families receiving this subsidy are not taxed in any way.
Therefore, (4) will not change, while (3) can be rewritten:
C1t = 2αλ(1− χ) + αnµ(1− e)− nbλ+ sne
= 2αλ(1− χ)− nbλ+ αnµ+ ne(s− αµ)
If the attendance-subsidy per child exceeds αµ, the opportunity costs of education will be
negative, so that families will never choose e < 1. Trivially, full-time education can easily
20Poor parents usually choose et = 0 or the unrestricted solution w.r.t education and n = nmax. If
the subsidy does not trigger switching between solutions, and if it is sufficiently large, they will choose
n = nmax and e = 1. If the subsidy triggers switching between solutions, parents will choose the
unrestricted solution w.r.t fertility and e = 1.
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be achieved if the government, in effect, makes good for the income-loss families would
otherwise experience. It remains to be seen whether there is a smaller subsidy (s < αµ)
such that parents still choose e = 1, and whether this way of inducing an increase in e is
more or less costly than other measures.
Figure 1.3: unrestricted solution with respect to education with subsidies (for αµ = 1/4)
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Analyzing first the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education (n = n¯), the new level of school-
ing depends on the subsidy as follows:
e(n¯, λ, s) =
zλ(β + β1)[2αλ(1− χ) + n¯αµ− bn¯λ] + n(s− αµ)
n¯zλ(1 + β + β1)(αµ− s) (12)
Obviously, e can take any value between zero and infinity for s ≤ αµ, as can be seen
by computing lims→αµ− e(n¯, λ, s) =∞ if b < 2α(1−χ)n¯ + αµλ .21 As the level of schooling
the government wants to achieve is e′ ≤ 1(¿ ∞), it is obvious that there exists some
subsidy s < αµ that will suffice to induce parents to choose e′ in this case (see figure 1.3).
Therefore, even if the schooling parents choose for some (low) efficiency is zero, there will
exist some subsidy s < αµ such that parents prefer e = e′. For high levels of efficiency,
21This condition for the costs states that consumption in the first period of adult life is nonnegative if
children work full-time. If the condition is not satisfied, parents cannot survive in the first period without
outside help even for e = 0. In reality, therefore, one can assume this condition to be fulfilled for some n
for all societies.
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three scenarios are possible. If b ≤ 2α(1−χ)
nmin
and z ≥ 1, parents will choose e > ecrit, and
no subsidy is needed. If b ≤ 2α(1−χ)
nmin
and z < 1, long-term growth is not possible, so that
this case will not be analyzed. If b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
, very high levels of efficiency are not relevant
economically, as parents cannot maintain C1t > 0, even if their offspring work full-time.
The value of z is irrelevant in this case.
Comparing subsidies: the unrestricted solution w.r.t. education
In this section, the total subsidies needed to induce parents to choose some value of e′ ≤ 1
will be compared. The focus will be on the corner solution w.r.t. fertility, as this case
can be analyzed more easily and as the low-level steady state of most economies lies in
this area. Therefore, regime-switching will be left out of the analysis at this stage, so
that fertility is fixed (n = n¯). The problems arising when regime-switching is taken into
account – that is, where fertility is not fixed – are addressed at the end of the section.
It is easy to show that subsidizing the expenditures on raising children and a flat transfer
will cost the same. The total subsidy needed to raise the level of schooling to e′ in both
cases is:22
S1 =
αnµ(1 + ze′λ)− zλ(β + β1){αnµ(1− e′) + λ[2α(1− χ)− nb]}
zλ(β + β1)
=
K1
zλ(β + β1)
(13)
In the case where the government subsidizes school-attendance directly, the total subsidy
required to raise the level of schooling from e to e′ is:
S2 =
K2
zλ(β + β1) + zλ+ 1/e1
(14)
22This is computed as follows: find the subsidy τ needed to achieve the level of schooling e′ for the
unrestricted solution. Then compute τbnλ. In an analogous way, one can directly compute the cash
transfer T f needed to raise the level of schooling from some level e to e′. It can then be shown that
K1 > 0 for e′ > e∗(n¯, λ), that is, a positive subsidy is needed to raise the level of schooling.
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The numerators of both equations are identical (K1 = K2 > 0), but the denominators
differ. As zλ(β + β1) + zλ + 1/e
′ > zλ(β + β1), ∀λ, e′ > 0, it follows immediately that
S2 < S1 for all λ and e
′ > e. That is, the total subsidy required to induce parents to
choose some level of schooling e′ > e will be lower if education is subsidized directly.
This exemplifies the principle of targeting: as a school-attendance subsidy directly at-
tacks the distortion arising from externalities from education, it will be the most efficient
way to increase the level of schooling. Comparing the influence on consumption in the
first period of a school-attendance subsidy s and a subsidy on the costs of raising chil-
dren τ confirms this result: ∂C1t/∂s < 0 and ∂C1t/∂τ > 0. A subsidy on expenditures
on raising children will increase C1t, whereas a subsidy on school-attendance will reduce it.
If regime-switching23 becomes relevant when a tax or subsidy is introduced, no analytic
results are possible. The exact subsidy needed in each case depends on the parents’ initial
efficiency, the child-raising costs and the education productivity factor z, and can only be
computed numerically. Therefore, it is not possible to state in advance which subsidy will
be cheaper. The interventions calculated above in equations (13) and (14) constitute an
upper limit for the total subsidy needed in the case where corner solutions w.r.t. educa-
tion are optimal after the intervention, and the total transfer required can be much lower
in some cases.24
1.5.3 Policy Programs
Subsidizing education for a finite number of periods will always lead to parents even-
tually choosing e > ecrit forever after, if z > 1 and b <
2α(1−χ)
nmin
, that is, if sustainable
growth is possible. The total resources needed depend on everything in the system but
23In the present case, regime-switching caused by a subsidy means that families change not only et when
receiving a subsidy, but also fertility. For example, they switch from choosing the unrestricted solution
w.r.t. education and n = nmax before the subsidy was introduced, to choosing et = 1 and the unrestricted
solution w.r.t. fertility thereafter. In there is no regime-switching, parents choose unrestricted solution
w.r.t. education and nmax before and after the subsidy is introduced.
24Particularly in the immediate vicinity of the point of discontinuity w.r.t. education and n (see figures
1.6a to 1.6i), where the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility becomes optimal, the total subsidy will be
very low.
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an upper limit thereon can be computed as follows: Assuming that the parents’ initial
level of efficiency is λ0 < λ
′,25 let P periods be needed to reach λ′ under the following
program: parents receive subsidies such that they choose e = 1 during the first P − 1
periods. In the last period, P , they are induced to choose the level of schooling eP
such that zePλP + 1 = λ
′. Without discounting, the total amount needed, measured in
units of output, is S = S1 + S2 + ... + SP , where Sp denotes the total subsidy needed
in period p. As subsidizing school attendance is most efficient as long as no regime-
switching regarding fertility takes place, one can compute Sp using equation (14) and
update the parents’ efficiency in any period p as follows: λp = zλp−1 + 1 for all p < P
and λP = zePλP−1 + 1 = λ′. Backwards induction then yields the minimum number
of periods needed to reach λ′. Given the restriction that only the unrestricted solution
w.r.t. education is analyzed, the number of children born will be constant over all periods.
If it is possible to finance the measure from abroad, for example, through loans to be
paid back no earlier than after P periods, or in some other way which does not involve
taxation during the periods in which the subsidy is paid, it is possible for the whole society
to escape the poverty trap simultaneously and in finite time. If the measure has to be
financed through current taxes, however, then whether a successful program can be set
up will depend on the system’s parameters.
The simplest program, in which no subsidies whatsoever are required, is one where poor
families – who would otherwise choose e ≤ ecrit and n = nmax – have to pay a very high tax
on the expenditures incurred in raising children. Confronted with this measure, parents
will reduce the number of children and increase schooling to e = 1. As in the case of a
subsidy fully financed from abroad, it is possible to raise the efficiency of the whole society
simultaneously to λ′ or above. Such a program would not be easy to implement, however,
as it would reduce the consumption and utility of at least one generation dramatically.
If the taxes raised were used to finance school-attendance subsidies, this measure would
25Recall that λ′ is chosen so that parents choose e ≥ ecrit for all λ ≥ λ′.
1.5. Governmental Intervention 45
involve a change in relative prices. Families experiencing such a measure might change
their decision to reduce fertility and increase education.
In the present setting, there are no other programs such that the whole society can escape
the poverty trap simultaneously. If subsidies need to be financed currently, and if this
financing is not ensured by means other than taxes, part of the population will have to
pay for the subsidies while the rest will enjoy them. Therefore, inequality will arise after
the first period in which the measure is introduced. If the process is continued, the effi-
ciency levels of the families so subsidized will exceed λ′ after a finite number of periods.
This group can now be taxed in some measure, and the revenue obtained can be used to
subsidize the poor families. If the tax schedule is chosen such that the efficiency of no
succeeding ’rich’ generation falls below λ′, and if enough revenue is raised to finance a
subsidy for the poor which enables the latter to reach λ′ after some time, the program
will lead to sustainable growth for the entire society after a finite number of periods. The
inequality that arises through such a program – due to fertility differences between the
groups and due to differences in the level of efficiency – will be discussed in the following
section.
1.5.4 Inequality
Consider a society of homogeneous adults, who live in extended families. Assume that
in the first period the entire economy is in the poverty trap, which is the only low-level
stationary state of the economy. All adults’ level of efficiency is low, and households
typically choose the corner solution w.r.t fertility and e < 1. Let z and b be such that
unbounded growth of efficiency is possible, and let e ≥ ecrit for all λ ≥ λ′. As already
discussed in previous sections, taxes and subsidies which lead to switching between so-
lutions are hard to analyze. For simplicity, therefore, we will assume that no switching
takes place, that is, fertility will be fixed in the first stage of the program. In this case,
lump-sum taxes will yield at least the same revenue as all other taxes discussed so far,
and school-attendance subsidies will increase schooling more cheaply and efficiently than
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any other subsidy. In the first part of the program, therefore, a lump-sum tax should
be levied on some part of the population and the education of the children of another
part should be subsidized. The assumptions of assortative mating and extended families
will hold for both groups of individuals, taxed or subsidized. As a consequence there will
be no link between the two groups except for fiscal policy and the enforcement of taxation.
Assuming that the subsidy is sufficient to raise the recipient families’ level of efficiency
just above λ′, it follows that these will subsequently choose e > ecrit, and, after a sufficient
number of periods, e = 1. The new situation is therefore one where two groups exist: ’rich’
families, who usually choose e = 1 and nr ∈ [nmin, nmax] and ’poor’ families, who usually
choose e < 1 and np = nmax. Given the assumption of assortative mating, the inequality
will be persistent, whereby the ’rich’ families’ level of efficiency will rise and ’poor’ families
will be in the poverty trap. Typically, the population growth rates of the two groups will
be different, with nr ≤ np, so that the relative number of rich families will decline over
time. The government might now contemplate taxing the rich families and using those
taxes to subsidize the poor households.
Whether rich families will ever be able to provide a tax base sufficient to subsidize all
poor families depends on several factors. First, the efficiencies of the two groups: the
more efficient they are, the more taxes rich parents can pay, and the smaller the subsidy
needed by poor families to reach λ′. Second, the relative size of the two groups: if there
are only few ’rich’ and many ’poor’ families, it will not be possible to raise sufficient rev-
enue for all the ’poor’. Third, the minimum number of children a family can have. As
discussed in section 1.5.2, if nmin is large, current taxable capacity is lower than in the
case where nmin is very low.
The following simplified example with nmin sufficiently close to zero will illustrate the
underlying problems. Assume that all poor families are in the poverty trap, that this is
the only stable stationary state, that sustainable economic growth is possible for λ ≥ λ′
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and that the total subsidy ’poor’ families need in a given period is S. Rich families – whose
initial level of efficiency is λr0 ≥ λ′ – can pay at most λr0(2α(1−χ)−nrb)− αn
rµ
β+β1
(
1 + 1
zλr0
)
each, while still choosing e0 = 1. Note that, in general, n
r = nmin after the taxes are
levied.26 In the first period, let there be r rich families, so that total tax revenue will be
T (λr) = r ·
(
λr0(2α(1− χ)− nrb)− αn
rµ
β+β1
(
1 + 1
zλr0
))
. If the total tax revenue in the first
period is not sufficient to pay for the subsidies, the inequality T (λr0) < S will hold. The
government has two options: it can either tax the rich families and subsidize a fraction of
poor families, or it can simply wait until the tax base is sufficiently large to subsidize all
poor families simultaneously. We will first take up the case where the government decides
to wait. In the following period, with fertility rates nr for the rich and np = nmax for the
poor, sufficient revenue can be raised if and only if:
nr
nmax
· T (zλr0 + 1) ≥ S.
Obviously, the relative population growth rate nr/nmax < 1 and the productivity of the
education function z influence whether ’waiting’ will ever lead to the government being
able to raise sufficient revenue to finance a subsidy for all the poor. After t periods, the
difference between revenues and spending δ(t) will be:
δ(t) ≡
(
λrt (2α(1− χ)− nrb)−
αnrµ
β + β1
(
1 +
1
zλrt
))
(nr)t − Sntmax, (15)
where λrt = λ
r
0z
t + (zt − 1)/(z − 1). Depending on z and the fertility rates of the two
groups, the tax revenues after P periods might suffice to finance the subsidies for the
’poor’, that is δ(t = P ) ≥ 0. δ(t) is a continuous function in t, with δ(t = 0) < 0 by
assumption. If znr > nmax, it can be shown that limt→∞ δ(t) = ∞ that is, there will be
some period P < ∞ such that δ(P ) ≥ 0. Therefore, if znr > nmax and the government
waits for P periods the tax revenues will suffice to finance a subsidy for all poor families.
In the following period, P + 1, all families will be outside the poverty trap, and the level
26Recall that families in the high-level stationary state normally reduce fertility before reducing school-
ing.
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of each adults’ human capital will be at least λ′.
The government could reduce this period of waiting by subsidizing a fraction of the
poor families in the first period, where the proportion of poor families subsidized will
be T (λr0)/S. As rich parents choose n
r = nmin, the taxable capacity of this group is
reduced in the following period. However, the families which have received a subsidy
in the previous period can also pay taxes if it is possible to find some tax such that
zetaxλ′ + 1 ≥ λ′. Note that this is always possible as long as the level of human capital
attained by the previously subsidized families lies above λ′. The subsidy required by all
remaining poor families is also smaller, and amounts to Snmax(1 − T/S). The period of
time required to subsidize all poor families depends on the parameters.
1.6 Conclusion
In a society where parents decide freely how many children to have and how well to edu-
cate them (as opposed to setting them to work), and also have some measure of altruism
towards their children, the child-raising costs, the social norms that govern the provision
of support in old age and the productivity of the underlying educational process all have
a vital influence. One possibility is that the economy will be trapped in a low-level, stable
stationary state – or poverty trap – in which adults’ labor efficiency and lifetime utility
are low, and child labor is the rule. Fertility will usually be at its exogenously given upper
limit, so that, while consumption and income per family are constant, the total population
grows exponentially. Only if child-raising costs are sufficiently low and the educational
process is highly productive can such a state be avoided.
Escape from this poverty trap is theoretically always possible if the educational process
is sufficiently productive (z > 1) and child-raising costs are not extremely high. If the
government is sufficiently strongly constrained in raising taxes, however – for example,
by the ease with which taxes can be evaded or by the upper limits on taxes imposed by
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minimal consumption needs – it might not be possible to devise a policy such that the
whole society can escape the poverty trap.
When parents can decide only about the extent of schooling, fertility being given exoge-
nously, the range of child-raising costs such that sustainable economic growth is possible
becomes much narrower; for parents have a more limited menu of choices of how to re-
act to taxes. As they can only reduce current consumption, or education, or both, the
imposition of taxes will usually lead to a stronger reduction in overall schooling than
if fertility is endogenous. Therefore, the maximal amount of tax rich families can pay
without falling back into the poverty trap is lower when fertility is exogenous. On the
other hand, the danger of extinction of the lineage is not relevant in such a setting. Poor
parents could theoretically be induced to choose full-time schooling through high taxes on
the expenditures on raising children, a step they could afford by reducing their fertility.
If fertility is fixed, however, the measure cannot have this effect. Therefore, in a setting
where schooling alone is analyzed, the simultaneous escape of the whole society from the
poverty trap is not possible without outside help.
Incorporating fertility decisions increases the household’s flexibility in maximizing its util-
ity and reacting to the introduction of taxes and subsidies. These fiscal measures are at
least as efficient in raising revenue or increasing schooling as in the case where fertility is
fixed exogenously. In the case of policy programs, under which rich families in a high-level
stationary state or growth steady-state pay taxes to subsidize poor families in the poverty
trap, the range of values for z (the productivity of the educational production function)
for which waiting is profitable is much wider if fertility is exogenous. However, with tax
revenues being generally higher and subsidies required being somewhat lower when fer-
tility is endogenous, the number of periods required to lift all families out of the poverty
trap might be lower, even if the relative number of poor families increases.
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1.7 Appendix
A.1 The corner solution with respect to fertility
If the number of children is fixed (nt = n¯), parents will choose the following level of
schooling (the time index t has been suppressed):
e∗(n¯, λ) =
zλ(β + β1)[2αλ(1− χ) + n¯αµ− n¯bλ]− αn¯µ
αn¯µzλ(1 + β + β1)
(16)
In order to investigate the properties of e∗(·), we begin by disregarding the restriction
e∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The shape of the function e∗(·) depends on two parameters: the child-raising
costs, b, and the parents’ efficiency, λ. Analyzing the function at the borders of its domain
reveals that poorly educated parents cannot afford to send their offspring to school, the
same being true for the case where raising children is very expensive.
lim
λ→0
e∗(n¯, λ) = −∞, lim
b→∞
e∗(n¯, λ) = −∞,
lim
λ→∞
e∗(n¯, λ) = sign[2α(1− χ)− bn¯]∞
Consumption in the first period of adult life can be rewritten so the impact of λ and b
becomes clear:
C1t = λt[2α(1− χ)− bn¯] + αµ(1− e)n¯
If the child-raising costs are sufficiently small (b < 2α(1−χ)
n¯
), the term in the square brack-
ets will be positive and λt[2α(1 − χ) − bn¯] will grow without bound for high levels of
efficiency. The term describing income from child labor will then be negligible in compar-
ison: as a consequence, parents will be able to afford to send their offspring to school if the
child-raising costs are low. If, on the other hand, b is large, the term in squared brackets
will be negative, and child labor will be crucial to financing C1t. For very high levels of
efficiency, parents will not be able to maintain a nonnegative level of consumption in the
first period: a negative school-time would be needed, if that were possible.
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With 2α(1 − χ)λt being the residual income of a family after payment of the transfer
to the grandparents, the condition 2α(1 − χ) − bn¯ ≥ 0, has a natural interpretation. If
the condition is satisfied, parents do not have to resort to child labor in order to enjoy
positive consumption in the first period of adult life. If, on the other hand, b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
,
some child labor will be optimal.
Apart from the behavior of the function e∗(·) for extreme values of efficiency and child-
raising costs, the schooling chosen is characterized by its zeroes and maxima, which are
of major importance for the economic interpretation and relevance of the closed-form so-
lution in (16). As the numerator is a quadratic function of λ, one expects to find up to
two zeroes:
λ1,2 = −1
2
αzn¯µ(β + β1)±
√
αzn¯µ(β + β1)[αzn¯µ(β + β1) + 8α(1− χ)− 4bn]
z(β + β1)[2α(1− χ)− bn¯] (17)
For sufficiently small costs (b < 2α(1−χ)
n¯
) only one of these will be positive and the func-
tion will have no extrema. For larger costs (b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
), there will be two zeroes and a
maximum. As the factor under the square root falls with increasing costs, and becomes
negative when they are sufficiently large (b > 2α(1−χ)
n¯
+ αzn¯µ(β+β1)
4n¯
), the function e∗(·) will
be negative for all levels of efficiency if b exceeds this limit. With increasing costs, the first
zero of the function will move towards larger levels of efficiency: the larger the costs, the
less parents can afford to send their children to school, given that the number of children
they have is fixed (e(b) > e(b′) ∀ b < b′).
The shape of e∗(n¯, λ) has been plotted in figure 1.2 for different costs. For the pur-
poses of depiction, the intervals for b that have been established above will be defined as
’low’, ’moderate’ and ’high’. If the function has no maximum and grows without bound
for high levels of efficiency, it will be economically relevant for some levels of efficiency
λ ∈ [max(1, λa),min(1, λb)] where e(λa) = 0 and e(λb) = 1. If the function has a maxi-
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mum, the ranges can be defined using the zeros of the function, as computed in (17). 27
The impact of changes in n¯ on e∗(n¯, λ) remains to be analyzed. With ∂e∗/∂n¯ < 0∀λ, n¯,
it follows immediately that e∗(nmin) > e∗(nmax): the fewer children a family has, the
better it will educate them. As parents do not have to spend so much money just raising
children, they can afford to educate them better. On the other hand, additional educa-
tion is necessary in order to finance and maintain consumption in the last period of life.
Therefore, if a family has fewer children for any reason, schooling will increase. A reduced
number of children increases C1t if the level of schooling remains unchanged, while C2t
will fall. Therefore, a shift in consumption between the two periods is needed, and as
education is the only variable in which C1t is decreasing and C2t is increasing, schooling
will be increased – if that is possible.28
A.2 The corner solution with respect to education
In this case, too, the solution depends on the parents’ level of efficiency and the child-
raising costs as well as the fixed level of schooling.
n∗(e¯, λ) =
−2αβλ(1− χ)
(1 + β)[αµ(1− e¯)− bλ] (18)
For very small λ, the function will be zero or negative for all parameters, while the shape
of the function for moderate and high levels of efficiency will depend on e¯ and the child-
raising costs b:
lim
λ→0
n∗(e¯, λ) = 0, lim
λ→∞
n∗(e¯, λ) =
2β α (1 + χ)
b (1 + β)
> 0
27As it can be shown that the maximum of the function lies below 1 for all parameters, the case where
the function is relevant in two separate sections can be ignored.
emax =
β + β1
1 + β + β1
[
1− 4α(1− χ)− 2nb√
z (β + β1) (2α(1− χ)− bn)nµα
]
< 1
28These considerations are only valid – at this point of the analysis – if the unrestricted solution w.r.t.
education is the household’s optimum. The intuitive argument will be valid for all solutions.
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If e = 1, the function n∗(·) will be independent of λ (n = 2αβ(1−χ)
(1+β)b
> 0), and decreasing in
b. For the value of n to be economically relevant in this case, the child-raising costs have
to satisfy the condition
b ∈
[
2αβ(1− χ)
nmax(1 + β)
,
2αβ(1− χ)
nmin(1 + β)
]
.
If e = 0, n will be negative for low levels of efficiency up to the point of discontinuity and
positive thereafter. In general, the critical efficiency (point of discontinuity) depends on
the chosen schooling and the child-raising costs: λ = αµ(1−e¯)
b
. For extremely large λ, n
approaches a positive value asymptotically from above, since ∂n/∂λ ≤ 0 ∀λ:
lim
λ→∞
n∗(e¯, λ) =
2αβ(1− χ)
b(1 + β)
> 0
For n∗(e¯, λ) to be economically feasible for any λ, the child-raising costs have to fulfill
the same condition as in the case e = 1. An exogenous increase in schooling will lead
to a decrease in the number of children a couple decide to have: ∂n/∂e¯ < 0∀λ, b. The
intuitive argument is the same as in the case where education was interior: An increase
in schooling will lead to a reduction in family income in the first period, and hence in C1t,
if all other variables remain unchanged, while C2t will rise. Therefore, parents will try to
shift consumption between periods by reducing fertility.
A.3 The corner solutions w.r.t. both variables
As stated in section 1.3.3, the unrestricted solutions w.r.t. either fertility or education are
not feasible for all parameters, and full corner solutions must be analyzed. We will first
take up 4Un and then 4Ue in the following two sections.
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4Un
The following condition for 4Un > 0 can be derived:
4Un := U(nmax, e¯)− U(nmin, e¯) > 0
⇔
ln
[2α(1− χ)λ+ α(1− e¯)µnmax − bλnmax
2α(1− χ)λ+ α(1− e¯)µnmin − bλnmin
]
+
+βln
[α(zλe¯+ 1)χnmax
α(zλe¯+ 1)χnmin
]
+ β1ln
[(zλe¯+ 1)
(zλe¯+ 1)
]
> 0
⇔
2α(1− χ)λ+ α(1− e¯)µnmax − bλnmax
2α(1− χ)λ+ α(1− e¯)µnmin − bλnmin >
(nmin
nmax
)β
A rearrangement yields: 4Un > 0 if and only if:
λ[2α(1− χ)(nβmax − nβmin)− b(n1+βmax − n1+βmin)] > −αµ(1− e¯)(n1+βmax − n1+βmin) (19)
As before, b and λ determine whether the condition above is satisfied or not.
If
b ≤ 2α(1− χ)(n
β
max − nβmin)
n1+βmax − n1+βmin
, (20)
the left-hand side of (19) will be nonnegative. Since nmin < nmax and 1+β > 1, the term
on the right-hand side of (19) will be negative or zero. Therefore, 4Un will be positive,
so that U(nmax, e¯) > U(nmin, e¯) for all levels of efficiency if b satisfies condition (20) . If
the child-raising costs are low, choosing the maximal number of children (nmax) will be
optimal for all families when e is fixed.
If
b >
2α(1− χ)(nβmax − nβmin)
n1+βmax − n1+βmin
,
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both sides of condition (19) will be negative, and U(nmax, e¯) > U(nmin, e¯) only if
λ <
αµ(1− e¯)(n1+βmax − n1+βmin)
2α(1− χ)(nβmax − nβmin)− b(n1+βmax − n1+βmin)
.
Choosing the maximal number of children, then, will only be optimal for poor parents,
while well-educated households will prefer having few children if the costs of raising them
are large. The lower the child-raising costs and the lower the level of schooling, the higher
is the critical level of efficiency.
4Ue
To analyze 4Ue, consider, first, the following simplification:
4Ue > 0⇔ (21)
ln
[2α(1− χ)λ+ αn¯µ− n¯bλ
2α(1− χ)λ− n¯bλ
]
+ βln
[ αχn¯
αχn¯(zλ+ 1)
]
+ β1ln
[ 1
zλ+ 1
]
> 0⇔
2α(1− χ)λ+ αn¯µ− n¯bλ
2α(1− χ)λ− n¯bλ >
( 1
zλ+ 1
)−(β+β1)
(22)
Analyzing the behavior of 4Ue for very small and very high levels of efficiency yields:
lim
λ→0
4Ue =∞ and lim
λ→∞
4Ue = −∞
Therefore4Ue has at least one zero or point of discontinuity. For b ≥ 2α(1−χ)n¯ , the function
will have a single point of discontinuity for positive levels of efficiency, and none other-
wise. As all ’goods’ are necessary in consumption, and as the condition b ≥ 2α(1−χ)
n¯
yields
C1t(e = 1) ≤ 0, it follows that et = 0 whenever b ≥ 2α(1−χ)n¯ . That is to say, the children
must then be put to work full-time in order to finance their parents’ consumption in the
first period of adult life.
If, on the other hand, b < 2α(1−χ)
n¯
, parents can afford to educate their children, both
e = 0 and e = 1 are possible optima, and the function 4Ue has no point of discontinuity.
The derivative ∂4Ue/∂λ being always negative for small costs and as4Ue takes all values
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between −∞ and∞, it follows that the function4Ue will have a single zero in the interval
0 ≤ λ <∞.
By analyzing the two cases β + β1 > 1 and β + β1 < 1 separately, it is possible to
approximate the critical levels of efficiency for 4Ue > 0 and 4Ue < 0. If β + β1 < 1 a
simplification 29 of the system yields:
4Ue > 0⇐
2α(1− χ)λ+ αn¯µ− n¯bλ
2α(1− χ)λ− n¯bλ > zλ+ 1
This inequality can easily be solved for the critical level of efficiency:
4Ue > 0 ⇔ λ ∈
(
−
√
αn¯µ
z[2α(1− χ)− n¯b] ,
√
αn¯µ
z[2α(1− χ)− n¯b]
)
The result in the case β + β1 > 1 will be identical. In both cases, the condition for the
critical level of efficiency derived above is necessary but not sufficient. It should be noted
that for extremely large child-raising costs, even full-time child labor cannot ensure non-
negative C1t, with the critical value for the costs depending on efficiency and the number
of children: b < 2α(1−χ)
n¯
+ αµ
λ
→︸︷︷︸
λ→∞
2α(1−χ)
n¯
.
A.4 Potential Steady States: the unrestricted solution w.r.t. e
There are two possible efficiencies such that e∗(n¯, λ) = ecrit:
λ = − 1
2
αnµ[(β + β1)(z − 1)− 1]
z(β + β1)(2α(1− χ)− nb) (23)
±
√
αnµ
[(
αnµ[(β + β1)(z − 1)− 1]2
)
− 4z(β + β1)2(2α(1− χ)− nb)
]
2z(β + β1)(2α(1− χ)− nb)
29The simplification used is: 2α(1−χ)λ+αn¯µ−n¯bλ2α(1−χ)λ−n¯bλ > (zλ+ 1)
1 > (zλ+ 1)(β+β1)
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For the term under the square root to be positive, the costs of child-rearing must satisfy
the condition:
b ≥ 2α(1− χ)
n
− αµ[(β + β1)(z − 1)− 1]
2
4z(β + β1)2
(24)
If (24) is not satisfied, there will be no λ so that e = ecrit for the unrestricted solu-
tion w.r.t education.30 If, on the contrary, (24) is satisfied, the two functions will have
up to two points of intersection, depending on the exact size of b, z and (β + β1). If,
further, the total weight of the future arguments of utility is sufficiently smaller than
that of C1t, that is, (β + β1) < 1, and if the productivity of education (z) is not
too large, then the term [(β + β1)(z − 1) − 1] will be negative. In this case, and if
2α(1−χ)
n
− αµ[(β+β1)(z−1)−1]2
z(β+β1)2
≤ b ≤ 2α(1−χ)
n
, there will be two points of intersection.31 If,
however, b > 2α(1−χ)
n
, the root in (23) being larger than the term before it, only one of
the signs will yield λ > 0, so that the two functions will cross only once.
30Both values in (23) will be complex numbers.
31The term under the square root in (23) will be positive but smaller than the term before it, so that
both signs will yield a positive efficiency.
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Figures: The Household’s Decisions and Phase Diagrams
The following parameters were used to plot figures 1.6a to 1.6i:
α = 1, µ = 0.5, χ = 0.4
β = 2/3, β1 = 1/5
nmin = 0.2, nmax = 10
With these parameters, we get:
2α(1− χ)
nmax
= 0.12
and
2α(1− χ)
nmax
= 6.
As a consequence, the following values were chosen for b and z:
b < 2α(1−χ)
nmax
→ b = 0.1 z < 1→ z = 0.5
b ∈ [2α(1−χ)
nmax
, 2A(1−χ)
nmin
] → b = 0.14 z = 1→ z = 1
b > 2α(1−χ)
nmin
→ b = 6.01 z > 1→ z = 2
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Figure 1.6a: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z < 1 and b < 2α(1−χ)nmax
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Figure 1.6b: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z = 1 and b < 2α(1−χ)nmax
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Figure 1.6c: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z > 1 and b < 2α(1−χ)nmax
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Figure 1.6d: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z < 1 and b ∈ [ 2α(1−χ)nmax ,
2α(1−χ)
nmin
]
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Figure 1.6e: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z = 1 and b ∈ [ 2α(1−χ)nmax ,
2α(1−χ)
nmin
]
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Figure 1.6f: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z > 1 and b ∈ [ 2α(1−χ)nmax ,
2α(1−χ)
nmin
]
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Figure 1.6g: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram for z < 1 and b > 2α(1−χ)nmin
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Figure 1.6h: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z = 1 and b > 2α(1−χ)nmin
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Figure 1.6i: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z > 1 and b > 2α(1−χ)nmin
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Chapter 2
Child Labor, Fertility and Land:
Economic growth in developing
countries
Abstract
We analyze household decisions in a setting in which altruistic parents decide about
fertility, education and child labor. Children can contribute to a household’s income while
young, and, on becoming young adults, must finance their parents in old age. Apart from
labor, the fixed factor land is the only input in production. Multiple steady states can
exist, such as a poverty trap with full-time child labor, a growth steady state in which
all children enjoy full-time schooling and cyclical steady states. In all non-cyclical steady
states, population will be stationary, but output can grow. Sustained long-term economic
growth can be attained through programs of fiscal interventions, even without outside
aid, if the educational technology is sufficiently productive.
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this essay is to examine household decisions on fertility and child labor, and
their consequences for economic growth in the presence of a fixed factor. While economic
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factors like wealth, employment and wages influence household decisions, other aspects
like health, social status, altruism or the households’ valuation of time also need to be
taken into account. Wealthy parents – be the wealth in the form of assets like land or
a high level of education – can usually afford to have more children, or to educate their
offspring better, or both. Depending on their environment, they might decide to increase
their social status by having many children, as anecdotal evidence from Burkina Faso re-
veals. A high level of altruism, on the other hand, will more likely induce wealthy parents
to have few but well-educated children.
In the context of the paper, it is assumed that parents raise children for both finan-
cial and altruistic reasons. Not being able to work when old, parents need transfers from
their offspring to finance their consumption in the last period of life. Similar levels of
income can be reached by having many uneducated or a few well-educated children when
saving in the form of physical capital is not possible. Raising and educating children,
however, involves costs, both directly, in the form of clothes, food and medical care, and
indirectly, as parents spend time caring for their children instead of working. Even if
education is free, sending a child to school instead of out to work involves opportunity
costs through lost income. Altruism expresses itself in several different ways: parents who
care for their children may be willing to reduce their own current and future consumption
in order to spend more time with their children and to finance their education, thereby
increasing the children’s well-being in the future.
In chapter one, we have shown that well-educated parents will typically choose to have
few children, whereby the number depends on the costs incurred in raising them, and that
all children will enjoy full-time schooling. For a sufficiently productive education function,
the adults’ level of efficiency will grow, yielding unbounded growth in both utility and pro-
duction over time. For all but high child-raising costs, population can also grow beyond
any bound. A poverty trap, which will exist in all economies for all but highly productive
education functions, will also yield high population growth rates, combined with stagnant
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levels of efficiency, output and utility. As high population growth rates are not sustainable
for very long periods, these results seem unrealistic, and suggest that there is some factor
limiting population growth when the total population size is sufficiently high. Including
land as an input in the production function is a natural way to limit growth.
The structure of the essay is as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the basic model. The house-
hold’s optima are discussed in section 2.3, treating interior and corner solutions separately.
All potential growth paths are then presented in section 2.4, while section 2.5 focuses on
the main steady states of the economy and economic growth. Section 2.6 discusses gov-
ernmental measures such as taxes and subsidies. A concluding discussion of the main
results is given in section 2.7.
2.2 The Model
As in chapter 1, it is assumed that both parents are identical with respect to their labor
efficiency, and that they raise and educate children in order to increase their own current
consumption and to finance their old age. Education is free except for the opportunity
costs of child labor. All children are treated identically.
In the first period, t = 1, each household is endowed with a single unit of land, owned
solely by the parents. When the parents are old (grandparents), ownership of the land is
transferred in equal parts to each of their grown-up children. Therefore, assuming that
a family has nt children in period t, the land owned by a household in period t, Ht, will
have the following structure over time:
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Period Number of land-owners (parents) Land (per family)
t = 1 N = 2 H = 1
t = 2 N = n1 H =
2
n1
t = 3 N = n1
2
n2 H =
22
n1n2
...
...
...
t = T N = n1 n2 ...nT−1
2T−2 H =
2T−1
n1n2...nT−1
The behavior of Nt and Ht are governed by the following difference equations:
Nt+1 =
Nt
2
nt
Ht+1 =
2
Nt+1
=
2
Nt
2
nt
= Ht
2
nt
If nt > 2 ∀t > t′, total population size will grow beyond any finite bound, and total
land ownership will asymptotically approach zero. For nt < 2, the population size will
decrease, and if nt = 2, then Nt+1 = Nt.
Income is generated through the production of a single non-storable good. Labor – mea-
sured in efficiency units – and land are the only inputs in production. Let the efficiency
of a child be fixed at µ, and denote the adults’ level of efficiency in period t by λt. As
each family consists of 2 identical parents and nt children, the total labor it supplies to
production in period t is:
Lt = 2λt + nt(1− et)µ. (1)
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to
labor, and decreasing returns to scale with respect to land. It is also assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas in form:
yt = αLtH
γ
t , γ < 1, α > 0
or, from (1), and Ht ·Nt = 2,
yt = 2αλt
( 2
Nt
)γ
+ (1− et)µntα
( 2
Nt
)γ
. (2)
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The above assumptions ensure that it is possible to distinguish between parents’ and
children’s production and income. The assumption is necessary, as grandparents receive
a fraction of the parents’ income only, which can be easily determined only if the pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to labor. Note that the
production function permits unbounded growth of output per familiy. The factor α can
be interpreted as a parameter describing the productivity of the technology. It is assumed
to be the same for all households in the same region.
The only active decision makers in the present setting are the parents, and the deci-
sions they make determine the level of consumption in the last two periods of their life,
as well as the level of efficiency attained by their children when these reach adulthood.
As in the first chapter, we will now also assume that parents have perfect foresight about
all relevant parameters in the future, and that α, γ and χ do not change over time.
The parents’ consumption in any period t is given by their income (2αλtH
γ
t ) and the
income of the children (αµnt(1− et)Hγt ) less the costs incurred in raising children (ntbλt)
and the required transfer to the grandparents (χ · 2αλtHγt ):
C1t = 2αλtH
γ
t (1− χ) + αµnt(1− et)Hγt − ntbλt (3)
Given the social rule expressed by χ, their old-age consumption is determined by the
number of their children and the level of efficiency each child reaches in adulthood:
C2t = χ · αntλt+1Hγt+1 (4)
The parents’ altruism expresses itself not only through expenditures on raising children,
but also in the parents’ concern for their children’s future well-being. However, in con-
trast to the first chapter, their well-being does not depend solely on the level of human
capital they attain on reaching adulthood, but also on the amount of land they will own.
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Therefore, we adapt the utility function employed in chapter 1, and get:
U(C1t, C2t, λt+1) = ln(C1t) + β ln(C2t) + β1 ln(λt+1 ·Hγt+1) (5)
The educational technology is identical to the one employed in the first chapter:
λt+1 = zetλt + 1, (6)
where z > 0 can be interpreted as the strength of the intergenerational transmission
mechanism. Recall that the growth rate of the adults’ level of efficiency in a highly
developed economy without child labor (et = 1 ∀t) is then given by:
gλ ≡ λt+1
λ1
− 1 = (z − 1) + 1/λt
If z < 1 unbounded growth is not possible, as gλ < 0 ∀λ > 11−z and therefore limλ→∞ gλ <
0. For z > 1, the growth rate will always be positive for sufficiently large levels of efficien-
cies. If z = 1, the economy will also grow for sufficiently large efficiencies, but the growth
rate will asymptotically approach zero as λ→∞.
Using (3), (4) and (6), the utility function can be rewritten such that it contains only the
decision variables nt and et and the model’s parameters:
U(et, nt;λt;Nt) = ln
[
2αλt(1− χ)
( 2
Nt
)γ
+ αµnt(1− et)
( 2
Nt
)γ
− ntbλt
]
+ β ln
[
αχ(zetλt + 1)nt
( 2
Nt
)γ( 2
nt
)γ]
(7)
+ β1 ln
[
(zet λt + 1)
( 2
Nt
)γ( 2
nt
)γ]
As in chapter 1, the utility function is neither convex nor concave in (nt, et).
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2.3 The Household’s Optimum
Parents maximise their utility choosing fertility and education. For the solution to be
relevant economically, it has to fulfill four conditions regarding et and nt, which are both
bounded: n ∈ [nmin, nmax] and e ∈ [0, 1]. It is further assumed that nmin is sufficiently low,
so that the condition C1t(nmin) > 0 is satisfied for all levels of efficiency and population
sizes, given the values of α, χ, µ, b and γ. To make sure that a stationary population size
is possible in principle, we choose nmin < 2 and nmax > 2. One can therefore formulate
the household’s maximization problem as follows:
max
nt,et
U(nt, et) s.t. nmin ≤ nt ≤ nmax and 0 ≤ et ≤ 1 (8)
2.3.1 The unrestricted solution
The maximisation problem (8) has a unique unrestricted solution. However, as the de-
terminant of the hessian is negative for all parameters, as in chapter 1, the solution does
not describe a maximum but rather a saddle point:
det(Hessian) = − [1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ]
3 µ2 (β1 + β γ + β1γ)
4λ2 (χ− 1)2 (β + β1)
< 0.
As argued in chapter one, choosing a non-linear educational function (λt+1 = ze
²
tλt + 1
with ² < 1 instead of ² = 1) or a Ramsey subutility function for altruism would either
exclude poverty traps by construction or yield complex and hard to analyze solutions. As
a consequence, we defer these two specifications to the third chapter, where no analytical
solutions are required and numerical solutions suffice.
Therefore, the full unrestricted solution being irrelevant, corner solutions have to be ana-
lyzed. A total of eight possible corner solutions can be found in three classes, as outlined
in table 2.1. In the following sections, the household optima will be denoted by n0 and
e0, while unrestricted solutions – that is, the levels of fertility and education solving the
respective FOC – will be denoted by n∗ and e∗. The following sections will present the
2.3. The Household’s Optimum 69
three classes of solutions, and also discuss the areas where they are relevant economically.
Table 2.1: Solutions to the household maximization problem
Class 1: unrestricted solutions Class 2: unrestricted solutions Class 3:
w.r.t Education w.r.t Fertility Full Corner Solutions
n = nmin, e = e
∗ ∈ [0, 1] n = n∗ ∈ [nmin, nmax], e = 0 n = nmin, e = 0
n = nmax, e = e
∗ ∈ [0, 1] n = n∗ ∈ [nmin, nmax], e = 1 n = nmin, e = 1
n = nmax, e = 0
n = nmax, e = 1
2.3.2 The unrestricted solution w.r.t. education
If the number of children a family can have is fixed at nt = n ∀t, solving the FOC with
respect to education yields:1
e∗(n, λ,N) =
zλ(β + β1)
[
2αλ(1− χ) + αnµ− nbλ
(
N
2
)γ]
− αnµ
αnµzλ(1 + β + β1)
(9)
As the parents’ level of efficiency is bounded below (λ ≥ 1), the function e∗(·) has no
points of discontinuity. Its behavior in the limit is as follows:
lim
λ→0
e∗(λ, n,N) = −∞
lim
λ→∞
e∗(λ, n,N) = signum [2α(1− χ)(2/N)γ − nb] · ∞
lim
N→∞
e∗(λ, n,N) = −∞
Therefore, the unrestricted solution w.r.t education will violate the definition of et as lying
in the interval [0, 1] for some levels of efficiency and population sizes.
The higher the total population size, the lower will be the level of schooling:
∂e∗(·)
∂N
= − γλb(β + β1)
αNµ(1 + β + β1)(
2
N
)γ
< 0 (10)
1As the dynamics of the system are not discussed in the present sections, the time subscripts are
omitted
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All families being equal, a large total population is equivalent to the parents’ having but
little land. Therefore, the less land a family has, the less will its children be educated if
fertility is fixed.
The effect of the parents’ level of efficiency on the unrestricted solution w.r.t. school-
ing depends on the total population size: for large populations, where families have only
little land, the child-raising costs will be large as compared to the parents’ income. In this
case, child labor will be needed to finance C1t, and the more so the higher λ is. That is,
the level of schooling e∗ will decrease with higher levels of efficiency if parents have only
little land. If, on the other hand, parents have sufficient land,2 the level of schooling e∗ a
child enjoys increases with the parents’ level of efficiency:
∂e∗(·)
∂λ
=
zλ2 (β + β1)
[
2α(1− χ)− nb (N
2
)γ]
+ nµα
αnµ zλ2 (1 + β + β1)
.
2.3.3 The unrestricted solution w.r.t fertility
For a fixed level of schooling, solving the FOC with respect to fertility yields:
n∗(λ, e,N) = − 2αλ(
2
N
)γ(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)
[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ][αµ( 2N )γ(1− e¯)− bλ]
(11)
∂n∗(·)
∂N
= − λ
2α( 2
N
)γ+1(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)γb
[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ][αµ( 2N )γ(1− e)− bλ]2
< 0 ∀λ,N, e = {0, 1}.
If e = 1, the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility will be independent of the parents’ level
of efficiency. It will only be positive if β(1−γ)−β1γ is positive. Similarly, the the level of
fertility n∗ will decrease with population size if β(1−γ)−β1γ > 0, and increase otherwise.
By choosing β(1− γ)− β1γ < 0, unrestricted solutions w.r.t. fertility would be excluded
when e = 1, while fertility would be increasing in population size for all other values of
e¯ and λ. As one would normally expect fertility to be lower when the total population is
2H >
(
zλ2nb(β+β1)
2αzλ2(β+β1)(1−χ)+αnµ
)1/γ
respectively N < 2
(
2α(1−χ)
nb +
αµ
zλ2b(β+β1)
)1/γ
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Figure 2.1: Unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility for a fixed level of efficiency as a function of N
0 N(n=n
min
)
Total number of young adults
 n*(N)
nmax
nmin
N(n=nmax)
Fertility n*
higher and families have little land, and as we do not want to exclude unrestricted solu-
tions w.r.t. n when parents choose full-time schooling, we make the following assumption
for the remainder of the essay:
Assumption
Assume that the values of β, β1 and γ satisfy: β(1− γ)− β1γ > 0.
Well-educated parents will always have at most as many children as families whose level of
efficiency is low, as the costs incurred in raising children (nλb) exceed the possible income
through child labor (nµα(2/N)γ(1− e)) when parents are highly efficient:
∂n∗(·)
∂λ
= −2 α
2( 2
N
)2γ(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)(1− e¯)µ
[αµ(1− e¯)( 2
N
)γ − bλ]2(1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ)
 < 0 if e¯ < 1= 0 if e¯ = 1
If e < 1, the function n∗(e, λ,N) will be negative for low population sizes and efficiencies(
λNγ < αµ2
γ(1−e)
b
)
, and positive for large N and λ. It is seen from (11) that n∗ is discon-
tinuous for all efficiencies and population sizes fulfilling the condition αµ( 2
N
)γ(1− e) = bλ
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or λNγ = αµ2
γ(1−e)
b
. In the (N, λ)− plane all points of discontinuity lie along a hyperbola.
As the derivatives with respect to both λ and N are negative for all parameters if e < 1,
the function will change sign at the discontinuity. The unrestricted solution w.r.t fertility
can only be economically relevant for sufficiently high levels of efficiency or population size
if e < 1. For e = 1, it depends on the population size alone whether n∗(·) is economically
relevant or not, as can be seen from figure 2.1.
2.3.4 The corner solutions w.r.t both variables
Neither unrestricted solution is relevant for all efficiencies and population sizes, so that
corner solutions w.r.t. both variables need to be analyzed fully to characterize the house-
hold’s optimum. It is therefore necessary to compare the levels of utility generated by all
combinations of n and e at their respective borders. It suffices to analyze:
∆U(n) := U(e, n = nmax)− U(e, n = nmin) and (12)
∆U(e) := U(e = 0, n)− U(e = 1, n) (13)
For nmin 6= 0, it can be shown that for any given level of efficiency there is a population
size Nun such that choosing the maximal number of children can be optimal only if and
only if the total population size is lower than Nun. Therefore, parents will prefer to have
as many children as possible if total population size is low, that is, if they have much land.
If, on the other hand, land is densely settled, parents will prefer to have the minimum
number of children.
The analysis of ∆U(e) is more complex.
∆U(e) ≥ 0 ⇔
λ[2α(1− χ)( 2
N
)γ − nb] + αnµ( 2
N
)γ
λ[2α(1− χ)( 2
N
)γ − nb] ≥ (1 + zλ)
(β+β1) (14)
2.4. Growth paths: a characterization 73
Choosing full-time child labor will be optimal for all population sizes if the parents’ level
of efficiency is sufficiently low. For higher levels of efficiency, choosing full-time schooling
is optimal for all but high population sizes:3 if parents are at least moderately efficient,
they will choose full-time child labor for their offspring as opposed to full-time schooling
only if the family has very little land. The critical value of λ is unique, but cannot be
derived analytically.
The household’s optimal choice of fertility (denoted by n0t (λt, Nt)) and education (denoted
by e0t (λt, Nt)) cannot be derived analytically for all levels of efficiency and all populations
sizes. Both n0t (λt, Nt) and e
0
t (λt, Nt) will typically have several points of discontinuity, so
that the difference equations describing the development of population size and efficiency
over time will also be discontinuous in λt and Nt:
λt+1 = z λt e
0(λt, Nt) + 1 ∀t
Nt+1 =
Nt
2
n0(λt, Nt) ∀t (15)
In contrast to the first chapter, where fertility decisions were independent of the house-
holds’ land holdings, the present system is much more complex. Current decisions do
not only influence the future level of human capital, but also land holdings, and these in
turn both influence future household decisions on fertility and education. Current fertility
decisions therefore have a direct effect on the future levels of both n and e.
2.4 Growth paths: a characterization
Although it is not possible to derive the household’s choice and the resulting difference
equations for λt and Nt analytically, it is possible to analyze some growth paths and en-
suing steady states.
3N > Nue = 2
[
2α(1−χ)
nb +
αµ
bλ
1
(zλ+1)β+β1−1
]1/γ
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Definition
A non-cyclical steady state is a growth path in which et and nt are constant ∀t > t′. A
cyclical steady state is a growth path in which et and nt alternate between some fixed
values, each with a fixed periodicity, whereby that of fertility, cn ≥ 0, does not necessarily
coincide with that of education, ce ≥ 0.
All possible paths are stated table 2.2. We will analyze whether the paths in table 2.2 can
exist in the present setting in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.5. Note that if et is constant, λt can be
either constant or growing. Similarly, a constant level of fertility implies a constant level
of Nt if and only if nt = 2 ∀t. Table 2.3 gives an overview of all logically possible steady
states, both cyclical or non-cyclical, and over the sections in which they are analyzed.
Note that path P7 is a subset of all potential paths in P3.
Table 2.2: Cyclical and Non-Cyclical Steady States
nt = const. ∀t nt alternates (cycle: cn)
et = const. ∀t Non-cyclical Steady state Cyclical Steady State
et alternates (cycle: ce) Cyclical Steady-State Cyclical Steady-State
Table 2.3: Steady States: fertility and education
P1 nt = const. nt < 2 ∀t Section 2.4.1
P2 nt > 2 ∀t Section 2.4.1
P3 nt = 2 ∀t et = const. Section 2.4.2
P4 et alternates Section 2.4.1
P5 et = const. et ∈ {0, 1} and λt = const Section 2.4.4
P6 et ∈ (0, 1) Section 2.4.3
P7 et = 1 and λt grows nt = const. Section 2.4.2
P8 et = 1 and λt const. or growing nt alternates Section 2.4.5
P9 et alternates nt alternates Section 2.4.1
2.4.1 Miscellaneous Paths
Paths P1 and P2
Paths along which N grows without bound cannot exist (nt > 2 ∀t, path P2 in table 2.3).
For if N were to grow without bound, this would yield limt→∞C1t < 0, even if efficiency
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were growing, as can be seen by rewriting C1t as
C1t = [2α(1− χ)
(
2
Nt
)γ
− nb]λt + αntµ(1− et)
(
2
Nt
)γ
.
For a sufficiently large population, the first and last terms will be negligible compared
to the second term, which is negative. Therefore, consumption in the first period would
eventually be negative, even if children worked full-time.
The case where population is constantly shrinking with limt→∞Nt = 0, that is, with
n0t < 2 ∀t, does not exist either; for parents choose the maximal number of children for
sufficiently small population sizes (N < Nun.)
Since paths P1 and P2 do not exist, then whenever fertility does take a fixed value on
some path, it must be nt = 2 ∀t. Similarly, if fertility alternates with a periodicity cn, the
total population size N must also alternate, as N cannot grow or fall without bound.
Path P4
Consider a path along which population is fixed, that is, nt = 2 ∀t, while et alternates
(path P4 in table 2.3 ). Rewriting equation (11) yields:
n∗(λ, e¯, N) = − 2α(
2
N
)γ(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)
[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ][αµ( 2N )γ (1−e¯)λ − b]
Assume that in the first period, we have n1 = 2. As full unrestricted solutions do not exist,
e1 can be either 0 or 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that e1 = 0. As we consider growth paths with
alternating levels of schooling, we must have e2 = 1. For the population size to remain
unchanged, we must have n2 = 2. This condition can only be satisfied if
(1−e1)
λ1
= (1−e2)
λ2
,
or 1/λ1 = 0, which cannot be the case. Note that even if the periodicity of schooling and
efficiency are higher than 2, there will be some period in which parents will switch from
choosing e = 0 to e = 1. Therefore, the above argument will hold for all paths where
population and fertility are constant over time, while schooling and efficiency change. As
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a consequence, cyclical steady states in which nt is fixed and et alternates do not exist.
Path P9
Another class of possible paths consists of those in which population size and schooling
are both alternating with some fixed periodicity. Note that for such paths to be steady-
state paths, the initial state of the economy and the parameters relevant for the household
decisions must all satisfy certain strict conditions. To illustrate the necessary conditions,
consider the following simple example, where both fertility and schooling alternate with
a period of 2.
Denoting the initial level of population byN1, we getN2 = (N1/2)n1 andN3 = (N1/4)n1n2.
As population must take alternate values if fertility does so, we must have N3 = N1, which
implies n1n2 = 4. If fertility is always at the corner, this condition can only be satisfied if
nminnmax = 4, which will be the case by pure chance only. If, on the other hand, fertility
is not at the corner, but takes interior values, the condition n1(λ1, N1; ·) ·n2(λ2, N2; ·) = 4
will be satisfied for specific values of λ1 and N1 only.
If the periodicity is higher than 2, the conditions are stricter still. As a consequence,
steady states in which both fertility and schooling are alternating will not be considered
further.
2.4.2 Growth paths with a constant total population size
In this section, we will analyze steady states in which nt = 2 ∀t. We have already shown
that paths along which fertility is fixed while schooling alternates (P4 in table 2.3) cannot
exist. Therefore, we are left with paths P3 and P7. For a constant level of schooling, and
if parents choose n0t = n
∗(·) = 2 ∀t, as given by (11) in and around the potential steady
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state, the total population size will take the stationary value:4
Nt = N
∗(e¯) = 2
[
α(1− χ)
b
(1− γ)β − β1γ
[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ] +
αµ
bλt
(1− e¯)
]1/γ
∀t. (16)
If et = 1 and nt = n
∗(·) ∀t, the stationary value N∗(e¯ = 1) can be reached asymptotically
only.5 If et = 0 and nt = n
∗(·) ∀t, it is not possible to derive Nt as a function of time
analytically. However, it is possible to find some sets of parameters and initial conditions
for which the stationary population size is reached in finite time.6
As the full unrestricted solution is not optimal, only solutions with e0t = 0 ∀t or e0t = 1 ∀t
are possible if parents choose the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility:
• If the level of efficiency is such that parents choose full-time schooling, N∗ will be
independent of the level of efficiency: N∗(e¯ = 1) = 2
[
α(1−χ)
b
(1−γ)β−β1γ
[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ]
]1/γ
. As
the total population size is constant, and children do not work, output will grow at
the same rate as efficiency, gy = gλ = z − 1 + 1/λt. Two cases are possible:
– If z ≥ 1 and e0t = 1 ∀t, the level of efficiency will grow over time, whereby
the growth rate of the level of efficiency and output both approach z − 1
asymptotically from above. It should be emphasized that Nt = N
∗ ∀t and
gλ = z − 1 > 0 is a steady-state configuration.
– If z < 1 and e0t = 1 ∀t, efficiency will approach the level 1/(1−z) asymptotically.
• If e0 = 0, the adults’ level of efficiency will be unity for all z. Therefore, N∗ will
also be constant: N∗(e¯ = 0) = 2
[
α(1−χ)
b
(1−γ)β−β1γ
[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ] +
αµ
b
]1/γ
∀t. Both efficiency
and population size being constant, the total output of the economy will also remain
unchanged over time: yt = 2(α + µ)(2/N
∗)γ ∀t. The configuration λt = 1, Nt =
4Note that if et = 1∀t, the stationary value will be independent of λt. If et = 0 ∀t, then λt = 1 ∀t, so
that N∗(e) will be constant.
5Rewrite Nt as follows: Nt = N
(1−γ)t
0 · (A/21−γ)(1−(1−γ)
t)/γ , where A = 2α(β(1−γ)−β1γ)(1−χ)[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ][b] and N0
is the initial value. One can then show that limt→∞Nt = N∗(e¯ = 1), and there is no T < ∞ such that
NT = N∗(e¯ = 1).
6For example, if γ = 1/2 and the initial population size is N0 =
2α2µ2((2+β−β1)µ+(β+β1)(1−χ))2
b2(1−χ)2(β−β1)2 , then
n∗(N0, e¯ = 0, λ = 1) ·N0/2 = N∗(e¯ = 0), that is, the stationary value of N is reached within one period.
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N∗(e = 0), et = 0 and nt = 2 ∀t describes a non-cyclical stationary state – a poverty
trap in the full sense.
Comparing the stationary values of N∗ from (16) we obtain:
N∗(e = 0, λt = 1) > N∗(e = 1).
If children are educated full time, the total population size in the steady state will be
lower than in the case where children work full time.
It is impossible to say which of the two steady states in population size will prevail
for which parameters exactly, and whether both are possible for some set of parameters.
We will analyze these issues in more detail in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
2.4.3 Path P6
This section analyzes growth paths with et ∈ (0, 1) ∀t. As the full unrestricted solution
cannot be optimal, this implies that fertility must be at a corner value. Therefore, as
nmin 6= 2 and nmax 6= 2 by assumption, the total population size cannot be constant in
such steady states. As shown in section 2.4.1, population cannot grow or fall without
bound, so that N must take alternating values if fertility is not constant. Denote the
values N can take by N ′, N ′′, . . . .
Two sets of paths are logically possible: first, there are paths along which λt grows
without bound;7 and, second, there are paths along which λt is constant. In the first case,
there will always be some level of human capital, say λˆ, such that e∗(λˆ, N) ≥ 1 for all
values population can take N ∈ {N ′, N ′′ . . . }. Consequently, growth paths along which
et ∈ (0, 1) while λt grows without bound do not exist. Having eliminated this possibility,
we consider what happens when λt is constant.
7Paths along which λt falls without bound are not possible, as λt ≥ 1 by construction.
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Proposition 1
Consider a steady-state growth path with a constant level of schooling et ∈ (0, 1) ∀t and
a constant level of efficiency λt = λt+1 ∀t. The levels of fertility alternate between the
levels nmin and nmax. For such a growth path to exist, the following conditions must be
satisfied:
• The level of schooling is constant in all periods: et+1 = et ∈ (0, 1) ∀t
• nminnmax = 4
• The total population size alternates, with a period of 2, between
N ′ = 2
[
α(1−χ)( 2nmax )
γ
(n2max−4)
2nmaxb(1−( 2nmax )
γ
)
]1/γ
and N ′′ = N ′nmax/2.
Note that if the three conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, they imply a stationary
state in human capital, with λt = λt+1 ∀t.
Proof :
To prove proposition 1 we will construct such a steady state. This will be done by ana-
lyzing the household’s decisions in 3 consecutive periods.
The first period
Assume there exists a vector (λ1, N1) such that parents choose the level of schooling such
that efficiency remains constant over time and e01 ∈ (0, 1). That is,
λ2 = zλ1e
0
1(λ1, N1, ·) + 1 = λ1.
W.l.o.g., let n01(λ1, N1) = nmax, so that N2 = N1nmax/2 > N1, by virtue of the assumption
that nmax > 2.
The second period
For the level of efficiency to remain constant over time (λ3 = λ2 = λ1), the level of school-
ing in the second period must be identical to the level of schooling in the first period:
e02(λ2, N2) = e
0
1(λ1, N1), with λ2 = λ1 and N2 = N1nmax/2. As N1 6= N2, it follows imme-
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diately that the level of schooling can only be constant if n1 6= n2. With fertility being at
the corner, this yields n2 = nmin. From (9) we can now derive a condition for nmin such
that e02(λ1, N1nmax/2, nmin) = e
0
1(λ1, N1, nmax) is satisfied:
nmin =
2α(1− χ)nmax
(
2
N1
)γ (
2
nmax
)γ
2α(1− χ)
(
2
N1
)γ (
2
nmax
)γ
+ nmaxb
[
1−
(
2
nmax
)γ] .8 (17)
In this case, e02 = e
0
1, n2 = nmin, which yields λ3 = λ1 andN3 = N2nmin/2 = N1nmaxnmin/4.
The third period
For the level of efficiency in the fourth period to be equal that in the previous peri-
ods (λ4 = λ3 = λ2 = λ1), parents must choose e
0
3(λ3, N3) = e
0
1(·). If parents choose
n03 = nmin and e
0
3 ∈ (0, 1) in the third period, the level of efficiency will increase, as
e03(λ1, N3) > e
0
2(λ1, N2) by virtue of equation (10) and N3 < N2. Again, a stationary state
with respect to human capital can only exist if the level of fertility changes, that is, if
n3 = nmax, and if e
0
3(λ3 = λ1, N3) = e
0
1(λ1, N1). Consequently, the level of schooling will
remain unchanged iff N3 = N1, that is, iff
nmaxnmin = 4. (18)
Therefore, the first and the third period will be identical with respect to all variables.
The last condition in Proposition 1 can be derived using (17) and (18) with N ′ = N1
and N ′′ = N1nmax/2:
N ′ = 2
[
α(1− χ)
(
2
nmax
)γ
(n2max − 4)
2nmaxb
(
1−
(
2
nmax
)γ)
]1/γ
, (19)
while the steady state level of efficiency can be derived using n01 = nmax, and equations
(6), (9) and (19). Note that if N1 = N
′, equation (17) reads nmin = 4/nmax, and it
8Note that equation (17) will satisfy the condition nmin < 2 for specific values of N1 only. We will
return to this issue at the end of the proof.
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satisfies the condition nmin < 2, as nmax > 2 by assumption.
Therefore, a steady state with et ∈ (0, 1) can exist only if both conditions (17) and
(18) are satisfied simultaneously. Such a steady state is characterized by a constant level
of efficiency and schooling and alternating population sizes and fertility levels, whereby
Nt+2 = Nt and n
0
t+2 = n
0
t ∀t. As condition (18) will only be satisfied by mere chance,
cyclical steady states with a constant level of efficiency, e ∈ (0, 1) and alternating levels
of fertility are knife-edge cases. Consequently, we will not treat them further.
2.4.4 A constant level of efficiency and e ∈ {0, 1}
Having demonstrated that steady states with a constant level of efficiency require that
nmin · nmax = 4 if et ∈ (0, 1), we now analyze whether steady states in λ are possible if
e0t = 0 or e
0
t = 1. We consider these cases in turn.
e0t = 0
Suppose e01 = 0. In this case, λ2 = 1, and λt = 1 ∀t must be the stationary value. Let
S1 = {N1 : e01(λ1 = 1, N1; ·) = 0}, which can be derived using (9) and (14) for interior
and corner solutions, respectively. If there exists an N1 ∈ S1 such that n01 = 2, a fully
stationary state will have been achieved. Growth paths along which parents choose the
unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility have been discussed in detail in section 2.4.2, and we
will now take up corner solutions w.r.t. fertility.
If n∗ /∈ [nmin, nmax], parents will choose fertility at a corner. Assume w.l.o.g. that
n01 = nmin. As nmin < 2, this yields N2 < N1. In the second period, and as e
0
t is non-
decreasing in Nt, there are several possibilities:
(i) The household’s optimum is a full corner solution, with e02 = 0 and n
0
2 = nmin. The
level of efficiency in the third period will then be equal to the level of efficiency in the
first period (λ3 = λ1 = 1), while the total population size will decrease: N3 < N2.
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(ii) Due to the smaller population (N2 < N1), parents now decide to educate their
offspring: e02 > 0 and n
0
2 = nmin. It follows that λ3 > λ2, which violates the
hypothesis that λ is constant.
(iii) Instead of increasing the level of schooling, parents increase the number of children
they have: e02 = 0 and n
0
2 = nmax. Thus, λ3 = λ1, while the population size rises:
N3 > N2.
(iv) If the change in total population size is sufficiently large, parents might increase both
the level of fertility and that of schooling: e02 > 0 and n
0
2 = nmax. Both the total
population size and the adults’ level of efficiency increase (N3 > N2 and λ3 > λ2),
which violates the hypothesis that the level of λ is constant.
Only the first and the third cases can lead to a growth path with λt = 1 ∀t. In the third
case, a growth path with a constant level of efficiency and e0t = 0 ∀t is feasible only if
both conditions
N2nmin/2 ≤ N1 and N1nmax/2 ≥ N2 (20)
are satisfied. It can be shown that there exist levels of nmin and nmax such that the
conditions above are satisfied for some (N1, N2) if e
0
t = 0 ∀t. The ensuing growth path is
characterized by full-time child labor (e0t = 0 ∀t) and stationary efficiency (λt = 1 ∀t),
with alternating levels of fertility and population size.
In case (i), however, if families choose n0t = nmin for a sufficiently large number of peri-
ods, total population size will eventually drop below some threshold, and choosing either
e0 > 0, or n0 = nmax, or the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility will be optimal. These
constellations are discussed in cases (ii), (iii) and (iv) above, as well as in section 2.4.2.
e0t = 1
With schooling at the corner, fertility can be either interior, or at a corner value. In
this section, we will focus on paths along which n0t ∈ {nmin, nmax} ∀t. We have already
discussed paths along which fertility is constant in section 2.4.2, while paths along which
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fertility alternates between values other than nmin and nmax will be taken up in section
2.4.5.
Proposition 2
There exists no steady state growth path with e0t = 1 ∀t and n0t ∈ {nmin, nmax} ∀t.
Remark:
Proposition 2 treats not only such paths along which λt is constant, but also those along
which efficiency is growing, i.e., both paths P5 and P7. As the level of efficiency plays no
role in determining the optimal level of fertility (and hence of population)9 when et = 1 ∀t,
it plays no role whether λ is constant or growing.
Proof :
As can be seen from equation (11), there always exist population sizes N1 and N2 (> N1)
such that n∗(e0 = 1, N1) = nmax and n∗(e0 = 1, N2) = nmin. Note that N1 and N2 will
be independent of λ, as e0 = 1. If the unrestricted solution w.r.t fertility is never optimal
for e0t = 1 ∀t, the following conditions must hold:
N2nmin/2 ≤ N1 and N1nmax/2 ≥ N2 (21)
It follows from (11) that the first condition can only be satisfied if nmax ≤
(
2
nmin
)γ
nmin.
With nmin < 2 and γ < 1 it follows immediately that nmax ≤
(
2
nmin
)γ
nmin < 2, which
cannot be the case, as nmax > 2 by assumption. Therefore, for e
0
t = 1, choosing the
unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility will always be optimal after a sufficiently large number
of periods, which proves Proposition 2.
9See equations (11) and (16).
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2.4.5 Path P8
It remains only to deal with the path along which et = 1 ∀t and fertility takes alternating
values. In Proposition 2, it has been shown that such a path cannot exist if nt alternates
between nmin and nmax. However, paths along which fertility alternates between two (or
more) other values might be possible.
To rule out this possibility, consider a path along which fertility alternates between the
levels n1 and n2, while et = 1 ∀t and λt grows. If these levels of fertility have a cycle
of 2, the levels of population will have the same cycle,10 implying Nt+2 = Nt ≡ N ′ ∀t
and nt · nt+1 = 4 ∀t. It can be shown11 that this latter condition can only be satisfied if
nt = 2 ∀t. For paths with a cycle longer than cn = 2, say, cn = x, it can be shown in a
similar way that the condition Nt = Nt+x ≡ N ′ will be independent of x and can only
be satisfied if nt = 2 ∀t. Hence, paths along which fertility takes alternating values while
et = 1 ∀t do not exist.
2.5 Conclusion: Paths
Ignoring the chance case where nminnmax = 4, and full alternating (cyclical) steady states,
the following sets of steady states are possible:
• A low-level, full stationary state (backwardness), with n0t = 2, e0t = 0, λt = 1 and
Nt = N
∗(e = 0) ∀t.
• A growth steady state, with a stationary population n0t = 2, e0t = 1, Nt = N∗(e =
1)∀t and limt→∞ λt =∞ for z ≥ 1.
• A high-level, fully stationary state, with n0t = 2, e0t = 1, Nt = N∗(e = 1) ∀t and
limt→∞ λt = 1/(1− z) for z < 1.
10Recall that paths along which population grows without bound or falls to zero are not possible.
11Define A = 2α(β(1−γ)−β1γ)(1−χ)[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ][b] . From equation (11) and with et = 1 ∀t we get nt = A(2/Nt)γ ∀t.
Then, the level of N ′ satisfying Nt+2 = Nt ≡ N ′ ∀t is N ′ = 2(A/2)(1/γ), and the associated level of
fertility is n = A(2/N ′)γ = 2.
2.5. Conclusion: Paths 85
• A cyclical steady state of permanent backwardness (λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t), but with
alternating population sizes and fertility rates.
If none of the three paths with a constant population size exists, the economy will evolve
towards an alternating steady state, whereby the maximum and minimum population
sizes and the levels of efficiency reached, as well as the periodicity, depend on the system’s
parameters. In sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 we will analyze the non-cyclical steady states in
more detail, determine the set of parameters values under which they will arise and discuss
whether it is possible for two or more steady states to exist simultaneously.
2.5.1 The low-level stationary state
For the low-level stationary state to exist, it must be that parents choose the steady state
value for education e0 = 0 when λ = 1 and N = N∗(e = 0). A condition necessary, but
not sufficient, for such a path is that parents must prefer full-time child labor to full-time
schooling when N = N∗(e = 0).12 As ∂n/∂e < 0, we have n0(e = 1) ∈ [nmin, 2):
u(e = 0, N∗(e = 0), n0 = 2, λ = 1) > u(e = 1, N∗(e = 0), n0(e = 1), λ = 1),
This condition will be satisfied if and only if:
z <
[
1 +
µ[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ]
(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)
]β(1−γ)−β1γ
β+β1
− 1 ≡ z0. (22)
Therefore, the low-level stationary state will exist if the education technology is insuf-
ficiently productive. The critical value of z, namely z0, depends on the parameters as
follows. If the children’s level of efficiency µ is large parents are more likely to send them
out to work, for ∂z0/∂µ > 0. If the transfer factor χ from the parents to the grandparents
is high, adults will need child labor to finance C1t, so that z0 is high.
The effects of γ, β and β1 on z0 cannot be derived analytically. If land plays an im-
12Recall that full unrestricted solutions are never optimal.
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portant role in production (in the sense that the value of γ is high), numerical simulations
show that z0 will decrease. The intuition for for this is as follows: if γ is high, having
many children – who will then own but little land as adults – is not profitable. Parents
will therefore prefer full-time schooling of a few children to full-time labor of many even
for relatively low values of z when γ is high.
Note that condition (22), while necessary, is not sufficient to ensure the existence of
the low-level stationary state, as parents might prefer the unrestricted solution w.r.t. ed-
ucation to the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility when λ = 1 and N = N∗(e = 0), as
derived in (16), even if condition (22) is satisfied. In this case, the low-level stationary
state will not exist.
2.5.2 The high-level stationary state and growth steady state
A similar necessary condition can be derived for these configurations. However, the level
of human capital is not constant over time, but growing, with limt→∞ λt = 1/(1 − z) for
the high-level stationary state and limt→∞ λt =∞ for the growth steady state. Therefore,
the condition must be satisfied for all levels of human capital on the path, λt :
u(e = 1, N∗(e = 1), n0(e = 1) = 2, λt) > u(e = 0, N∗(e = 1), n0, λt),
that is, parents must prefer choosing full-time schooling to full-time child labor. This
condition will be satisfied if
z >
1
λt
[
1− µ[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ]
(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)λt
]−β(1−γ)+β1γ
β+β1
− 1
λt
≡ z1(λt). (23)
Note that limλt→∞ z1 = 0, that is, if the parents’ level of human capital is high, they
will always prefer full-time schooling to full-time child labor. The higher λt, the lower
will be the level of z1. As a consequence, z1 will take its maximal value if λt is minimal,
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that is13 z1(1) ≥
[
1− µ[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ]
(β(1−γ)−β1γ)(1−χ)
]−β(1−γ)+β1γ
β+β1
− 1. Therefore, the growth steady state
will exist if z > 1 and the initial level of human capital λ0 is sufficiently high, satisfying
z1(λ0) ≤ z. The high-level stationary state will exist if z < 1 and the implicit condition
z1(λ = 1/(1− z)) ≤ z is satisfied.
For low z, therefore, the economy will be typically trapped in the low-level stationary
state, whereas long-term growth is possible for high z. For medium levels of z, the system
can be very unstable, as the optimal levels of schooling and fertility are not smooth func-
tions of Nt and λt but have points of discontinuity: small changes in the initial conditions
can lead to extreme differences in the long-term population sizes and levels of efficiency.
An alternating steady state will always exist if neither of the conditions (22) and (23) are
satisfied.
Both the low-level and the high-level stationary states will exist if z1(λ = 1/(1 − z)) <
z < z0. Similarly, if 1 ≤ z < z0, both the low-level stationary state and the growth steady
state can exist simultaneously. It can be shown numerically that there are sets of para-
meters for which each of these conditions is satisfied.14 In these cases, it will depend on
the initial levels of λ and N alone which steady state will be reached.
2.5.3 Economic Growth
In the present model, economic growth can be measured with respect to three indices:
the adults’ level of efficiency, λt, the level of family income or output, yt, and the lifetime
utility of a generation, U(C1t, C2t, λt+1). However, growth rates for output and lifetime
utility can only be derived numerically in most cases. Therefore, we confine our analysis
to efficiency as a measure of economic growth. Sufficiently large changes in the adults’
13Note that z1(1) can be both larger and smaller than 1, depending on the parameters.
14For example, if µ = 1/2, β1 = 1/5, β = 2/3, γ = 1/4 and χ = 0.4 we get z0 = 0.968 while the
implicit condition z1(λ = 1/(1−z)) ≤ z yields z > 0.671, and both the low-level and high-level stationary
states exist. If γ = 1/5, we get z0 = 1.05, and both the low-level stationary and the growth steady states
exist.
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level of efficiency will always lead to large changes in output and utility for a constant
population size, and limλ→∞ yt(N = N∗) = limλ→∞ ut(N = N∗) =∞.15
For the low-level stationary state, there is no growth: both the level of efficiency and
total population size are constant with λt = 1 and Nt = N
∗(e = 0) ∀t.
For the high-level stationary state and growth steady state, parents choose to have two
children who enjoy full-time schooling; so that the total population size and land holdings
of each family are constant over time (Nt = N
∗(e0 = 1) and Ht = 2/N∗(e0 = 1) ∀t). The
growth rate of efficiency will be:
gλ ≡ (λt+1 − λt)/λt = (zetλt + 1− λt)/λt = z − 1 + 1/λt
as et = 1 ∀t. If z < 1, the high-level stationary state is approached asymptotically:
limt→∞ λt = 1/(1− z).
If z ≥ 1, the adults’ level of efficiency will grow at the rate gλ = z − 1 + 1/λt ∀t :
the growth rate approaches z − 1 from above. As ∂y/∂λ and ∂U/∂λ are both positive,
per capita GDP and utility will grow when λ grows.
In all other steady states and for all other values of z, the growth rate of λ will eventu-
ally be negative or zero. This result holds for all measures of economic growth presented
above. Note, however, that the long-term prospects of an economy depend not only on
the productivity of the education function, but also on the initial conditions regarding the
adults’ level of efficiency, population size and land holdings.
Assume, for example, that both a poverty trap and a growth steady state exist. For
such a situation to be feasible, it must be that 1 ≤ z < z0. If the adults’ initial level of
efficiency λ0 is high, satisfying z1(λ0) < z, the economy will typically attain the growth
15This is valid for all parameters such that Cit > 0 ∀λt, i = 1, 2
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steady state, so that long-term growth is feasible. If, however, the parents’ initial level
of efficiency is low, the economy will eventually fall into the poverty trap – if the initial
population size is not too high. Long-term growth is feasible even from a low initial level
of efficiency, however, if the total population size is very high in the first period. The
intuition for this result is that parents are forced to reduce fertility if N is currently high,
and therefore to increase their children’s level of schooling in order to finance old-age
consumption. Therefore, the level of efficiency will grow (z ≥ 1), while total population
size will decrease.
2.5.4 Dynamic Efficiency
It is a well-known result in the literature that household choices in OLG models lead to
dynamically inefficient outcomes, particularly if there are no bequests or gifts from one
generation to another (Abel (1987)). In the present setting, parents are altruistic toward
their children, but bequests are ruled out and capital markets do not exist. Parents can
only raise their children’s endowment as adults by sending them to school, or by choosing
lower fertility, so that each child has more land. The transfers from young to old adults
do not stem from children’s altruism towards their parents, but rather from a fixed social
norm requiring the young to finance their parents’ old age. Therefore, it is not to be
expected that the steady states derived above will be dynamically efficient.
2.6 Governmental Intervention
In the following sections, the analysis will focus on the case where the only steady states
are the low-level stationary state and steady growth. It is assumed that the government’s
main aim is to induce and maintain growth.
An economy will end up in the stationary state if the initial level of efficiency is low
enough, or if the education function is not sufficiently productive. The danger also arises
if children have relatively high levels of efficiency, the transfer to the grandparents is gen-
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erous, or the parameter γ takes a low value, all of which work to increase z0 as derived in
(22). In all these cases, having many children who are put to work full-time is profitable,
as the earnings through child labor then make a significant part of the total household
income, while the resulting strong increases in the total population of young adults in the
next period have but a slight influence on output per family.
Measures enhancing the productivity of the education function might encompass the con-
struction of schools and training teachers, but also setting up adequate, standardized
curricula and financing teaching materials. Some of these measures are included in the
World Bank Project, ”Effective Schooling In Rural Africa”, which aims at developing best
practices. It turns out, however, that evaluating their impact, both long- and short-term,
involves major difficulties. Formulating z as a function of spending on these measures is
only possible through extensive data collection and econometric estimation, whereby the
results will be valid for specific regions only. A similar argument is also valid for changes
in the production technology, as characterized by γ.
Measures designed to influence µ, the children’s level of efficiency, and hence the im-
plicit wage for child labor, typically consist of either prohibiting child labor altogether or
taxing it – both are unpopular and inefficient measures, as well as hard to enforce. The
value of χ, the social rule governing transfers to the old, can be changed if the government
can set up capital markets. As Ranjan (1999) has shown, child labor can be reduced if
households can save and borrow, which they use to finance either old-age consumption or
education.
As measures designed to influence z, γ, µ and χ are hard to analyze, we will focus on
direct taxes and subsidies. We will assume that only young adults, the parents, pay taxes
and receive subsidies. The government raises revenues by imposing lump-sum taxes (T ),
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which are equivalent to taxing the adults’ income (τ) or land holdings (τ0):
C1t = 2αλtH
γ
t (1− χ) + αµnt(1− et)Hγt − ntbλt − T − τ0 · (2αλtHγt )− τ1 ·Ht
with τ0 = T/(2αλtH
γ
t ) and τ1 = T/Ht as the level of land holdings are given for any
household. Therefore, the further analysis will focus on lump-sum transfers, whereby a
negative lump-sum tax is a subsidy. The only other transfer analyzed in this context will
be a direct subsidy for schooling, whereby each child receives a fixed amount s ≥ 0 for
each unit of time she spends at school. While s is a cash transfer in the present model,
the subsidy could also take the form of school meals like the Food-for-Education program
in rural Bangladesh, free medical service, or other goods or services. As none of these
transfers takes place in the last period of an adults’ life, (4) remains unchanged while
consumption in the first period needs to be rewritten:
C1t = 2αλt(1− χ)
( 2
Nt
)γ
+ αµnt(1− et)
( 2
Nt
)γ
− ntbλt − T + ntstet, (24)
where at most one of the variables T and st is non-zero. Describing the optimal path to
permanent and persistent growth is only possible by introducing a social welfare function
encompassing several generations. However, as the household decision cannot be derived
analytically, and as welfare functions have specific problems like the choice of the tem-
poral discount factor, which strongly influence the optimal outcome, we will refrain from
introducing a social welfare function. Instead, assume that the government tries to induce
parents into choosing full-time schooling until the economy reaches the high steady state.
The government tries to reach its aim through lump-sum transfers and school-attendance
subsidies, whereby each family can either be taxed or subsidized, but never both in the
same period.
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2.6.1 Lump-sum transfers
Assume a family in the low-level stationary state is confronted with a lump-sum tax.16
Families can react to taxes by changing fertility or education or both. Each household in
the low-level stationary state has two children who work full-time, so that a reduction of
education as a means of financing the tax is not feasible. Therefore, parents will reduce
fertility. As λt = 1 ∀t and Nt = N∗(e = 0) from (16) in the low-level stationary state, the
total tax a household can pay is limited by the condition C1t − Tmax ≥ 0,17 that is:
Tmax ≤ 2α(1− χ)
( 2
N∗(e = 0)
)γ
+ αµn0t (1− e0t )
( 2
N∗(e = 0)
)γ
− n0t b.
Poor families confronted with a lump-sum tax choose e0t = 0 and n
0
t = nmin. Therefore, a
household in the poverty trap can pay at most:18
Tmax =
b(1− χ)[2 + (2− nmin)(β(1− γ)− β1γ)]
(1− χ)(β(1− γ)− β1γ) + µ(1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ) . (25)
A family in the growth steady state chooses n0 = 2 ∈ (nmin, nmax) and full-time school-
ing for all children. It will reduce fertility before reducing the level of education when
confronted with a lump-sum tax if the adult level of efficiency is sufficiently high. Only
if the tax is very high will parents reduce e. As was the case for the low-level stationary
state, the total tax families can pay is limited by C1t > 0 only. Rich families can pay the
maximal tax when choosing n0 = nmin
19 and e0 = 0:
Tmax = 2αλ(1− χ)
( 2
N∗(e = 1)
)γ
+ αnminµ
( 2
N∗(e = 1)
)γ
− nminbλ,
with N∗(e = 1) from (16). However, after paying this tax once, the level of efficiency of
the children when reaching adulthood will be λ = 1, so that the family will have fallen into
the poverty trap. The government might therefore prefer raising a lower tax T 0max, so that
16The issues of limits on taxes like tax evasion or minimal consumption will be addressed later.
17As C2t > 0 ∀nt > 0
18Note that Tmax is positive for all parameters as nmin < 2 by assumption.
19Note that for rich families, the condition bλ > αµ(2/N∗(e = 1))γ is always satisfied.
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children still enjoy full-time schooling. As parents first reduce fertility until n = nmin and
only then schooling, T 0max must satisfy the condition e
∗(n = nmin, λ,N∗(e = 1), T 0max) = 1 :
T 0max =
2bλ
β(1− γ)− β1γ −
nminµ(1 + zλ)b[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ]
(β(1− γ)− β1γ)(1− χ)zλ(β + β1) + (2− nmin)λb (26)
Note that T 0max is positive for sufficiently large levels of efficiency.
20
2.6.2 School-attendance subsidies
As families in the high-level stationary state already choose full-time schooling, no subsi-
dies are required for rich households. For poor families, which are in the poverty trap, to
choose full-time schooling voluntarily, a subsidy is required. Note that if the government
reimburses families fully for the loss of child wages, that is, if the subsidy exceeds the
maximal income through child labor αµnt
(
2
N∗(e=1)
)γ
, all poor families will choose full-
time schooling for their offspring. As parents are altruistic towards their children, a lower
subsidy, s0, will suffice to induce full-time education. As switching between solutions can
take place as a response to the introduction of a subsidy, finding the required subsidy
must be done for both cases separately.
If no switching between solutions takes place, that is, if families choose the unrestricted
solution w.r.t. fertility before and after the subsidy is introduced, the minimum subsidy
that induces full-time schooling must satisfy the condition
u(e = 1, n∗;λ,N∗(e = 0), s0) ≥ u(e = 0, n∗;λ,N∗(e = 0), s0),
that is,
s0 ≥ bλ+
[
µα
( 2
N∗(e = 0)
)γ
− bλ
]
[1 + zλ]
β+β1
β(1−γ)−β1γ
20For sufficiently low levels of efficiency, parents would require a subsidy to choose full-time schooling,
that is, T 0max < 0.
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This yields the optimal subsidy for families in the low-level stationary state, which induces
them into choosing full-time schooling:
s0 ≥ b− b
[ (1− χ)((1− γ)β − β1γ)
(1− χ)((1− γ)β − β1γ) + µ[1 + β(1− γ)− β1γ]
]
[1 + z]
β+β1
β(1−γ)−β1γ (27)
It can be shown that parents receiving s0 will always have fewer than two children if
z ≥ 1 and if no switching between solutions takes place. Therefore, the introduction
of a school-attendance subsidy will increase the level of education children enjoy while
reducing fertility and therefore total population size. For all z ≤ z0, s0 will be positive.
For higher levels of productivity, z > z0, parents voluntarily choose full-time schooling for
their offspring when λ = 1 and N = N∗(e = 0), so that no subsidy is required. On the
contrary, even if school fees were introduced (s < 0), parents would still choose full-time
schooling if the fees were not too high.
If switching between solutions takes place, the optimal subsidy s∗ must satisfy the condi-
tion e∗(s∗;λ,N∗(e = 0)) = 1, which yields:
s∗ =
αµ
(
2
N∗(e=0)
)γ
(1 + zλ)− zλ2(β + β1)
[
2α(1− χ)
(
2
N∗(e=0)
)γ
1
n¯
− b
]
1 + (1 + β + β1)zλ
. (28)
Note that the optimal subsidy depends on the level of fertility n¯. The larger n¯, the higher
the subsidy required to induce full-time schooling, as parents need the income from child
labor to finance child-raising costs.
Numerical simulations suggest that switching between solutions takes place for large val-
ues of z only: in this case, education is sufficiently profitable for parents to reduce fertility
to nmin and to increase the level of schooling their children enjoy. If, however, z is low,
parents will always choose the unrestricted solution w.r.t. fertility and full-time child la-
bor, that is, switching between solutions will not take place. For unproductive education
functions parents will therefore effectively forgo the subsidy as long as it is low,21 but
21By choosing n0 = n∗ = 2 and e0 = 0 the total subsidy parents receive is n0e0s = 0.
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receive the full subsidy for each child if this exceeds s0.
2.6.3 Governmental Programs
Two types of societies are of interest in the context of governmental intervention: a ho-
mogeneous society in which all families are in the poverty trap, and an inhomogeneous
society, in which some are enjoying steady-state growth. In both cases we will assume
that both the low-level stationary state and the growth steady state exist. The assump-
tion of assortative mating is maintained. In addition, we will assume that there is no link
between groups with the exception of fiscal policy.
In the case of a homogeneous society in a poverty trap, the government might tax a
fraction of the population and subsidize the rest. The revenue it can raise through a tax
can be derived using (25), while the total subsidy required depends on z. If the proportion
of the population which is taxed is sufficiently large relative to the proportion receiving
a subsidy, some families will escape the poverty trap and eventually reach the growth
steady state; so that an inhomogeneous society emerges.
In an inhomogeneous society, some (’rich’) families, say rt in number, are in the growth
or high-level stationary state, whereas all other (’poor’) families, say pt in number, are in
the low-level stationary state. In this case, the numbers of poor respectively rich families
will not change over time, as all households have n0t = 2 ∀t children. With poor parents
sending their offspring to work full-time, the level of efficiency of poor families remains
stuck at unity. Rich families, on the other hand, will either get even richer over time,
their level of efficiency growing at the rate z − 1 + 1/λt ≥ 0 ∀t for z ≥ 1, or, for z < 1,
their level of human capital will be constant. Therefore the total subsidy poor families
need will remain unchanged, while the potential tax revenues increase over time if z > 1,
due to the growth of the rich adults’ level of efficiency, as can be seen from (26) . Even
if there are only few rich families, these will eventually be able to finance any arbitrarily
large subsidy, if z > 1 . Note, however, that rich families might become virtually extinct
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if the tax burden is high, as they typically finance taxes by reducing fertility. If z < 1,
that is, if no growth steady state exists, the potential tax income does not increase over
time, as rich families do not get richer.
Assume, for simplicity, that one single subsidy, say S, is sufficient for all poor fami-
lies to eventually reach the growth or high-level stationary state, denote the tax each rich
family can pay by T as derived in (26) and assume that the subsidy exceeds total tax
revenues in the first period, t = 0, that is, S0 = S > rT0. In all following periods, S will
remain constant, while the tax revenues will change as the adult’s level of human capital
grows. Rewriting Tt from equation (26) yields:
Tt = X1λt −X2 1
zλt
−X2
where X1 =
(
2b
β(1−γ)−β1γ + (2− nmin)b
)
, X2 =
nminµb[1+β(1−γ)−β1γ]
(β(1−γ)−β1γ)(1−χ)(β+β1) and λt = λ0z
t + z
t−1
z−1 .
Note that if z = 1, Tt will be independent of time. For z > 1, ∂Tt/∂t > 0 asX1 > 0, X2 > 0
and ∂λt/∂t > 0. For tax revenues to exceed expenditures for subsidies, the government
must wait for P periods. P is only well-defined if a growth steady state exists, that is, if
z > 1 :
P = ln
(
1
2
z(z − 1)(X2 + S/r)− 2zX1 +
√
z(z − 1)2[z(X2 + S/r)2 + 4X1X2]
zX1[λ0(z − 1) + 1]
)
1
ln(z)
.
This period of time will be extended if the government cannot or does not want to im-
pose the maximal tax on rich families, fearing tax evasion or social unrest. Note that
inequality will rise during the P periods of ’waiting’, falling dramatically in period P. As
rich families will typically have a higher level of efficiency, even after the measure, than
the households formerly trapped in the low-level stationary state, inequality will again rise.
In the case where land is not an input in production (as in Chapter 1), poor families
typically had a higher level of fertility than rich families. Rich families could therefore
eventually finance a subsidy for all poor families only if the education function was highly
2.7. Conclusion 97
productive (z ≥ nmaxb(1+β)
2α(1−χ)β À 1 as nmax is large and for moderate child-raising costs),
whereas z need only satisfy the condition z > 1 in the present setting, in which fertility
is at replacement levels in both groups before the intervention occurs.
2.7 Conclusion
When altruistic parents decide about the number of children to have and the level of
schooling these are to enjoy, each family’s land holding plays a major role, along with
the productivity of the education function and social rules about transfers from young to
old adults. If the education function is not sufficiently productive and the initial level of
efficiency is low, households will be trapped in a low-level stationary state – the poverty
trap – in which the adults’ level of efficiency is at its minimum, children work full-time
and all families have two children. If, however, the adults are highly efficient, or if the
education function is very productive, such a poverty trap can be avoided. Households
will send their offspring to school full-time, and the economy will grow with respect to
all measures except population, which will eventually become stationary. A permanent
escape from the poverty trap is always possible if a growth steady state exists. In a ho-
mogeneous society, all families can escape the poverty trap simultaneously only if outside
intervention occurs.
Other possible measures – which might be less expensive and more efficient than sub-
sidizing all poor families – encompass reorganizing the education system (that is, trying
to increase z), or changes in the technology employed by poor families, thereby increasing
adult income. Setting up a functioning financial sector which provides even poor families
with access to credits and savings can also reduce child labor, as shown by Ranjan (1999).
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Chapter 3
The Long-run Effects of HIV/AIDS
in Kenya
Abstract
This essay analyzes the long-run economic effects of HIV/AIDS in Kenya, with emphasis
on fertility, education and child labor. Human capital, which is built up through formal
education and parental child-rearing, is the only input in production. Two aspects are
central to the analysis: First, a mature AIDS epidemic causes massive premature adult
mortality, thereby destroying existing human capital and reducing the labor force on a
large scale. Second, the transmission of human capital to future generations is weakened,
as children are left orphaned and surviving adults are correspondingly burdened. As a
consequence, per capita income decreases and communities can less afford to raise and
educate children as they did before the outbreak of the disease. The underlying theoretical
model, in which it is assumed that parents raise and educate children for both financial and
altruistic reasons, is calibrated using data for the period 1920 to 2000. The long-run effects
of the disease, which depend heavily on parents’ expectations about future mortality rates,
are estimated for the years 2000-2040. Both human capital and per capita income grow
significantly more slowly after the outbreak of the epidemic, while the incidence of child
labor doubles for some periods. The level of fertility falls in the immediate aftermath of
the outbreak, but can be significantly higher when the epidemic has reached a mature
phase, depending on parents’ expectations. Governmental interventions in the health
sector in the early phase of the epidemic can strongly mitigate its adverse effects.
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3.1 Introduction
Kenya declared the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national disaster in 1999, 15 years after the
first HIV/AIDS case had been reported. By that time, more than half a million Kenyans
were estimated to have died of the disease, and some 2.5 million adults were infected.
Other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had reacted to the epidemic more than a decade
earlier – notably Kenya’s neighbor Uganda, which had declared AIDS a national disaster
in 1986. Expectations in Kenya in 1999 were grim: the death rate was projected to rise
from 560 persons per day in 2000 to 760 by 2005.1 While governmental interventions
following the 1999 declaration seem to have borne some fruit, and the death rate had
even been reduced to 300 per day by 2003,2 the epidemic has not yet been brought under
complete control.
Most new infections occur among young people, particularly women aged 15 to 24 and
men aged 30 and younger.3 As 70 per cent of all Kenyan children are born to mothers
younger than 30, high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in this age group will strongly affect
the way families raise and educate children. As the parents become ill, family income is
reduced, either because they cannot work or because of the stigma towards those infected,
who have difficulty finding employment. The high costs of treatment further increase the
burden on the household’s income. Children raised in families affected by HIV/AIDS
often enjoy less parental guidance and care, and their education suffers, as they may have
to work to support their parents and siblings. As therapies are often too costly, most vic-
tims die within 8-10 years of being infected, leaving their children orphans. By 2003, 37%
of all orphans were AIDS orphans, up from an estimated 3% in 1990 and 22% in 1995.4
Even the education of those children whose parents are not ill suffers, as their teachers are
often too sick to conduct their classes. The Kenya Teachers Service Commission reports
that deaths among teachers more than tripled between 1995 and 1999, rising from 450 to
1Source: http : //www.standwithafrica.org/hiv aids/reality1.php
2Source: http : //www.aegis.com/news/afp/2003/AF031233.html
3Source: http : //www.unaids.org/EN/Geographical +Area/by + country/kenya.asp
4Sources: 1990 and 1995 figures: ‘Children on the Brink‘,2002, U.N.AIDS, UNICEF and USAID
collaboration. 2003 figure: ‘Children on the Brink‘, 2004, U.N.AIDS, UNICEF and USAID collaboration
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1500 per year.5 On average, 1.4% of all teachers are expected to die of HIV/AIDS yearly
between 2000 and 2010.6
As women of child-bearing age are strongly affected by the disease, and may transmit
the virus on giving birth, the total number of children raised by a family is also expected
to change. Yet only 30% of all women know that taking anti-retroviral drugs during late
pregnancy can reduce the risk of Mother-To-Child-Transmission, according to the ‘Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey’ conducted in 2003. Two different effects are possible:
on the one hand, with potential mothers falling ill and dying and higher child mortality
due to HIV/AIDS, completed familiy size could fall. On the other hand, families might
respond to the rise in mortality by having more children, enough of whom would then
survive to take care of their parents when these cannot care for themselves, either due to
HIV/AIDS or to old age.
Several studies have projected the impact of the epidemic in Kenya, focusing on eco-
nomics, the health and education sectors, the development of the population size or spe-
cific population groups, like orphans or women. While macroeconomic empirical studies
in the 1990s (e.g. Bloom and Mahal (1997)) suggest that the effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemics on the economies of Sub-Saharan African countries are small, more recent work
suggests that the effects on specific countries or regions may be very damaging. Bell,
Devarajan and Gersbach (2003), for example, simulate the South African economy for
the years 1990-2080 and show that the effects of the epidemic will indeed be strong, with
a distinct possibility of a collapse of the economy in the absence of government action.
Arndt and Lewis (2000) use a shorter simulation period, namely, 1997-2010, and find
that both total and per capita GDP are substantially lower in the face of the epidemic,
compared to the counterfactual without HIV/AIDS. Bollinger, Stover and Nalu (1999)
review several studies of the impact of AIDS in Kenya, and analyze the economic impact
of the epidemic on that country’s households, agriculture, firms and macroeconomy. They
5Source: ‘Education and HIV/AIDS: A window of hope’, The World Bank, 2002
6Source: ibid.
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conclude by recommending measures aimed at mitigating the effects of the disease and
emphasise the importance of governmental commitment to addressing HIV-related prob-
lems, and treating the disease as a ‘national priority’.
Bell et al. (2004) employ a three-generation OLG model to simulate the effects of the
disease in Kenya up to 2050. Unlike the South African case, they find that the Kenyan
economy is not threatened with a collapse, but GDP in the AIDS case is lower by about
40% in 2040 compared to the counterfactual without AIDS, and population is lower by
about a third. Kenya’s long-term problems are attributed to three interrelated factors:
first, the ’weakening of the mechanisms through which human capital is transmitted from
one generation to the next’; second, a sharp drop in the productivity of human capital in
the decade following 1990; and third, the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To analyze the effects of
these mechanisms on the Kenyan economy, Bell et al. (2004) focus on household decisions
concerning education.
The purpose of the present essay is to extend their analysis by incorporating households’
fertility decisions, as it seems realistic to assume that families react to exogenous shocks
to mortality by adjusting not only the level of schooling, but also the number of children
they intend to have in the first place. The essay will draw upon Bell et al. (2004), par-
ticularly where the model’s structure and the data are concerned.
The essay is structured as follows: Section 3.2 gives a historical overview and discusses
the data used. The model is introduced in section 3.3, and its calibration is presented
in section 3.4. Several variations of projections of the Kenyan economy until 2040 are
discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6, while the issue of public policy is taken up in section
3.7. The issue of formulating and measuring social welfare in the presence of premature
adult mortality is addressed in section 3.8. The main results are stated in section 3.9,
with conclusions in section 3.10.
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3.2 Historical Overview and Data: 1920-2000
At the beginning of the 20th century, Kenya was a British Protectorate officially called
‘British East Africa’. Inland colonization by white settlers began around 1901, when
the railway line connecting Mombasa and Lake Victoria was completed. By 1920, 9000
settlers were living in Kenya, and by 1950 their number had increased nearly 10-fold.7
Control over nearly all economic activity was concentrated in their hands, and the indige-
nous population was either employed as workers on the coffee farms, or engaged in mostly
low-productivity traditional occupations. Legislation prevented the African population
from purchasing and owning property in the highly fertile Kenyan Highlands and from
taking part in government. It was only in 1944, that the first African became a member
of the Colony’s Legislative Council.8 These inequalities in economic and political power
led to unrest, culminating in the Mau Mau Uprising between 1952 and 1960. While the
uprising was suppressed by British troops, some of the Mau Mau’s aims – like land reform
– were attained in subsequent years.
In 1963, Kenya gained independence, and Jomo Kenyatta became its first president. He
was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi in 1978, who stayed in power until 2002. After Inde-
pendence, several reforms were undertaken, especially in the spheres of land policy, the
educational system, and the political system. Many of these reforms – particularly those
regarding education – can be observed in the time series used in this essay, to which we
now turn.
Decadal data on the economies’ output and demography for the years 1950 to 2000 are
used, as well as data on the average years of schooling from 1920 onwards. A detailed
discussion of the time series and revisions is given in Bell et al. (2004), on which this
section draws. For the remainder of the essay, the round years will be used as time points,
whereby the variable t = 1, 2, 3..., 14 denotes the number of decades elapsed since the year
7Source. http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/africa/nairobi/printable.htm
8Source: http://www.kenyalogy.com/eng/info/histo12.html
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1900, so that t = 10 denotes the decade starting in the year 2000.
3.2.1 Population
During the period of interest, five censuses were conducted in Kenya, in the years 1948,
1962, 1969, 1979 and 1989. The United Nations Population Division, the World Bank (in
the form of the World Development Indicators, WDI) and the Penn World Tables (PWT)
provide secondary data on the Kenyan population and its structure. For the purposes
of the calibration, data for the years 1950-1990 are used, with estimates for the nearest
round date in the case of the Census figures.
The WDI does not report the total population for 1950, and its data for 1960 onwards are
identical to the UN’s, as are the PWT data. However, the population in the PWT for 1950
is higher than both the UN and Census data by 3.6% and 7.7% respectively. Bell et al.
(2004) reconstruct the early part of the series and reject the PWT’s estimates for that year.
Both the UN Population Division and the Censuses provide data on the age distribu-
tion. Except for the first and last group, which include infants aged 0-5 and people aged
65 and older, respectively, all 8 age groups span 10 years, their mid-points being 10, 20,
30, 40, 50 and 60. Age-groups will be denoted by the index a = 0, . . . , 7 and the size9 of
an age group in period t will be denoted by Nat . As both estimates are problem-ridden, a
revised series was derived, in which the implicit age-specific death rates (defined below)
are higher for those 35 and older than those implicit in of the original UN data. As a
consequence, old cohorts are smaller, while young cohorts are relatively larger than the
U.N.’s. Denote the mortality rate in age group i over the period t to t+ j − i, (j > i) in
period t by qi,jt . The age-specific death rate for age group a is defined as the probability
that a member of age group a will not survive to become a member of age group (a+ 1)
10 years later, and will be denoted by qa,a+1t . Mortality rates can then be computed from
9The unit of Nat and of all other population data in the essay is 103.
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Table 3.1: Population Tables
age group/year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0-4 1040 1541 2294 3482 4458 4696
5-14 1606 2317 3371 4951 7182 9006
15-24 1192 1491 2167 3179 4715 6875
25-34 882 1097 1381 2019 2979 4447
35-44 634 784 983 1248 1833 2731
45-54 441 542 677 857 1099 1634
55-64 240 349 432 545 698 911
65+ 125 201 238 351 511 864
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
the population tables as follows:
qi,jt = 1−
N jt+(j−i)
N it
.
In the remainder of the essay, the probability that a member of age group a = 2 reaches
age group a = 4 will play a major role. It will be denoted by κt :
κt ≡ 1− q2,4t =
N4t+2
N2t
. (1)
3.2.2 Output
Both the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators provide data on
aggregate output, with the PWT time series starting in 1950 and the WDI 10 years later.
The PWT contains data on per capita GDP in constant purchasing power units with
the base year 1995, as well as population data. As discussed in the previous section, the
PWT population estimate for 1950 is implausibly high; so that total GDP for that year
is derived using the revised estimate instead. The two series do not differ significantly
for the following years, and the PWT series is chosen, being the longer of the two. As
the purpose of the analysis is to derive long-term effects, short-term shocks to GDP are
smoothed by forming 5-year moving averages. As can be seen from table 3.2, the Kenyan
economy experienced period of fast growth after Independence, but also a marked slowing
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down after 1990, with per capita GDP actually falling. For the remainder of the paper,
GDP will be denoted by Yt.
Table 3.2: GDP in Kenya, 1950-2000
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
GDP (107) 436 642 1089 2014 3076 3633
Average annual GDP growth (%) – 3.9 5.4 6.3 4.3 1.7
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
3.2.3 Educational Attainment
The educational system in Kenya underwent several major changes in the last century.
The Department of Education was founded in 1911, but only 3% of the country’s African
population had enjoyed any formal education by 1925 (Thias and Carnoy, 1972). Primary
education was financed and organised by the communities and missionaries, and no com-
mon curriculum existed. Until Kenya gained independence in 1963, the African population
received mostly technical and vocational training, as recommended by the Fraser Report
of 1909. The Ominde Commission, set up in 1964, led to changes in the schooling system
which aimed at increasing enrolments in secondary education. Up to 1966, primary and
secondary education spanned 8 and 4 years respectively. Primary education was reduced
to 7 years after 1966, but was extended again to 8 years in 1985, with all schools using the
same curriculum. By 1973, school fees had been abolished for the first 6 years of primary
education, following UNESCO’s proposals. This led to high enrolment rates, particularly
so in 1974 and 1979. As a consequence, the government hired a substantial number of
new teachers, many of them poorly trained, thereby possibly reducing the quality – albeit
not the quantity – of educational inputs.
Two data sets are used to determine the average years of completed schooling: the Cen-
suses mentioned in section 3.2.1 and reports by the ministry of education. A very detailed
description of the method is given in Bell et al. (2004), the results of which are set out in
table 3.3. The variable et denotes the average years of schooling of the school-age cohort
in period t, expressed as a fraction of a 12-year schooling period.
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Table 3.3: Educational Attainment
Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Education et 0.047 0.080 0.134 0.201 0.367 0.458 0.520 0.570
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
3.3 The Model
The basic model describes household decisions concerning the bearing and rearing of chil-
dren in the presence of premature adult mortality, for example, due to HIV/AIDS.
As in Chapters 1 and 2, it is assumed that households consist of three generations, namely,
children, parents and grandparents, each of whom is endowed with one unit of time. Chil-
dren divide their time between working and learning, where the fraction of time assigned
to education will be denoted by e ∈ [0, 1]. Surviving parents work full-time, as do grand-
parents. It is assumed that parents receive the income of the entire family, including that
accruing to the grandparents, and then redistribute this income according to some set of
social rules, which are described below.
For simplicity, it is assumed that parents (father and mother) are identical with respect
to both their levels of human capital and their mortality rates. They raise and educate
children in order to increase their own current consumption and to finance their old age.
As investment in physical capital is ruled out by assumption, and grandparents work part-
time only, they also rely on transfers from their children to finance their consumption. A
fixed fraction χ ∈ (0, 1) of the family’s income is transferred to the grandparents. There
are no bequests. It is also assumed that, apart from the opportunity costs of child labor,
education is free. In this assumption we depart form Bell et al. (2004), who assume that
families spend a fraction of their income on schooling. Raising children, however, is costly,
and the better educated parents are, the more they spend on raising their children.
The temporal structure of the model is as follows: When they reach age group a = 2, say
in period t, young adults form couples and decide on the number of children they intend
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to have and raise. They also enter into a binding contract on the education these children
are to receive when they reach school-going age. If parents have perfect foresight about
child mortality and if there is ’replacement fertility’, as in Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach
(2003), then a decision about fertility is equivalent to deciding about N1t , and we will take
N1t as the corresponding decision variable for the remainder of the essay. When parents
are in age groups a = 2 and a = 3 their children go to school according to the decision
made at birth, as stated in the contract; their level of schooling is et, and the level of hu-
man capital (measured in efficiency units of labor) they attain upon reaching adulthood
is denoted by λt+1(et). In period t + 1, the children start working themselves, and have
their own children. When their parents reach age group a = 4 in period t+ 2, they start
receiving transfers from the younger generations. Therefore, the total number of ’young
couples’ in period t will be (N2t +N
3
t )/2, while the total number of ’old couples’ in period
t+ 2 will be (N4t+2 +N
5
t+2 +N
6
t+2 +N
7
t+2)/2.
It is assumed that the efficiency of a grown-up depends on the time she spent at school,
the average efficiency of her parents and the productivity of the educational process [see
Bell et al. (2004)]. If an individual does not spend any time at school, she will attain the
basic minimum level of efficiency λ = 1. It is assumed that adults in the two youngest age
groups (i.e. a = 2 and a = 3) are involved in educating children, and that the educational
technology is isoelastic with parameter ², as in Bell et al. (2004). The children which are
going to school in period t attain the following level of human capital in period t+ 1 :
λt+1 = 2zte
²
t
(
N2t λt +N
3
t λt−1
N2t +N
3
t
)
+ 1, zt, ² > 0 (2)
where zt(> 0) can be thought of as the strength of the mechanism for the inter-generational
transmission of knowledge. The growth rate of the adults’ level of efficiency in the case
of full-time schooling is:
gλ ≡ λt+1 − λt
λt
= 2zt
(
N2t +N
3
t
λt−1
λt
N2t +N
3
t
)
+
1
λt
− 1. (3)
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Note first that the growth rate will always be positive if previous generations enjoyed no
schooling whatsoever, that is,10 if λt = λt+1 = 1. The growth rate gλ will be positive even
for high levels of efficiency if zt is greater than 0.5. If, however, zt is lower than 0.5, the
growth rate will depend on the level of λt : If λt is sufficiently close to one, gλ will be pos-
itive, whatever be the level of λt, as 1/λt is then sufficiently close to one.
11 If the adults’
level of efficiency is growing, however, the term in brackets will be lower than 1, while
1/λt will be falling, so that gλ will eventually be zero or negative. A steady-state in λ can
arise if zt is stationary, with the steady-state level of efficiency being λ
∗ = 1/(1 − 2zt).
Note that in a steady-state with respect to λ, population growth plays no role, as the
term in brackets in (3) will be 1 in all periods when λt = λt+1. The temporal structure
of the population pyramid, however, is important, as it influences the choice of et, and
therefore also determines whether stationary value of λ can be reached.
Income is generated through the production of a single, non-storable good. Labor –
measured in efficiency units – is the only input in production. Let the efficiency of a
school-age child be fixed at µ. Assume, further, that those younger than 5 and older than
65 years of age, that is, age groups a = 0 and a = 7, do not work at all. Therefore, ignor-
ing unemployment, the total labor supply (measured in efficiency units) of an extended
family in period t will be:
Lt = N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4︸ ︷︷ ︸
adult labor
+N1t (1− et)µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
child labor
(4)
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to
labor (measured in efficiency units). Given the long-term character of the model, assessing
the effects of land use in the production function is only possible if long-term data on land
use, development and quality is available. While a data series on arable land is available
at the FAO, and reaches back to 1960, it does not include any information on the quality
10This result is valid not only for the case of full-time schooling, but also for all et+1 > 0.
11For λt = 1, gλ is always positive, as 2zt
(
N2t+N
3
t
λt−1
λt
N2t+N
3
t
)
+ 11 − 1 > 0
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of the land used, and no data are available for the years before 1960, nor are projections
for the future. Assessing the quality of the arable land, however, is extremely important in
Kenya, as it is highly inhomogeneous: more than 80% of the total land area are semi-arid
or arid, and cannot be used for agriculture, while about 12% are humid, and therefore
highly suitable for growing crops. Furthermore, the UN Population Division estimates12
that the rural population, that is, that part of the workforce which needs land to produce
output, will stay virtually constant after 1990 (growing by 0.6% per year after 1990,
compared to nearly 5% p.a. for the urban population), so that per capita land use in the
agricultural sector will also remain unchanged, even if the population grows. Therefore
we choose a production function where labor is the only input. With (4), this yields the
total output in period t:
Yt ≡ αtLt (5)
= αt(N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4 +N
1
t (1− et)µ),
The factor αt > 0, which denotes the amount of output produced with one unit of efficient
labor, describes the general level of economic productivity. It can change over time, for
example, as a result of economic policy.
The only active decision-makers in the present setting are the (young) parents, and the
decisions they make determine their level of consumption in the last phase of life, as well
as the level of efficiency their offspring will attain as adults. For simplicity, assume that
the parents’ decisions do not influence mortality rates.
Assume that raising infants is free, so that the level of consumption of a family which has
infants only is not influenced by their fertility decisions. Therefore, when making fertility
decisions in period t, parents, who are in age groups a = 2, 3 consider their (expected)
level of consumption while their children are going to school (denoted by c1, t) and later,
12Source: Online Database at http://www.un.org/popin/data.html
3.3. The Model 110
when they themselves are old, whereby only consumption in the first period of old age
is considered for simplicity (denoted by c2, t+2). The adults also possess altruism, which
expresses itself not only through the expenditures on educating and raising children, but
also in their concern for the children’s future welfare. For simplicity, it is further assumed
that the utility function is additively separable, whereby the level of utility of adults who
die prematurely is normalized to zero. Following Bell et al. (2004), we choose the form:
EtU(c1, t, c2, t+2, et, N
1
t ) = β0ln(c1, t) + β1κtln(c2, t+2) +
2N1t κt+1
N2t +N
3
t
(
1− λt+1(et)
−η
η
)
(6)
where κt+k, k = 0, 1 is the parents’ subjective estimate thereof at time t.
Note that by choosing
φ =
2N1t κt+1
N2t +N
3
t
(
1− λt+1(et)
−η
η
)
as the subutility function with respect to altruism and the education production function
in (2), equilibria with λt = 1 and et = 0 ∀t (poverty traps) are excluded by construction if
² < 1. To see this, differentiate the subutility function with respect to et+1, and evaluate
this derivative for et = 0:
lim
et→0
∂φ
∂et
=∞ ∀² < 1, ∀η.
As will be shown in the following section, the model can only be calibrated by choosing
² < 1, so that poverty traps are indeed excluded. The step in the calibration needed to
determine ² is independent of the choice of functional form for preferences, so that the
result ² < 1 will be valid even if the utility function took a different form. Therefore, as
long as the subutility function satisfies the condition limet→0
∂φ
∂et
= limet→0
∂φ
∂λt+2
∂λt+2
∂et
=
limet→0
∂λt+1
∂et
=∞, no poverty trap will exist. Stationary equilibria with respect to λ, how-
ever, can still exist if the parents’ choice of schooling and fertility satisfies the condition
λ = 2ztet(λ,N
2
t , N
3
t , . . . )
²λ+ 1 ∀t. Note, however, that this also implies some kind of equi-
librium with respect to population, so that et(λ,N
2
t , N
3
t , . . . ) = et+1(λ,N
2
t+1, N
3
t+1, . . . ) ∀t,
which seems unlikely.
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Consider a family that raises N1t children in period t. Each pair of adults in the groups
a = 2, 3 receives the same fraction of the family’s total income:
Yt
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
=
2αt(N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4)
N2t +N
3
t
+
2N1t (1− et)µαt
N2t +N
3
t
.
A fixed fraction χ ∈ [0, 1] of the total output produced by adults is allocated to the
grandparents (a = 5, 6, 7), who consume it. Assume that each child consumes bλt+1
units per decade, as in Chapters 1 and 2. Then the consumption of a couple in age groups
a = 2, 3 in period t is:
c1,t = 2αt(1− χ)(N
2
t λt +N
3
t λt−1 +N
4
t λt−2 +N
5
t λt−3 +N
6
t λt−4)
N2t +N
3
t
+ 2αt(1− et)µ N
1
t
N2t +N
3
t
(7)
− 2bλt N
1
t
N2t +N
3
t
.
The share χ is divided equally among all old members of the family:
c2,t+2 = 2αt+2χ · (N
2
t+2λt+2 +N
3
t+2λt+1 +N
4
t+2λt +N
5
t+2λt−1 +N
6
t+2λt−2)
N4t+2 +N
5
t+2 +N
6
t+2 +N
7
t+2
. (8)
When deciding about N1t and et parents can observe all relevant historical and current
values of N, λ and e, particularly λt and et, and the mortality rates in period t. They also
form expectations about future mortality rates, and hence expectations about Nat+k for
a = 2, . . . , 7, and k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Assume that parents have perfect foresight about all the qi,jt in all future periods t +
1, t + 2, . . . . They can also observe or deduce the levels of efficiency λt−2, λt−1 and λt
associated with age groups a = 5 and a = 6 in period t+2. All the other values needed to
determine c2, t+2, namely, N
2
t+2 and N
3
t+2 as well as λt+2 are unknown. The level of N
3
t+2
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can be determined from N1t , which is endogenous, using N
3
t+2 = (1 − q1,3t )N1t . Similarly,
N2t+2 = N
1
t+1(1− q1,2t+1). However, the level of N1t+1 is not known to the parents when they
make their decisions. Therefore, parents must make conjectures about the future number
of school-going children and about et+1, which will determine λt+2. Given the complexity
of this structure, assume that parents use a simplifying rule: they expect the level of
schooling to be stationary:
Etet+1 = et, (9)
and the number of school-age children raised by couples in a = 2 and a = 3 in period t+1
to be stationary too:
Et
(
2N1t+1
N2t+1 +N
3
t+1
)
=
2N1t
N2t +N
3
t
⇔ EtN1t+1 = N1t ·
N2t+1 +N
3
t+1
N2t +N
3
t
≡ N1t θt (10)
Note that N2t+1 appears in θt, which is endogenous, as N
2
t+1 = N
1
t (1− q1,2t ). For simplicity,
however, the ratio θt will be computed from the population tables (e.g. table 3.1). In
making these assumptions, parents regard both et+1 and N
1
t+1 as given: that is, when
determining N1t and et, they will ignore the influences these have on N
2
t+2 and λt+2, re-
spectively, under the above assumptions about stationarity.
Using (2), (7) and (8), the couple’s expected utility can be rewritten as a function of
N1t and et as well as Etet+1 and EtN
1
t+1 alone. Its optimization problem at time t is then
formulated as follows:
max
et,N1t
EtU(et, N
1
t ;Etet+1, EtN
1
t+1, ·) subject to Nmin ≤ N1t ≤ Nmax (11)
and 0 ≤ et ≤ 1
This yields two first-order conditions as functions of Etet+1 and EtN
1
t+1:
∂EtU(·;Etet+1, EtN1t+1)
∂N1t
and
∂EtU(·;Etet+1, EtN1t+1)
∂et
.
3.4. Calibration 113
Together with (9) and (10) these yield, for an interior solution,
∂EtU(·)
∂N1t
∣∣∣∣
Etet+1=et,EtN1t+1=N
1
t θt
= 0 and
∂EtU(·)
∂et
∣∣∣∣
Etet+1=et,EtN1t+1=N
1
t θt
= 0, (12)
which, in turn, yield the optimal levels of N1t and et.
Note that in the present setup, there is no time-inconsistency regarding the parents’
decisions about et, as their expectations about mortality rates are correct by assumption
if there is no HIV/AIDS shock. That is, when their children reach school-going age,
parents have no incentives to depart from the binding contract on et which they made at
child-birth. If, however, the parents’ expectations about mortality rates prove to be incor-
rect, that is, if there is an unexpected mortality shock like the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic after the children are born but before they reach school-going age, it is unlikely
that the contractual level of et is still optimal, from the parents’ point of view. Therefore,
et might be open to renegotiation, an issue which will be addressed in section 3.5.3.
3.4 Calibration
The model presented in the previous section is calibrated to the data from section 3.2.
The data on output, population and education can be used to derive the adult’s level of
efficiency λt in each past generation, the children’s level of efficiency µ, the factors ², zt
and αt, which characterize the education and production functions, respectively, the social
rules governing transfers to the old and to children, χ and b, and the parameters of the
subutility functions, β0, β1 and η. This will be done in two steps: first, national aggregates
will be used to compute ², µ, zt, αt and λt. Second, the calibration of preferences will yield
the values of β0, β1, b, χ and η.
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Step 1
The first step of the calibration is identical to the one employed in Bell et al. (2004). As
noted in section 3.2.3, only 3% of all adult Africans had enjoyed any education by 1925.
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that in 1910, before the Department of Education was
established, the general population had no education at all and their level of efficiency
was λ1 = 1, that is, the minimum possible. Following Bell et al. (2004), λ2 is set to 1.01.
Using this as an initial condition and equation (2) yields a set of 8 equations describing
the dynamics of the adults’ level of efficiency:
λt = 2zt−1e²t−1
(
N2t−1λt−1 +N
3
t−1λt−2
N2t−1 +N
3
t−1
)
+ 1, t = 3, . . . , 10 (13)
While no data on e10 are available yet, it seems reasonable to assume e10 = 0.621 (see
Bell et al. [2004]). The second condition used in the calibration gives the age groups’
contribution to GDP, as stated in equation (5):
Yt = αt(N
2
t λt+N
3
t λt−1+N
4
t λt−2+N
5
t λt−3+N
6
t λt−4+N
1
t (1− et)µ), t = 5, . . . , 10 (14)
The system described by (13) and (14) consists of 14 equations and 24 unknowns: αt for
t = 5, . . . , 10, λt and zt for t = 3, . . . , 10 as well as µ and ², which are assumed to have
stayed constant over time. As the system is underdetermined, solving it is only possible
by making assumptions about the values of some of the variables.
Beginning with 1940, adults had enjoyed at least one year of schooling on average (see
table 3.3), which suggests that the measures undertaken in the education sector in the
early phase of the century had started to bear fruit. Therefore, the first shift in zt is
assumed to have taken place in 1940. The second shift came after Kenya abolished school
fees and reformed the educational system, that is, for the decade starting 1980. While
per capita GDP grew until 1990, it started to fall thereafter. Hence, we assume that α
stayed constant until t = 9, and dropped once, in t = 10. With these assumptions, the
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total of 14 variables associated with zt and αt is reduced to 5:
z2 = z3, z4 = z5 = z6 = z7, z8 = z9 = z10
α5 = α6 = α7 = α8 = α9, α10
To anchor the system, it is still necessary to choose one more variable. To simplify the
calculation, ² is chosen exogenously, as the equations are linear in all other parameters.
Solutions where ² < 0.49 or ² > 0.62 are not considered, as they yield either negative
values of one of the parameters, or µ > 1, that is, the labor efficiency of a child is higher
than that of an adult who did not enjoy any schooling. The exact value of ² chosen should
reflect the parents’ decisions regarding schooling. As these decisions are determined by
their preferences, we now turn to their calibration.
Table 3.4: Households’ choices of et and N1t
Year 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
et 0.047 0.080 0.134 0.201 0.367 0.458 0.520 0.570
N1t 1606 2317 3371 4951 7182
2N1t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) 1.55 1.79 1.90 1.91 1.87
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Step 2
Table 3.4 presents the households’ decisions concerning education and fertility for the
years 1950 to 1990. As can be seen, an interior solution existed during the whole period13
and the two conditions in (12) can be used to recover the preference parameters. For
any given value of ² and ensuing values of µ, λt, zt and αt, five parameters need to be
determined through a calibration of the preferences, namely, η, χ, b, β0 and β1. For com-
putational reasons, solving the system is only possible if one chooses η exogenously, using
a grid search method. The other variables are calibrated using (12) for the years 1970 and
1990. A plethora of results exists for the different values of ² and η: from all the possible
13If the household decisions were corner solutions, this would imply that the social rule onNmin required
each family to raise at least 1.55 children. As such a high value of Nmin is rather restrictive, it seems
reasonable to assume that 1.55 children per family, as raised in 1950, constitutes an interior solution.
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results, one with β0/β1 ≈ 1 and c1,t=9/c2,t=9 ≈ 1 is chosen. That is, it is assumed that
families choose a fairly smooth path of consumption in the two periods of life, apart from
the eventuality of premature death, which is captured by the term κt+1 in (6). The results
of the calibration are set out in table 3.5. If ² < 0.49, the calibration yields µ > 1, that is,
Table 3.5: Calibration Results
Exogenous:
² = 0.5 η = 1
Endogenous:
µ = 0.962 χ = 0.237 b = 267.32
β0 = 4.847 β1 = 3.776
t λt zt αt
2 1.01 1.3724 –
3 1.5991 1.3724 –
4 2.0442 0.9425 –
5 2.2759 0.9425 585
6 2.8436 0.9425 585
7 3.9729 0.9425 585
8 5.5084 0.4938 585
9 4.4967 0.4938 585
10 4.6451 0.4938 481
a child’s level of labor efficiency is higher than that of an adult who enjoyed no schooling
whatsoever, which is not realistic. If ² > 0.51 or η /∈ [0.99, 1.02], there are no results
with β0/β1 ≈ 1 and c1,t=9/c2,t=9 ≈ 1. Therefore, the calibration only yields desirable re-
sults if η ∈ [0.99, 1.01] and ² ∈ [0.49, 0.51], and we choose the midpoints η = 1 and ² = 0.5.
The ratio β0/β1 ≈ 0.8 implies a rate of pure impatience to consume, independently o
premature mortality, of about 1.2% per annum. Nearly one fourth of the adults’ total
income in any given period is transferred to the old (χ = 0.237), a ratio which corresponds
roughly to the grandparents’ share of the population ((N4t +N
5
t +N
6
t +N
7
t )/
∑7
a=0N
a
t ≈
0.2 for t ≤ 9). A child’s level of labor efficiency lies slightly below the level of human
capital of an adult who did not receive schooling, µ = 0.962, by way of comparison, the
adults’ level of efficiency when the epidemic broke out in 1990 was nearly five times higher.
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There were two sharp falls in the efficiency associated with the educational technology,
one in the 1930s and another in the 1970s, after the Kenyan government had started to
reform the school system yet again. The transmission factor zt fell by nearly 50% during
the 1970s, and settled at a value just below 0.5, which implies the existence of a steady
state in the adult level of efficiency with full-time schooling and λ∗ = 1/(1 − 2z) ≈ 81.
With zt sharply reduced, the growth rate of λ slows too; indeed, the young adults’ level of
efficiency falls between 1980 and 1990. The economy experiences another shock over the
period 1990 – 2000, as αt falls by 17%. This shock has two effects: first, labor income is
reduced. Second, raising children becomes relatively more expensive. Recalling (7), note
that the costs incurred in raising children depend on b, λt+1 and N
1
t+1 only,
14 and not on
αt+1, which was constant during the years used in the calibration of b. As a consequence,
the ratio b/αt was constant too for t = 7 and t = 9, with b/αt = 0.46. By 2000, however,
the ratio rises to b/αt = 0.55 as α falls, so that raising children is now relatively more
expensive by about 20%.
To summarize, the calibration is done in two steps: the first determines the parameters
of the technologies and historical values of λ, while the second deals with the preference
parameters. To derive the parameter values we have imposed two sets of restrictions:
first µ ≤ 1, β0/β1 ≈ 1, with β0 ≥ β1, and c1,t=9/c2,t=9 ≈ 1, which have economic reasons
and are independent of the data employed or the country/problem analyzed. The second
set of restrictions imposed concerns zt and αt. These restrictions are specific to the data
set used, and hence to the country/historical experience it reflects. Changing any of the
restrictions will lead to significant changes in the calibration results, if any can be derived
at all. Koukoumelis (2005) shows that the calibration will, in general, be sensitive to even
small measurement errors in Y5, the 1950 GDP level. He also shows that the degree of
sensitivity to errors in Y5 can be reduced by choosing a different set of restrictions regard-
14If the costs incurred in raising children were a function of α, the factor describing labor productivity
would drop out of the utility function, as this is logarithmic in form. As a consequence, all decisions on
children would be independent of α, which does not seem realistic.
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ing zt. In the present paper, we have kept the original restriction in Bell et al. (2004) in
order to ensure that the calibrations are comparable.
3.5 Projections: The Base Case
3.5.1 Preliminaries
Using the results of the calibration presented in the previous section, the household deci-
sions regarding completed fertility and education are determined under several scenarios.
First, there is the benchmark case without HIV/AIDS, which is the counterfactual. Sec-
ond, there is the benchmark case in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic breaks out, and families
fully recognize its effects at the very outset in the 1980s. Third, there is the case in which
parents fail to take notice of its effects until 1990. In all cases, the projections start with
N19 and e9, that is, the first decisions are made in period t = 8 and implemented in period
t = 9.
Data
To compute the projections, data on mortality rates for 2000 onwards are needed. For
both scenarios, revised projections based on those made by the US Bureau of Census are
used, following Bell et al. (2004). The population pyramids for both cases are given in
tables 3.6 and 3.7. The implicit survival rates κt and mortality rates (1− κt) are set out
in table 3.8. Survival rates for the second age group (age 15 to 24) are lower by up to 30
percentage points if the epidemic breaks out, and mortality rates are at least 1.9 times
higher in the case of AIDS. At the peak of the epidemic, mortality rates are more than
250% higher than their respective values in the case without AIDS during four consecutive
decades.
N1t is derived endogenously in the present model, in contrast to the projections in ta-
bles 3.6 and 3.7. Yet the implicit survival probabilities underlying these tables are used
to compute the number of adults in each age group in future periods, and therefore new
3.5. Projections: The Base Case 119
Table 3.6: Projections: Population Tables without AIDS
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
0-4 4458 4696 4602 4503 4537 4398 4336 4336 4336
5-14 7182 9006 9550 8995 8965 8968 8715 8715 8715
15-24 4715 6875 8666 9236 8744 8759 8807 8601 8644
25-34 2979 4447 6526 8277 8878 8458 8525 8624 8475
35-44 1833 2731 4116 6098 7809 8454 8129 8269 8442
45-54 1099 1634 2463 3755 5628 7290 7982 7761 7982
55-64 698 911 1379 2115 3280 4998 6581 7323 7234
65+ 511 864 1294 1969 3131 5266 8395 8395 8395
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Table 3.7: Projections: Population Tables with AIDS
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
0-4 4458 4556 3874 3436 3238 3038 2972 2972 2972
5-14 7182 8612 8416 7197 6578 6258 5971 5971 5971
15-24 4715 6839 8209 8040 6945 6429 6186 5902 5902
25-34 2979 4187 5780 6912 6997 6360 6182 5948 5676
35-44 1833 2410 3052 4136 5266 5873 5878 5713 5498
45-54 1099 1487 1760 2173 3125 4372 5352 5357 5207
55-64 698 906 1149 1361 1746 2666 3956 4843 4847
65+ 511 821 1087 1362 1693 2353 3657 3657 3657
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
Table 3.8: Survival rates κt and mortality rates (1− κt) in the benchmark cases
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
NO AIDS κt 0.873 0.887 0.901 0.915 0.930 0.944 0.959
AIDS κt 0.647 0.605 0.641 0.730 0.846 0.889 0.889
NO AIDS 1− κt 0.127 0.113 0.099 0.085 0.070 0.056 0.041
AIDS 1− κt 0.353 0.395 0.359 0.270 0.154 0.111 0.111
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age pyramids:
N1+it+i = N
1
t · (1− q1,1+it ), i ≥ 1 (15)
where q1,it is the probability that a member of age group 1 in period t will not survive to
become a member of age group 1+ i in period t+ i. Equation (15) enables the calculation
of the diagonals of the population table, namely, values for N2t+1, N
3
t+2, N
4
t+3, . . . , starting
with N1t , which is endogenous. Those values of the age pyramid which cannot be com-
puted using (15), for example N29 or N
4
11, are taken from table 3.7.
One last step is necessary before turning to the projections, namely, the determination
of N1min and N
1
max. As the number of school-going children depends on the number of
families, one must define N1min and N
1
max relative to family size. We choose N
1
min so as
to allow stationarity with respect to population size. As some children and adults always
die prematurely, even without an AIDS epidemic, the replacement fertility rate will lie
somewhat above 1. In the light of these data, N1min is set to
N1min = 1.05 ·
N2t +N
3
t
2
∀t
in every period t. Variations in N1min will be discussed in section 3.6.1. It turns out that the
value of N1max plays a minor role in all but one variation. Historically, the highest number
of children raised (a = 1) per family according to the above definition was 1.91 during
the 1980s. Therefore, we choose N1max slightly higher, so that 2N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) ≤ 1.95 or
N1max = 1.95 ·
N2t +N
3
t
2
∀t.
This implies that, in a steady state, the total population can double within about 20 years
if all families choose N1t = N
1
max. We also assume that the number of children cannot drop
from N1max to N
1
min within one period. If the family’s optimum yields 2N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t ) >
(1.95 + 1.05)/2 = 1.5 in some period t, then the minimum number of children in the
following period, t+1, is set to N1min = [1.05/2+N
1
t /(N
2
t +N
3
t )] · (N2t+1+N3t+1)/2 instead
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of N1min = 1.05(N
2
t+1 +N
3
t+1)/2. Only in period t+ 2 does N
1
min take the restricted value
of N1min = 1.05(N
2
t+2 + N
3
t+2)/2. Consider, for example, t = 9, where 2N
1
9/(N
2
9 + N
3
9 ) =
1.87 > 1.5. This yields, in period t = 10 : N1min = [(1.05 + 1.87)/2] · (N210 + N310)/2 =
1.46 · (N210 + N310)/2 instead of N1min = 1.05 · (N210 + N310)/2, that is, N1min is higher by
nearly 40%.
Procedure
For each year, the solution to the household maximization problem, that is, the optimal
values of N1t and et, is computed. Both interior solutions, i.e. solutions to (12), and a
total of 8 corner solutions are calculated in order to find the optimum, including interior
solutions with respect to only one variable, that is, solutions in which N1t is at the corner,
while et solves the corresponding first-order condition in (12), and vice versa. λt+1 and the
relevant values of the age pyramid are calculated using (2) and (15), and these values are
then used to determine the household optima for the following periods. The projections
are limited to 2040 by the need to know κt+1 = N
4
t+3/N
2
t+1, as the last value of N
4
t+3
available is that for 2070.
3.5.2 The Benchmark Cases
The results for the first benchmark case, that is, the scenario without an HIV/AIDS epi-
demic, are set out in table 3.9. Table 3.10 states the results of the second benchmark
case, in which it is assumed that when the HIV/AIDS epidemic breaks out during the
1980s families foresee all its effects (’perfect foresight’) and react to them immediately.
This assumption does not seem to be very realistic, particularly in the light of African
countries’ late reaction to HIV/AIDS. Therefore this case will be considered only in this
section, as an example of what could have happened if families had perfectly foreseen
the epidemic’s effects. Like the NO AIDS case, therefore, the AIDS benchmark case is a
thought experiment.
The variable yt denotes GDP per capita, and is computed from the last two columns. Total
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population, measured in 1000s, is stated in the last column. WithN1min = 0.525(N
2
t +N
3
t ),
Table 3.9: Benchmark Case I: NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8256 1.46 0.65 1263 3792 30023
11 4.67 8211 1.13 0.96 1411 5064 35890
12 5.51 9119 1.17 1.00 1517 6548 43151
13 6.04 11708 1.42 1.00 1533 8177 53329
14 6.72 14002 1.40 1.00 1650 10739 65099
Table 3.10: Benchmark Case I: AIDS, perfect foresight
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 5684 1.48 0.52 1451 3054 21047
10 4.49 5040 1.05 0.65 1397 3204 22929
11 4.59 4924 1.05 0.85 1453 3430 23616
12 5.14 4593 1.05 1.00 1517 3597 23703
13 5.83 4764 1.12 1.00 1563 3850 24629
14 6.43 5264 1.21 1.00 1680 4452 26501
a value of 1.05 in the fourth column of the tables indicates a corner solution with respect
to N1t . Similarly, a value of 1.46 for t = 10 also denotes a corner solution, as described
in section 3.5.1. In the first benchmark case, parents reduce fertility during the 1990s
sharply, from 1.87 children per family to 1.46 children a decade later, as the labor pro-
ductivity parameter αt drops by 20%, from its 1990 value of 585 to 481 in 2000. As a
consequence, raising children is now relatively more expensive, the value of b remaining
unchanged, and parents must reduce N1t in order to be able to finance child-raising.
15
By 2020, all children start enjoying full-time schooling, and parents find it worthwhile to
invest in having more children once again. As a consequence, N113 and N
1
14 both lie above
N1min, while e13 = e14 = 1.0.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic does not (measurably) change the adult population structure
15Note that this result would not hold if the child-raising costs were defined as N1t bλt · αt rather than
N1t bλt.
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for 1990, the first year of interest, as can be seen from tables 3.6 and 3.7. It does, however,
change the parents’ expectations, concerning both future mortality rates and population
pyramids. Fewer of them will survive to old age, so that consumption in that phase of
life becomes effectively less important than consumption while they are young, as the
weight attached to c2,t+2, β1κt, falls. The interior solution is N
1
9 = 3692 and e9 = 0.74,
that is, each family would like to raise only about one child, which would be better-
educated than in the NO AIDS case. However, due to the social rule on N1min, choosing
N19 = 3962 < N
1
min = 5684 is not an option. As a consequence, parents decide to have
the minimum number of children they can have in 1990, that is, N19 = 5684, a drop of
21% compared to the NO AIDS case. As raising these children is costly, the offspring
have to work, so that parents also reduce the level of schooling these children are to enjoy,
from 0.57 in the NO AIDS case, to 0.52. Note that if N1min were higher, children would
have to work even more; if, however, N1min were lower, it could also happen that children
would enjoy more schooling in the AIDS case than in the NO AIDS case – this issue
will be addressed in section 3.6. Total GDP in 1990 is slightly lower in the NO AIDS
case, mostly due to the reduction in the number of school-going children, which is not
fully offset by the increase in child labor. After 1990, the level of schooling grows, albeit
slowly. Child labor disappears in the both cases by 2020. In the first benchmark case,
GDP grows, on average, by 2.5% annually between 1990 and 2040, and by only a third
of that rate, (0.8% annually) in the second benchmark case. Total GDP in the NO AIDS
case is more than double its AIDS case value for 2040. Population is always lower with
the epidemic, by almost 60% in 2040. It grows by 2% annually on average in the NO
AIDS case over the period 1990 – 2040, and by 0.5% in the AIDS case. Compared to the
US Bureau’s projections in tables 3.6 and 3.7, total population in 2040 as predicted by
the present model is higher by 15% in the NO AIDS case and lower by 30% in the AIDS
case. Note that population and GDP are virtually constant in the AIDS benchmark case
after 2010.
Per capita GDP falls between 1990 and 2000 in the NO AIDS benchmark case, due
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to the drop in αt in 2000. After this initial reduction of about 3.6%, per capita GDP
grows in all decades thereafter; however, the growth rate is very low – only 0.5% annually,
on average. In the AIDS case, yt is higher in 1990 compared to the NO AIDS case, by
about 11%. This is due to the fact that parents have fewer children, and therefore the
dependent population is lower, while GDP remains virtually unchanged. Per capita GDP
falls between 1990 and 2000, and the drop is as large as in the NO AIDS case. yt grows
slowly after 2010, and, by 2020, GDP per capita in the AIDS case is no greater than its
level in the NO AIDS case. It is higher, however, in all following periods. This stems from
three facts: first, the number of children raised by each family is lower in the AIDS case,
which reduces the dependency ratio. Second an adult’s level of efficiency and therefore
GDP produced per adult are only slightly lower in the AIDS case. Third, children enjoy
full-time schooling in both cases and do not contribute to GDP.
3.5.3 Scenarios: Household Behavior when expectations are re-
vised with a delay
In the previous section, it was assumed that parents foresaw the effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the 1980s, and could adapt their decisions for 1990 accordingly. Given the ev-
idence from most African countries, this assumption does not seem realistic. The Kenyan
government, in particular, reacted to the epidemic very late, declaring it to be a national
disaster only in 1999. It is clear that households had not anticipated the epidemic’s effects
in the 1980s, more than a decade earlier than their government was prepared to acknowl-
edge its gravity; for the optimal choice of N19 = 5972 in the case of perfect foresight departs
from the observed value of N19 = 7182 for that period. As the population pyramids for
the 1990s in the AIDS and NO AIDS cases – as estimated by Bell et al. (2004) – are
virtually identical, and as families apparently did not react to the growing epidemic in
the 1980s, the number of school-going children, N1,NO AIDS9 and N
1,AIDS
9 , will be the same.
Assume therefore that on January, 1st, 1990, parents suddenly realized that an epidemic
had broken out. Several scenarios are possible, in which two groups of adults play an
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active role. The first group consists of those individuals whose children are to go to school
during the 1990s. This group had decided on N19 and e9 during the 1980s (when the chil-
dren were born), and is now confronted with a change in expectations regarding future
mortality rates – both their own and their children’s. The second group consists of those
young adults who will decide about N110 and e10 during the 1990s, and who would nor-
mally be the sole decision-makers in that decade. Their decision is influenced by, among
other things, the level of N19 , which is fixed, and e9, which might be open to renegotiation
among members of the groups a = 2 and a = 3. Three scenarios will be discussed. The
first is the scenario termed ’binding contract’, in which it is assumed that the contract
about e9 is binding, and therefore its value remains unchanged. Second, there is the sce-
nario in which the first group of adults revise their former decision about e9, and choose
a new level of schooling in the light of changed expectations. Third, there is a scenario
in which the second group decides not only about N110 and e10, but also about e9. Note
that it is also possible that the two groups of individuals negotiate about the level of e9,
whereby the result will lie somewhere between those in the second and third scenarios,
depending on the negotiation skills of the two groups and their respective sizes. If there
is no HIV/AIDS shock, the results of the benchmark cases and all scenarios but the third
will be identical.
Scenario 1: The Binding contract
In this scenario, the level of e9 remains unchanged: during the 1990s, children enjoy the
same level of schooling as if the HIV/AIDS epidemic had not occurred, so that e9 = 0.57.
The second group of adults, however, are aware of the force of the epidemic when deciding
about N110 and e10. The results are set out in table 3.11.
Note that there is no difference between the NO AIDS and the AIDS cases for t = 9,
due to the binding contract concerning e9. As N
1
9 is higher in this scenario than in the
case of perfect foresight, the number of families which can raise children in 2000 is higher,
and therefore total population for that and all following periods is higher. Consequently,
total GDP is also higher, and the gap between the two AIDS scenarios widens. GDP per
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Table 3.11: Scenario 1: AIDS, e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.45 1273 3686 28944
11 4.05 7058 1.05 0.69 1375 4233 30799
12 4.54 6928 1.05 0.85 1397 4535 32464
13 4.93 7632 1.22 1.00 1384 4903 35423
14 5.69 8040 1.18 1.00 1508 5963 39551
capita, however, is lower in table 3.11 in all years following 2000, albeit the difference is
rather small – at most 10% (in 2040). Note that in the case of a binding contract on
e9, the young adults (age group a = 2) in 2000 are more numerous and better educated
than in the AIDS benchmark case. Individuals who make their decisions about N110 and
e10 during the 1990s are aware of the fact that, by the time they reach old age, their
consumption will be provided by the young adults who enjoyed schooling during the
1990s – and these individuals will produce and earn more than their counterparts in the
AIDS benchmark case. As a consequence, with their old-age consumption better secured,
the decision makers for the 2000s will try to increase their consumption while young. As
they cannot further reduce the number of children they intend to raise below N1min, they
will also reduce schooling. For 2000, they choose e10 = 0.45, which is lower than their
choice in the AIDS benchmark case, e10 = 0.65 (see table 3.10). While e9 is higher in
the ’binding contract’ case, the difference between the levels of schooling in the two cases
in 2000 is so large, that the young adults’ level of efficiency will be lower in all periods
following 2000 and per capita GDP is also correspondingly lower. Therefore, from an
aggregate point of view (i.e. GDP, population), the economy will be larger if families
react to the AIDS epidemic only with a delay, in 2000. Where λtis concerned”
however,
an early reaction is better over the long run.
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
Assume that the parents who had their children during the 1980s, and so have N19 school-
going children during the 1990s, reconsider their earlier decisions about schooling as they
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realize the epidemic’s impact on mortality rates. In doing so, they find a level of e9 which
solves the first-order condition associated with education in (12), thereby taking N19 as
given. Individuals deciding about N110 and e10 observe the new choice of e9, and make
their decisions accordingly. The results are found in table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Scenario 2: AIDS, e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.45 1217 3521 28944
11 3.82 7058 1.05 0.64 1307 4025 30799
12 4.12 7912 1.20 0.71 1263 4283 33917
13 4.32 9631 1.43 0.76 1210 4762 39355
14 4.64 10293 1.25 0.88 1284 5869 45721
Upon suddenly realizing that both their own and their children’s likelihood of surviving to
old age is much lower, the adults strongly reduce the level of schooling their children are
actually to receive in the 1990s, to e9 = 0.42, compared with e9 = 0.52 if they had realized
the full extent of the disease a decade earlier, as in the AIDS benchmark. As children
work more, total GDP is higher in 1990 and the level of efficiency of young adults (age
group a = 2) in 2000 is lower than in all other benchmark cases and scenarios. As each
family has already chosen the minimum allowable number of children, it will now choose
less schooling for its children as a consequence of the low level of efficiency in all periods
after 1990. Per capita GDP in all years but 1990 is the lowest among all cases presented:
in 2040, yt is higher by 22% in the NO AIDS case, by 26% in the case of AIDS with
perfect foresight and by 15% in the case of a binding contract about e9. Total population
is higher than in all other AIDS cases: with the adults’ level of efficiency being very low,
investing in education does not pay off, so that parents increase et only slowly after 2020,
and increase N1t instead. Compared to the benchmark AIDS case, total population is now
higher, as N19 , and therefore the number of young adults who can bear and raise children
is higher in all future periods. With a greater population, total GDP also lies above the
respective values in the other AIDS cases, the difference amounting to 34% compared to
the AIDS benchmark case. Note that although the total poplation in 2040 is 83% higher
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when the first group of adults revises e9 compared to the binding contract scenario, the
GDP values are not as far apart, as the adults’ levels of efficiency are correspondingly
lower, by nearly 30%. As a consequence, GDP per capita is also much lower, despite the
fact that children work more.
Scenario 3: e9 revised by the second group
In the previous scenario, the parents of school-going children revised their choice of e9 after
they suddenly learned about the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Normally, however, the decision-
making process in any decade is left to the very young adults in age group a = 2. After
realizing that the HIV/AIDS epidemic will affect future levels of mortality from January
1st, 1990 onwards, the decision about e9 is subject to reconsideration. In the third sce-
nario, it is the very young adults who decide about e9, and not the parents of the children
who are about to enjoy e9. Therefore, the maximization problem in period 9 is revised to
read:
max
e9,e10,N110
[
β0ln(c1, 10) + β1κ10ln(c2, 12) +
2N110κ11
N210 +N
3
10
(
1− λ11(e10)
−η
η
)]
(16)
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and
λ10(e9) = 2z9e
²
9
(
N29λ9 +N
3
9λ8
N29 +N
3
9
)
+ 1
λ11(e10) = 2z10e
²
10
(
N210λ10(e9) +N
3
10λ9
N210 +N
3
10
)
+ 1
Note that e9 appears only in λ10(e9), as young adults in age group a = 2 do not receive
income from child labor and pay the costs of raising the children of school-going age not
in period t = 9, but rather in period t = 10. The results are set out in table 3.13.
Table 3.13: Scenario 3: e9 revised by the second group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 1.00 1236 2902 23475
10 5.83 8040 1.46 0.47 1406 4069 28944
11 4.60 7058 1.05 0.83 1533 4721 30799
12 5.60 6928 1.05 1.00 1613 5238 32464
13 6.05 6591 1.05 1.00 1734 5871 33869
14 6.77 8193 1.30 1.00 1770 6860 38760
It turns out that the first-order condition of the parents’ maximization problem with
respect to e9 involves the corner solution e9 = 1, whatever values e10 and N
1
10 take. Sim-
ilarly, the first-order condition with respect to N110 when e9 = 1 and e10 ∈ [0, 1], involves
N110 = N
1
min. The optimal value of e10 can then be derived using the remaining first-order
condition. It turns out to be scarcely larger than in scenarios 1 and 2.
In the decades following 2000, the level of schooling children enjoy is typically higher
than in both the other AIDS scenarios; for the level of adults’ efficiency is higher in 2000,
so that parents invest more in education. As a related consequence, they also have fewer
children, so that the total population is lower than in the first and second scenario. It is,
however, higher than in the AIDS benchmark with perfect foresight, as N19 is higher than
in that case. The effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on λt is lowest in the third scenario
– indeed, it is almost 1% higher in 2040 than its counterpart in the NO AIDS case. In
2000, per capita GDP is 13% higher than in the NO AIDS case, as children work more,
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while λ10 is also higher. By 2020, children enjoy full-time schooling in both in the third
scenario and the NO AIDS benchmark case. However, families in the former have fewer
children, while their level of efficiency – and therefore income – is nearly unchanged, so
that per capita GDP is somewhat higher.
While it seems likely that adults will revise their decisions when confronted by a shock
they did not foresee, it is hardly to be expected that parents who are in their thirties will
allow younger adults to decide on their children’s education. The third scenario, therefore,
will not be discussed in the context of the variations and public spending on health in the
subsequent sections.
3.6 Variations: Parameters
To test how sensitive the results derived above are to the assumptions made, some varia-
tions in the latter will now be presented. The variations will concern the choice of N1min,
and alternative paths for {αt}t=9,10,... and {zt}t=9,10,.... In all variations, it will be assumed
that parents perfectly foresee all future changes in parameters, even if they do not imme-
diately foresee the course of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Three cases will be discussed for
each variation; first, a benchmark NO AIDS case; second, the ’binding contract’ case; and
third, the scenario, in which the parents reconsider their earlier choice of e9. The case of
perfect foresight and the third scenario will not be discussed, as the decision mechanisms
and assumptions that underlie them do not seem realistic.
3.6.1 Variation 1: The level of N 1min
The first major assumption concerned the minimum number of children parents can choose
to have, which was set by the condition N1min = 1.05 · (N2t +N3t )/2. As a variation, N1min
is increased slightly, to N1min = 1.1(N
2
t + N
3
t )/2. The results can be found in table 3.14.
In the NO AIDS case, parents now raise more children than in the benchmark case in all
years but 1990, but they invest less in schooling; so that the level of efficiency of young
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Table 3.14: Variation 1: The level of N1min
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8398 1.48 0.64 1256 3799 30239
11 4.64 8390 1.15 0.95 1402 5089 36292
12 5.46 9270 1.17 1.00 1509 6590 43680
13 6.00 11847 1.41 1.00 1527 8241 53975
14 6.68 14226 1.40 1.00 1640 10818 65984
AIDS, scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8178 1.48 0.45 1266 3692 29155
11 4.03 7467 1.10 0.66 1353 4266 31527
12 4.45 7533 1.10 0.80 1366 4626 33859
13 4.75 8375 1.24 0.94 1348 5059 37540
14 5.43 8736 1.18 1.00 1464 6177 42201
AIDS, scenario 2
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8178 1.48 0.44 1210 3528 29155
11 3.80 7467 1.10 0.61 1287 4057 31527
12 4.04 8454 1.23 0.68 1240 4369 35219
13 4.20 10538 1.47 0.71 1179 4912 41656
14 4.43 11859 1.33 0.79 1230 6124 49768
adults is somewhat lower in all periods, as is per capita GDP. However, with the parent’s
level of efficiency being lower by the time children start going to school full-time, that is,
by 2020, families choose to have slightly fewer children than in the case where the N1min−
factor is 1.05. Consequently, total population is higher in all periods from 2000 onwards,
but the difference is small, reaching 1.3% in 2040. The difference in GDP (per capita and
total alike) is even smaller, amounting to less than 1%.
In the first scenario, that is, the case in which e9 is subject to a binding contract, GDP
and population are higher than in the reference case (Table 3.11), as parents have more
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children from 2000 onwards. They invest less in education, so that et, λt and per capita
GDP lie below their respective reference values. The effects of the epidemic on λt and yt
are stronger than in the reference case, as parents can less afford to educate their more
numerous children. The effects on GDP, however, are slightly weaker.
In the second scenario, wherein parents reconsider their earlier decisions about e9 when
learning about HIV/AIDS, the new value for e9 chosen remains unchanged, being indepen-
dent of N1min. Compared to the reference case, parents now have more, but worse-educated
children (see tables 3.12 and 3.14), and per capita GDP is lower. As in the first scenario,
the impact of the epidemic on λt and yt is stronger than in the case where the N
1
min−
factor is 1.05, while its impact on GDP and population is weaker.
3.6.2 Variation 2: The level of αt
The labor productivity factor αt dropped by more than 17% in the decade following 1990,
from 585 to 481, and this reduction is the main reason for the households’ decision to
reduce fertility from 2000 onwards, even in the absence of the disease – see section 3.5.2.
Assume that αt recovers after the sharp drop in the 1990s, to some value between α10 and
α9. To be precise, let productivity take the value αt = 0.5(α9+α10) = 533 after 2000. As
in the previous section, it will be assumed that parents foresee changes in αt perfectly.
The results are set out in table 3.15.
In the NO AIDS case in 2000, parents would like most to have very few children (as
raising them is relatively costly when αt is low) but to educate these children very well,
as future pay-offs from schooling are higher, with αt expected to rise after 2000. However,
due to the social rule on N1min each family in 2000 must raise at least 1.46 children, and
therefore cannot afford to educate them above e10 = 0.65. Thus, the changes in αt do not
lead to an increase in either N110 or e10, as one might expect. By 2010, however, when αt
has recovered substantially, the relative costs incurred in raising children are lower, and
parents have more children than in the case of a low level of αt for t > 10. Note, however,
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that with αt higher, the same level of income can be attained for a lower level of efficiency,
so that parents choose a lower level of et than in the benchmark case. As a consequence,
per capita GDP is lower, while population and total GDP are higher (compare tables 3.9
and 3.15).
Table 3.15: Variation 2: Recovery of αt after 2000
.
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8256 1.46 0.65 1263 3792 30023
11 4.67 11741 1.62 0.74 1399 5753 41122
12 4.94 16038 1.69 0.77 1423 8104 56946
13 5.18 21203 1.60 0.82 1460 11335 77636
14 5.55 27487 1.54 0.91 1542 16055 104103
AIDS, scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 5972 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.45 1273 3686 28944
11 4.05 9548 1.42 0.57 1391 4791 34435
12 4.20 12892 1.66 0.55 1301 5680 43654
13 4.03 19869 1.95 0.50 1172 7210 61509
14 3.87 30042 1.95 0.47 1129 10300 91201
AIDS, scenario 2, e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.45 1217 3521 28944
11 3.82 10490 1.56 0.49 1286 4604 35811
12 3.73 16063 1.95 0.43 1138 5604 49239
13 3.45 23617 1.95 0.42 1042 7393 70945
14 3.28 36345 1.95 0.39 989 10647 107687
A similar argument holds for the two AIDS scenarios, in which the effects are even stronger
than in the NO AIDS case. In both of these cases, parents are constrained to choose a
high level of fertility in 2000, as N1min cannot fall to 1.05 within one period. As a conse-
quence, the level of schooling e10 is low, and λ11 lies well below its NO AIDS value, so that
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investing in education in all periods after 2010 does not pay as well, particularly in the
light of the fact that child-raising costs fall as αt recovers. By 2030, parents choose the
maximal level of fertility, Nmax, which suggests that the number of children per family in
all following periods will remain unchanged and high. As et falls after 2010, it is possible
that the economy will reach some low equilibrium with respect to λt and et some time
after 2040. Recall, however, that an equilibrium in λt with et = 0 is not possible.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly check whether a low-level equilibrium ex-
ists, as suggested by the time series {et, λt}t≥12, nor where the equilibrium values lie, as
mortality rates and/or population tables after 2070 are not available. In the context of
the present model, in which there is no limit to the population Kenya can support, it
seems possible to construct a scenario in which the economy moves toward some low equi-
librium with respect to et, λt and yt, while the total population grows without bound. In
reality, however, parents will start to reduce the number of children they have when the
total population is large enough. Particularly poor, rural households will not be able to
support numerous offspring when land holdings are very small. As a consequence, parents
might start investing in education again, thereby leaving the low equilibrium.
3.6.3 Variation 3: The level of zt
As the adults’ choice of et is driven, at least in part, by zt, the last variation presented will
address the development of the transmission factor after 2000. Assume that zt recovers
after 1990, and, following Bell et al. (2004), set its value to zt = 0.65 ∀t ≥ 10. If parents
perfectly foresee this change in the productivity of education, they will raise the level of
schooling children enjoy during the 1990s, even though z9 takes a low value; for young
adults take into account the education of several future generations when making their
decisions, and investing in et early is profitable. Therefore, if there is perfect foresight
concerning {zt}, the results for 1990 will differ from the data. This issue can be solved by
assuming either that zt recovers only later, that is, by 2010, or that parents do not take
note of the changes in zt until they actually take place. To keep matters simple, assume
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that zt recovers only late, in 2010, that is: z9 = z10 = 0.4938 and zt≥11 = 0.65.
Table 3.16: Variation 3: Recovery of zt by 2010
NO AIDS
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8256 1.46 0.67 1261 3785 30023
11 4.72 8926 1.23 1.00 1372 5070 36949
12 7.09 8516 1.05 1.00 1725 7405 42936
13 8.78 9282 1.12 1.00 1994 9921 49753
14 11.31 10324 1.21 1.00 2382 13650 57311
AIDS, scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.46 1272 3681 28944
11 4.09 7058 1.05 0.84 1363 4199 30799
12 6.16 6928 1.05 1.00 1548 5025 32464
13 7.69 6591 1.05 1.00 1848 6259 33869
14 10.07 6596 1.05 1.00 2267 8248 36388
AIDS, scenario 2, e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.46 1215 3517 28944
11 3.86 7126 1.06 0.77 1293 3996 30898
12 5.54 6962 1.05 1.00 1432 4666 32579
13 7.13 6637 1.05 1.00 1704 5798 34028
14 9.30 6636 1.05 1.00 2086 7630 36570
By construction, the results for 1990 remain unchanged compared to the benchmark cases
and scenarios, as z11 does not appear in the household’s maximization problem when it
chooses N19 and e9. By 2000, however, parents start taking into account future changes
in zt, and increase education accordingly. In the NO AIDS case, child labor is eradicated
a decade earlier than in the benchmark case, and the adult level of efficiency in 2040 is
higher by 68%, while per capita and total GDP are higher by 44% and 27%, respectively.
As λt is higher in all periods, raising children is more costly, so that parents prefer to have
fewer children than in the case where zt does not recover.
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As expected, the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on λt and yt are slightly weaker
than in the case where zt does not change, as parents invest heavily in education even
in the presence of the epidemic. The effects of the disease on population and GDP are
generally weaker than in the case where zt remains unchanged at 0.494 in all cases but
the second scenario. Recall from tables 3.9 and 3.12 that, after 2020, parents choose to
raise more children per family in the second scenario compared to the NO AIDS case. If
zt improves to 0.65, however, parents always choose N
1
t = N
1
min, so that the difference
between the population sizes in the NO AIDS case and the second scenario is larger.
Despite the outbreak of the disease, per capita GDP in 2040 when zt≥11 = 0.65 is higher
than in the NO AIDS benchmark case (see table 3.9), and the difference amounts to
more than 50% if parents perfectly foresee the upcoming epidemic. Child labor is now
eradicated by 2020 even in the presence of the epidemic.
3.7 Policy
Governmental intervention has been necessary, since the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic in Africa in the 1980s, particularly in the health and education sectors, in order to
mitigate its adverse effects. Individuals in developing countries do not have the resources
to learn unaided about how the disease is transmitted, and cannot afford the treatment if
they become infected. With the number of AIDS orphans estimated to have risen by 30%
between 2001 and 2003 alone,16 communities which have taken in orphans in the past are
increasingly overwhelmed.
Governmental programs can therefore be classified into three types of measures: prevent-
ing the disease from spreading, treating and caring for the ill, and looking after orphans.
Preventive measures encompass information campaigns in the media and schools, the dis-
16Source: ‘Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2004,’ U.N.AIDS, 2004, Page 193
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tribution of condoms and setting up AIDS test facilities in all affected regions. Before the
epidemic breaks out fully, the number of HIV infections typically rises in certain popula-
tion groups like prostitutes and truck drivers – targeting preventive campaigns at these
groups can prove to be highly effective.
After the epidemic breaks out, however, the economy must bear the combined burden
of a workforce reduced by illness and death, and the costs of caring for the sick and their
families. At this stage, public policies should aim at extending the life of the infected
through treatment and preventing them from spreading the disease to the healthy. While
information campaigns in the media and schools remain important, measures now also
consist of treating HIV-positive pregnant women with drugs to reduce the likelihood of
the unborn child also being infected at delivery. With a prevalence rate among Kenyan
adults aged 15-49 of 6.7% in 2003,17 that is, more than 1 million AIDS cases to follow, the
medical infrastracture needs to be extended, by building additional hospitals and clinics,
as well as training and employing more health personnel.
Preventive measures such as information campaigns and condom distribution are relatively
cheap – particularly so before a full outbreak of the epidemic, when it is often sufficient to
target focus groups. Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn (2002) estimate the costs of preven-
tion at about 8-12 US$ per case averted. Saving one disability-adjusted-life-year (DALY)
through a bundle of measures such as prevention of mother-to-child transmission, supply
of condoms for sex workers, control of sexually-transmitted diseases, voluntary counseling
and testing as well as blood supply safety, costs an estimated US$12.50. Treatment costs,
for example through highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) are much higher: in
the developed world, they exceed 10,000 US$ per patient per year. With the emergence
of generic drugs, which are intended for distribution in developing countries only, drug
costs amount to 350 US$ per patient per year. Note, however, that these costs do not
include distributing the drugs and payments for medical personnel. As a consequence,
17Source: ‘Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2004,’ U.N.AIDS, 2004, Page 191
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Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn estimate the costs of saving a DALY for a cost-effective
HAART program to be 395 US$ per patient yearly.
3.7.1 Procedure
Intervention in the health sector will aim at reducing mortality rates, both through pre-
venting AIDS from spreading and by treating those who are already ill. In the initial
phase of the epidemic, intervention will consist mainly of cost-effective preventive mea-
sures. Treatment will gain importance when preventive measures do not bear fruit any
more. Denote public spending on health in period t, normalized per sub-family, by Gt,
and mortality rates in the presence of the disease (D = 1) by qt(D = 1). Following Bell
et al. (2004), assume the relationship between premature adult mortality in the presence
of the disease and public spending on health to be as follows:
1− κt(Gt;D = 1) ≡ qt(Gt;D = 1) = dt + 1
at + cte−btGt
, (17)
which allows for sufficient curvature (diminishing returns) over a flexible interval. The
values of at, bt, ct and dt need to be calibrated for each period in which Gt > 0. As the
present essay uses the same data as Bell et al. (2004), the results derived there remain
valid for present purposes.18 Due to the changes in mortality rates, the population tables
Table 3.17: The parameter values of the function qt(Gt;D = 1)
2000 2010 2020
at 0.9073 0.9863 1.3852
bt 0.0169 0.0187 0.0266
ct 0.3124 0.3395 0.4768
dt 1.2152 1.1128 0.8066
Source: Bell et al. (2004)
need to be recalculated using (17) and table 3.17. To be able to compute the new values of
Nat , the public spending program needs to be defined and the age-specific mortality rates
qa,a+1t , must be formulated as a function of qt(Gt;D = 1). For reasons of comparability,
18Source: Bell et al. (2004), page 47
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the same functional form as in Bell et al. (2004) is chosen. Following Bell et al. (2004),
Gt, i.e. the level of spending per family, is defined as:
Gt ≡ At
(N2t +N
3
t +N
4
t )/2
, (18)
with At being the level of governmental spending on health. Consider the 30-year spending
program:
A = (A2000, A2010, A2020) = (50 · 106, 100 · 106, 100 · 106),
where A2000 = 50 · 106 means that 50 million dollars are spent on health every year be-
tween 2000 and 2009, and A2010 and A2020 can be interpreted analogously. Assume that
the program A is financed through grants from abroad, which are fully funded by in-
ternational donors. As the grants do not need to be repaid, levying taxes or reshuﬄing
the governmental budget to finance them is not necessary. It is also assumed that the
government has no means to extend the program beyond the donors’ grants.
The age-specific mortality rates are then defined as follows:
qa,a+1t (Gt;D = 1) = q
a,a+1
t ·
(
1− qt(Gt;D = 1)
qt(0;D = 1)
)
(19)
As a consequence of the policy program A, the number of children raised by a family
and surviving to old age will now change, and the size of Gt is endogenous because as
Nat is endogenous. Therefore, the population tables need to be recomputed in each period.
Parental decisions are determined in part by their expectations about future mortality
rates. In the absence of public spending, parents were assumed to have perfect foresight
about mortality rates. To keep matters simple in the case of governmental spending on
health, assume parents are more short-sighted: They are aware of the mortality structure
if the governmental spending did not take place, and of all future effects of the spend-
ing program. However, they do not take into account the effects their own decisions on
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N1t will have on future values of Gt. Hence, the subjective estimates of κt and κt+1 are
computed as follows: The current population tables and mortality rates are taken as a
basis to calculate Gt from (18) and the new mortality rates q
a,a+1
t (Gt;D = 1), from (17)
and (19), which, in turn, are used to compute new values for Nat from (15) and hence
κt and κt+1. All values of N
a
t which are not influenced by the policy program A are left
unchanged.
3.7.2 Policy: Results
As the policy program A does not affect the NO AIDS case, only the results for the AIDS
scenarios are reported. Taking into account the history of policies to deal with AIDS in
Kenya, it seems unlikely that households in the 1990s could have foreseen that a program
would be implemented in the 2000s. Due to the nature of HIV/AIDS, the effects of such a
program on mortality will not make themselves felt immediately, so that it will be assumed
that, first, parents during the 1990s do not foresee the program, and second, that even
during the 2000s they do not realize its effects, and therefore do not revise their decisions
about e10. Young adults in t = 10, however, who decide about N
1
11 and e11, realize the
programs’ effects and make their decisions accordingly. Therefore, even if the government
intervenes in the health sector, the outcomes for t = 9 and t = 10 regarding fertility
and schooling will remain unchanged. The results are set out in tables 3.25 to 3.28 in
the appendix. The direct effects of the policy program on the families’ decisions can be
observed for 2010, that is, the first year in which they react to changes in mortality. Table
3.18 sets out the adult’s level of efficiency in 2010 as well as the qualitative changes in
fertility and education: a ”+” in the third column states that fertility is higher compared
to the case without public spending, a ”–” denotes that fertility is lower, and a ”0”means
that it remains unchanged. The symbols in the last column are interpreted analogously.
As a consequence of the policy program A, mortality rates are indeed reduced much,
so that more of the parents will survive to old age. At the same time, more of their chil-
dren will survive to adulthood and be able to finance their parents in old age. Therefore,
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consumption in the second stage of adulthood becomes more important in all calculations.
To finance it, parents can invest either in education, or in fertility, or in both. If λt is low,
the returns from investing in education will be low, while the ratio of income from child
labor to child-raising costs will be relatively high. As a consequence, parents will increase
fertility if λt is low. This is particularly the case in the second scenario, as can be seen
from table 3.18. The effect is strongest when zt is high, where parents not only increase
fertility when λ is low, but also reduce schooling slightly, from e11 = 0.77 to e11 = 0.76,
in the presence of the program. As this reduction of schooling does not appear in any
other variation, it seems to be associated with the high level of z. If mortality rates are
high, parents normally do not invest much in education if λt is low, except when zt is
high. With mortality rates reduced as a result of the program, investing in fertility be-
comes more profitable again, for all values of z, and the payoffs from education are lower.
Therefore, parents reduce schooling from its very high level in the absence of the policy
program to a somewhat lower level in its presence when z is high. The overall effects of
the program on λt, yt, Yt and population will be discussed in detail in section 3.9.
Table 3.18: The effects of the policy program A on fertility and education: 2010
λt
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et
Base Case
Scenario 1 4.05 0 +
Scenario 2 3.82 + 0
Variation 1 (N1min)
Scenario 1 4.03 0 +
Scenario 2 3.80 + +
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 4.05 + +
Scenario 2 3.82 + +
Variation 3 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 4.08 + +
Scenario 2 3.86 + –
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
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3.8 The Effects on Social Welfare
In order to assess the overall effects of the epidemic and the policy program A, a social
welfare function (SWF) is required. The choice of a SWF, however, poses difficulties of
its own. It has to capture and value several effects of the epidemic: first, some individuals
die prematurely, and are robbed of the opportunity to enjoy their lives and be productive.
Second, some individuals are never born, either because their parents die prematurely or
because their parents decide to have fewer children. Third, even those individuals who do
not die prematurely often enjoy less schooling than they would have done in the absence
of the disease, so that their lifetime income is reduced and their parents’ utility from the
capacity they attain as adults will fall. There is very little literature on the evolution of
welfare when fertility is endogenous. Schweizer (1996) considers an open economy and
defines efficiency using the concept of net trade. His welfare measure, however, holds only
for economies in a steady state, where population growth is constant over time. As this is
not the case in our projections, the measure developed by Schweizer cannot be employed
in our framework.
The first step is to decide what unit – monetary or physical – to use. As one of the
reasons for introducing a social welfare function is to assess the effects and profitabil-
ity of the policy program A, and as the costs of this program are measured in dol-
lars, we will choose a money-metric utility. In general, changes to an individual’s level
of utility are valued using the concepts of the compensating or equivalent variation
(CV and EV), as these capture all individual-level effects described above and assign
them a monetary value. The CV measures how much money, in the form of a lump-
sum transfer, is required such that and individual’s level of utility in the AIDS case
with the lump-sum transfer be identical to her level of utility in the NO AIDS case:
U(NO AIDS; ·) = U(AIDS,CV > 0; ·). The EV is the lump-sum an individual is will-
ing to pay in order to avoid the changes in mortality brought about by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic and its consequences: U(NO AIDS,EV < 0; ·) = U(AIDS; ·). The CV and
EV measure the effects on individuals. By summing the CV and EV over all relevant
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individuals19 in some periods, it is possible to assess the overall losses and gains due to
the epidemic or an intervention. This aggregation, however, does not include those indi-
viduals who are never born, but would have been under other circumstances. The CV and
EV can be defined in an analogous way to compute the effects of the policy intervention.
The transfer can be paid or received either in period t, that is, while the children are
going to school, or in period t + 2, that is, when the parents reach old age, or in both
periods. Note, first, that even though the transfers are lump-sum in form, parents will
change N1t and/or et. Consider, for example, a family receiving a lump-sum transfer Tt in
period t, and nothing in period t+2. As there are no capital markets, individuals cannot
smooth consumption by saving, and therefore they will change their choice of fertility,
schooling or both.20 It is not possible to determine et and N
1
t analytically as functions of
the transfer, so that the values of the functions U(AIDS,CV ; ·) and U(NO AIDS,EV ; ·)
must be determined numerically. In fact, the CV and EV can only be derived using grid
search methods,21 which are computationally expensive, as they have to be done sepa-
rately for each period, variation and scenario.
Note, also, that the CV and EV are likely to differ significantly, as the changes in mortal-
ity incurred when the epidemic breaks out are large. The difference stems from the fact
that it is not only the the levels of consumption which change, but also the weights of
the subutility functions. When computing the CV, we consider the AIDS utility function,
when computing the EV, the NO AIDS one. These differ, for instance, in the weight
19Aggregating the EV h over all individuals h rests on the assumption that the marginal utility of income
is the same for all individuals. This assumption is easily satisfied within a period, as all individuals are
identical. However, the marginal utility of income will be identical between two periods by pure chance
only.
20This argument also holds if parents receive the transfer when they are old, as borrowing is not
possible. While it is possible that there will exist a tuple of transfers Tt, Tt+2 for which fertility and
schooling both remain unchanged, it is very unlikely that these transfers will correspond to a CV or EV
21The procedure, in the case of the EV, is as follows: First, compute the levels of utility attained in
the AIDS case. Second, use the NO AIDS utility function to calculate the optimal levels of fertility and
education for each transfer T, and the ensuing level of utility. Third, choose that level of T for which
utility in the NO AIDS case with the transfer is equal to the level of utility in the AIDS case without the
transfer. Steps two and three must be done separately for every year. The procedure in the case of the
CV is similar. Both the EV and CV can be calculated analogously when evaluating the policy program
A.
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attached to old-age consumption, β1κt, which is much lower in the case of the CV. Hence,
the CV will generally be much larger than the EV as mortality rates rise, and vice-versa.
The EV and CV being hard to compute, we will now turn to other, simpler, measures of
welfare. One such measure is income, summed over all relevant individuals and periods.
While income measures, to some extent, the utility which accrues to households through
its close connection to consumption, it does not measure the utility that arises from the
educational attainment of the individual’s children, and it does not fully measure the
disutility arising from premature mortality. The contribution of the altruism term to an
individual’s level of utility is less than 2% in all years, scenarios and variations analyzed;
consumption, especially its distribution over time, and the parents’ expectations about
mortality determine the rest. Therefore, the major drawback of using income as a mea-
sure of welfare is that is does not fully capture the losses and gains arising from changes
in mortality rates. If these changes are small, income can be used as an easy to compute
measure of welfare.
The results, however, require careful interpretation, for they depend on whether per capita
or total income (GDP) is used. Total income can rise in two ways: either the number of
individuals rises, while income per head is constant, or the income of each individual rises
while the number of individuals remains constant. If parents decide to reduce schooling
while increasing fertility, per capita income will be lower – suggesting that individuals
might be worse off – while total income might rise – suggesting that an economy-wide in-
dicator has improved. If such a tradeoff does not exist, as is the case when the HIV/AIDS
epidemic first breaks out,22 both income per capita and total GDP are arguably accept-
able measures of welfare. In the case of the policy program A, however, such tradeoffs
are frequent, particularly in the second variation, in which per capita GDP rises while
total GDP (and population) fall. Therefore, when total GDP is the measure of welfare,
22Both per capita and total GDP are higher in the NO AIDS case compared to either AIDS scenario.
The single exception is the period t = 10, in which per capita GDP in the presence of the disease is
somewhat higher than in its absence due to a rise in child labor. As the difference amounts to less than
1% in all cases, we will ignore this problem for the rest of the welfare analysis.
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the policy program has negative consequences, as it reduces the size of the population
substantially. If per capita GDP is used instead, the program has positive consequences.
Which measure, then, is better? When the program is undertaken, mortality rates fall,
yet the population size is smaller than in the absence of the program. This is the result
of the families’ decisions to have fewer but better-educated children. Therefore, from an
individual’s point of view, the lower total population size is ’optimal’ (and, hence, ’good’),
suggesting that per capita income is a better measure of welfare than total GDP in the
presence of the program. As a consequence, both per capita income and total income can
be used to measure the welfare losses incurred when the HIV/AIDS epidemic breaks out.
As has been argued above, per capita income seems to be a more appropriate measure
of welfare if there is a tradeoff between schooling and fertility, and premature mortality
falls, as is the case if the policy intervention is undertaken.
One last aspect needs to be discussed, namely, the treatment of those individuals who
are born under one program but not under another. The valuation of such individuals
and their lives is the issue of a lively discussion in both philosophy and economics, and
there is no commonly accepted method or procedure. Most authors who are concerned
with AIDS, for instance, Young (2005), do not take such individuals into account. Note
that whatever individual measure of welfare is chosen – CV, EV or per capita income – it
has to be summed up over all households/individuals who experience the losses and gains
in order to capture the full effects to be analyzed. Consider, for instance, the effects of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. When only those individuals who actually lived at some point
of time are considered, the losses are underestimated: if there had been no epidemic,
parents would have had more and better-educated children, whose hypothetical income
and lives involve losses which need to be taken into account when measuring the effects
of HIV/AIDS.
In the present paper, we need to estimate the effects of the HIV/ADS epidemic in the ab-
sence of the intervention, when there is no tradeoff, and the effects of the policy program
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A, when there is. Two measures of welfare will be employed, both of them based on indi-
vidual incomes: first, a measure in which unborn individuals are taken into account, and
second, one in which they are not. To compute the first measure, we calculate the income,
in every period, of every individual alive in that period in the presence of the intervention
or shock, and compare it to the total income of every individual in the absence of the in-
tervention/shock. As the income of all individuals in some period is simply the total GDP
of that period, the first method compares GDP levels. As argued before, this method is
more appropriate when there is no tradeoff between schooling and fertility, that is, when
comparing the NO AIDS and AIDS cases. To compute the second measure, we calculate
the number of people who have died prematurely, or will do so, because of HIV/AIDS (or,
respectively, who would have died if there had been no policy intervention), and assess
their lost earnings. This step is somewhat more complicated than computing premature
deaths. The simplest way of doing it is to assume that, even if the mortality rates had
been different, these individuals would have enjoyed the same education, so that their
level of human capital would remain unchanged. In this case, their lost earnings would
be αtλ
a for each adult in each decade, where λa denotes her level of human capital. It is
also possible, however, that the individual would have enjoyed more schooling, and hence
a higher level of human capital, if mortality rates had been lower, and vice versa. As
it is not possible to compute this hypothetical level of schooling, we will simply assume
that et takes the same value as in the case without the HIV/AIDS mortality shock or the
governmental intervention, as appropriate. Therefore, when computing the (monetary)
losses, we will make two assumptions:
(A1) The fact that some potential children will never be born as a consequence of HIV/AIDS
will be ignored
(A2) The level of schooling enjoyed by all children will be either
(A2a) the same level as in the case where the shock/intervention takes place.
(A2b) the same level as in the case where the shock/intervention does not takes place
3.9. Results 147
For all measures employed, we compute the 1990 net present value (NPV) of all losses
and gains, and compare it either to the 1990 NPV of total, NO AIDS GDP, or to the 1990
NPV of the cost of the policy intervention A, to assess the effects of the epidemic or the
social profitability of the policy program. In all cases, the calculations are limited to the
years 1990 to 2040, so that gains and losses which accrue after 2040 are not included.
3.9 Results
The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the policy program A are discussed in sections
3.9.1 and 3.9.2 respectively. We will first present changes in some basic measures of welfare,
namely, the adults’ level of human capital, λt, per capita income, yt, total GDP, Yt and
population in the last period of the projections (t = 14). Second, we will determine the
overall effects of the epidemic and the intervention using the procedures described above.
3.9.1 No public spending on health
The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the Kenyan people and economy are substantial,
but they also depend on the way households react. Table 3.19 sets out the levels of several
simple measures of welfare as a percentage of their respective NO AIDS levels for the year
2040. While λ and y describe welfare at the individual level, GDP and population are
aggregate measures. The effects of the epidemic on λ and per capita GDP are strongest
in the case where e9 is revised in 1990,
23 that is, in the second scenario. The impact of
the disease on individuals can be reduced by measures aimed at increasing zt after 2000,
or by reducing N1min.
In the case of the individual measures of welfare, the first scenario is always better than
the second. Recall that e9 is always higher in the first scenario, as is it revised and there-
fore reduced in the second, so that the adults’ level of human capital is always higher if e9
is subject to a binding contract. The impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP is a heavy one: it is
23Recall that in the second scenario, parents suddenly realize that an epidemic has broken out on
January, 1st, 1990, and revise their decision concerning e9 accordingly.
3.9. Results 148
Table 3.19: The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic expressed as a % of the NO AIDS levels in 2040
λ GDP per cap.
y
GDP Y Population
Base Case
Scenario 1 85 91 56 61
Scenario 2 69 78 55 70
Variation 1 (N1min)
Scenario 1 81 89 57 64
Scenario 2 66 75 57 75
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 70 73 64 88
Scenario 2 59 64 66 103
Variation 3 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 89 95 60 63
Scenario 2 82 88 56 64
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
lower by at least a third in all cases. Increasing N1min has positive consequences for both
GDP and population size, independently of the parents’ reaction, or the lack thereof, to
the outbreak of the epidemic. Likewise, the recovery of αt after 2000 has positive effects
on the aggregate variables in all cases computed. A recovery of zt has similar effects on
all individual measures of welfare.
In the present setting, the government has several options apart from the policy pro-
gram A; these will be discussed separately in section 3.9.2. One area of intervention
concerns N1min, that is, the minimum number of children a family can raise. After the
outbreak of HIV/AIDS, or after the fall in αt between 1990 and 2000, families would like
to reduce the number of children they raise, but it is assumed that they cannot do so
due to the social stigma attached to having only very few children and to the lack of
available contraceptive measures. Providing condoms and information about contracep-
tive measures would have two positive effects: first, to reduce N1min and, second, to reduce
the spread of HIV/AIDS. The second area of intervention concerns measures aimed at a
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recovery of αt and/or zt after 2000, for example, through the better conduct of economic
policy, investment in schools and the training of teachers. The third option concerns the
way households reconsider their choice of e9 during the 1990s in the absence of perfect
foresight. The government might try to influence this decision, for example, by trying to
enforce the contract on e9 (scenario 1) or by endorsing one of the two groups of adults
which could revise e9 (scenarios 2 and 3). It seems very unlikely, however, that the gov-
ernment really can determine which of the mechanisms will be employed.
In general, governments assess the economy’s condition by looking at per capita GDP,
total GDP, population, or a combination of these factors. If the government’s aim is to
maximize population (which, in most cases, also maximizes GDP) after the outbreak of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, trying to enforce the decision mechanism employed in scenario
2 is best. Over the long run, however, this will have adverse results for individuals, whose
level of efficiency and per capita income will be very low, while child labor will increase.
To increase household welfare, that is the indicators λt and yt, implementing an early
information campaign about the effects of the epidemic on mortality rates, so that par-
ents would have more perfect foresight about the disease, is best. It is now arguably too
late for such a measure, so that the government can try, instead, to conduct programs
aimed at reducing N1min or improving zt after 2000. Finally, it can also reduce mortality
rates through the public spending program A, the effects of which will be discussed in
the following section.
The overall effects of the epidemic are set out in tables 3.20 and 3.21. Table 3.20 gives
the 1990 NPV of the overall losses as a fraction of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP
when unborn individuals are taken into account, for the base case. The variations are
reported in the appendix.
Table 3.21 gives the 1990 net present value (NPV) of the loss of income incurred through
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Table 3.20: Lost income through premature adult mortality, including unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
0.0% p.a. 28 31
1.2% p.a. 26 28
5.0% p.a. 18 20
All values expressed as a % of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and
2040
Table 3.21: Lost income through premature adult mortality, excluding unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
(A2a) (A2b) (A2a) (A2b)
0.0% p.a. 14 20 13 25
1.2% p.a. 13 19 12 23
5.0% p.a. 9 13 9 16
All values expressed as a % of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and
2040
premature adult mortality as a fraction of the NPV of total GDP in the period 1990-2040,
when unborn individuals are ignored, using assumptions (A2a) or (A2b). Three different
annual rates of interest are considered: first, r = 0; second, r = 1.2%, which corresponds
to the families’ own pure discount rate, as computed from β0 and β1; and third, r = 5%,
which is the interest rate employed in Bell et. al (2004). As expected, the effects of the
epidemic are stronger under assumption (A2b), as the levels of lost income per capita
are higher in that case. Whichever scenario is chosen the effects of the epidemic range
from 9% to 14% of total GDP under assumption (A2a), and 6 to 8 percentage points
more under (A2b) (The effects are about 1.5 times as large when unborn individuals are
considered). Even when the incomes of unborn individuals are ignored, therefore, the
society suffers significant economic losses when HIV/AIDS breaks out.
3.9.2 Public Spending on Health
The effects of the program A, expressed as a % of the 2040 NO AIDS level, are set out in
table 3.22. In the base case, all measures of individual and aggregate welfare are some-
what higher if the program is undertaken. The effects of the program in the variations,
however, are mixed, and can be negative in several cases, to the discussion of which we
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Table 3.22: The effects of the public spending program A, expressed as a % of the NO AIDS levels in
2040
λ per capita
GDP y
GDP Y Population
Base Case
Scenario 1 1.3 1.3 3.4 2.8
Scenario 2 2.7 3.2 2.8 0.7
Variation 1 (Nmin)
Scenario 1 3.3 2.9 3.2 1.4
Scenario 2 4.6 5.5 1.0 -4.0
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
Scenario 1 8.3 11.4 -3.7 -16.2
Scenario 2 2.5 2.2 1.0 -2.0
Variation 3 (zt≥11)
Scenario 1 0.6 0.3 3.9 3.8
Scenario 2 -0.4 -0.1 4.9 5.7
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
now turn.
If N1min is higher than in the base case, the policy program A has mostly positive ef-
fects in all cases but one, namely, total population in the second scenario. This measure
is lower by 4% if the program is undertaken; but the cause is benevolent. One would
expect population to be higher if mortality rates are lowered, e.g., by spending in the
health sector; and total population in the second variation is indeed higher if the program
is undertaken, but only up to 2030. Fertility also matters, of course, and rates are higher
until 2020. Thereafter, families start investing in education and raise fewer children than
in the case without the program A. Consequently, total population in 2040 is lower, de-
spite the lower mortality rates.
The policy program A has negative effects on some indicators if αt recovers after 2000.
At first, families increase both fertility (as raising children is relatively cheaper) and the
level of schooling these children will enjoy, as more of them will survive to finance the
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parents’ old age. Therefore, λ12 is higher than without A. This has two further effects:
child-raising costs are higher than when the program is not undertaken, but education is
more profitable. Consequently, fertility is lower, and education is higher, after 2020 in
the case where the policy program A is undertaken. By 2040, total population is lower
under A. GDP is also lower if the drop in population is sufficiently large compared to
the increase in λt (as in scenario 1). Again, the cause of the ’adverse’ effect on total
population is a benevolent one.
Recall from table 3.15 that the economy seems to be approaching a low-level equilib-
rium with respect to λt in the first and second scenarios. As can be seen from table 3.27
in the Appendix, λt grows in the first scenario, but is still falling in the second. Therefore,
if e9 is fixed by a binding contract, the policy program A can prevent the economy from
reaching a low-level equilibrium, and its effects are arguably strongest in that case.
If zt recovers after 2000, as in the third variation, the policy program A always has
positive effects on the aggregate measures of welfare. Surprisingly, however, the effects
on individual measures of welfare can be negative, as in the case of the second scenario
in variation 3. Recall from section 3.7.2 that parents reduce the level of schooling their
children receive when the program is undertaken if the parents’ level of human capital is
low, and increase et otherwise. In second scenario of the third variation, therefore, et falls
when the program is undertaken, as investing in fertility is more profitable than investing
in education. As a consequence, λt and yt are lower. Note, however, that even though
the policy program has negative effects on λt and yt, these are small, amounting at most
to 0.4% of the respective NO AIDS levels.
To assess the social profitability of the program A, we employ the methods presented
in section 3.8. Tables 3.23 and 3.24 report the results when unborn individuals are, and
are not, considered, respectively. As there are some striking results for the variations in
the case where unborn individuals are taken into account, we report those cases here, too.
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Assumption (A2) from section 3.8 now reads as follows:
(A2) The level of schooling enjoyed by all children will be either
(A2aˆ) the same level as in the AIDS case with a policy program.
(A2bˆ) the same level as in the AIDS case without a policy program.
Note that the levels of schooling and human capital are generally lower in the case of As-
sumption (A2bˆ), so that the effects of the policy program A will also be lower in that case.
When unborn individuals are taken into account, the policy program seems to be prof-
itable, in general, particularly if the interest rate is low. However, in the case of the second
variation, that is, if αt recovers, the policy intervention seems to have a small negative
impact on the economy if the interest rate is low. As the negative effect disappears if the
interest rate is higher, and as low interest rates mean that future gains and losses are not
discounted much, the losses in question seem to accrue at the end of the period in question.
GDP and population both fall in the second variation if the program is undertaken, as
parents decide to have fewer but much better educated children. That is, there is a trade-
off between education and fertility, and, consequently, between per capita income (which
rises) and total GDP (which falls; see table 3.22). As argued in section 3.8, however,
total GDP is not a good measure of welfare if there are such tradeoffs. Similarly, unborn
individuals should not be taken into account when parents decide freely to have fewer
children and increase their schooling when a policy intervention is undertaken. Therefore,
the figures presented in table 3.23 do not constitute good measures of the profitability of
the program when fertility rates fall as a consequence of the policy intervention, and the
results set out in table 3.24 should be used instead.
In the case where unborn individuals are not taken into account, the discounted gains
are at least three times as high as the discounted costs, so that the program is very prof-
itable indeed. Note also that when computing the values in tables 3.23 and 3.24, we did
not take into account the program’s gains which accrue after 2040. More recent evidence
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suggests that the costs of saving a DALY through HAART might be lower than those
employed in the present essay – in this case, the policy program would be even more
profitable, as it saves and prolongs more lives.
Table 3.23: The policy program A: Profitabilitya, including unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
0.0% p.a. 8 9
1.2% p.a. 7 8
5.0% p.a. 5 5
Variation 1
0.0% p.a. 8 6
1.2% p.a. 7 5
5.0% p.a. 4 4
Variation 2
0.0% p.a. -0 5
1.2% p.a. +0 4
5.0% p.a. 1 3
Variation 2
0.0% p.a. 11 13
1.2% p.a. 9 11
5.0% p.a. 6 7
aAll entries expressed as multiples of the 1990 NPV of the costs of A.
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
Table 3.24: The policy program A: Profitabilitya, excluding unborn individuals
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
(A2aˆ) (A2bˆ) (A2aˆ) (A2bˆ)
0.0% p.a. 5 4 5 5
1.2% p.a. 5 4 4 4
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 3
aAll entries expressed as multiples of the 1990 NPV of the costs of A.
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
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3.10 Conclusion
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kenya has had, and continues to have, a very damaging im-
pact on the country’s economy and population, both at the individual and at the aggregate
level. Three factors play a major role in determining the long-term dynamics. First, there
is the drop in the inter-generational transmission factor after 1970, which leads to a direct
reduction in the formation of human capital and to levels of schooling. Second there is
the reduction in labor productivity during the 1990s, as a consequence of which, fertility
and total population both fall. Third, there is the increase in mortality rates after the full
outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The individuals’ reaction to the epidemic depends,
first, on when they realize its effects, and second on the social mechanisms governing the
way exogenous shocks are dealt with. As has been argued in this essay, changes in the
inter-generational transmission factor and the labor productivity factor can mitigate or
intensify the epidemic’s consequences. Similarly, measures aimed at changing N1min can
also form part of an anti-AIDS program.
The policy program called A, which is fully financed by foreign grants, has a positive
effect on all individual-level welfare measures. In reaction to A, parents normally increase
the level of schooling their children enjoy, and therefore their future income and per capita
GDP. At the aggregate level, however, the program can lead to lower fertility, so that both
the total population size and GDP may be lower, too. These effects are strongest if the
labor productivity factor recovers after 2000. Combining A with measures aimed at influ-
encing N1min, αt and/or zt, can further mitigate the effects of the epidemic. Note, however,
that comparing A with the other measures discussed in the variations is difficult, as the
costs incurred in implementing the changes in the latter are unknown. The gains which
accrue if A is undertaken outweigh many-fold the costs incurred in financing it, even if
the overall returns to this investment that occur after 2040 are left out of account.
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3.11 Appendix
Table 3.25: The Policy Program A: Base Case
AIDS, Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.45 1273 3686 28944
11 4.05 7136 1.05 0.73 1372 4275 31164
12 4.63 7070 1.05 0.88 1409 4719 33494
13 5.03 7962 1.23 1.00 1401 5232 37355
14 5.78 8279 1.18 1.00 1530 6332 41389
AIDS, scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.45 1217 3521 28944
11 3.82 7580 1.12 0.64 1283 4083 31812
12 4.13 8230 1.18 0.73 1269 4521 35636
13 4.36 9568 1.32 0.83 1238 5106 41241
14 4.82 9531 1.14 1.00 1337 6169 46154
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Table 3.26: The Policy Program A: Variation 1: The level of N1min
AIDS, Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8178 1.48 0.45 1266 3692 29155
11 4.03 7518 1.10 0.70 1352 4306 31854
12 4.54 7670 1.10 0.83 1379 4806 34857
13 4.85 8405 1.21 1.00 1376 5364 38995
14 5.65 8590 1.14 1.00 1511 6520 43149
AIDS, scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8178 1.48 0.44 1210 3528 29155
11 3.80 7711 1.13 0.63 1277 4104 32135
12 4.10 8393 1.19 0.72 1261 4555 36111
13 4.31 9851 1.34 0.81 1226 5152 42013
14 4.74 9812 1.15 0.99 1321 6229 47153
Table 3.27: The Policy Program A: Variation 2: Recovery of αt
AIDS, Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.45 1273 3686 28944
11 4.05 9863 1.46 0.58 1379 4845 35146
12 4.25 11887 1.48 0.62 1359 5873 43230
13 4.24 16375 1.64 0.63 1278 7262 56820
14 4.33 20758 1.56 0.67 1305 9699 74304
AIDS, scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.45 1217 3521 28944
11 3.82 10628 1.57 0.51 1282 4649 36263
12 3.79 15124 1.80 0.48 1182 5762 48747
13 3.59 23107 1.95 0.44 1073 7576 70635
14 3.42 35107 1.95 0.41 1023 10802 105601
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Table 3.28: The Policy Program A: Variation 3: Recovery of zt
AIDS, Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.57 1310 3076 23475
10 4.65 8040 1.46 0.46 1272 3681 28944
11 4.09 7332 1.08 0.86 1350 4244 31450
12 6.23 7168 1.05 1.00 1560 5276 33828
13 7.75 6934 1.05 1.00 1856 6694 36077
14 10.14 6900 1.05 1.00 2275 8774 38558
AIDS, scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
year t λt N
1
t
N1t
(N2t +N
3
t )/2
et yt Yt(10
7) Pop.
9 4.50 7182 1.87 0.42 1336 3135 23475
10 4.14 8040 1.46 0.46 1215 3517 28944
11 3.86 7797 1.15 0.76 1263 4058 32129
12 5.50 7403 1.05 1.00 1434 4965 34622
13 7.15 7260 1.05 1.00 1697 6308 37173
14 9.26 7177 1.05 1.00 2083 8294 39816
Table 3.29: Lost income through premature adult mortality, including unborn individuals: Variations
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Variation 1 (N1min)
0.0% p.a. 28 30
1.2% p.a. 25 28
5.0% p.a. 17 20
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
0.0% p.a. 27 27
1.2% p.a. 25 26
5.0% p.a. 18 19
Variation 3 (zt≥11)
0.0% p.a. 28 32
1.2% p.a. 26 30
5.0% p.a. 17 22
All values in % of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and 2040
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
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Table 3.30: Lost income through premature adult mortality, excluding unborn individuals: Variations
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
(A2a) (A2b) (A2a) (A2b)
Variation 1 (N1min)
0.0% p.a. 14 21 13 26
1.2% p.a. 13 19 12 24
5.0% p.a. 9 13 9 16
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
0.0% p.a. 12 19 11 26
1.2% p.a. 12 18 11 24
5.0% p.a. 9 13 9 17
Variation 3 (zt≥10)
0.0% p.a. 10 15 10 19
1.2% p.a. 10 14 10 18
5.0% p.a. 8 11 8 14
All values in % of the 1990 NPV of total NO AIDS GDP between 1990 and 2040
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
Table 3.31: The policy program A, excluding unborn individuals: Profitabilitya
Interest Rate Scenario 1 Scenario 2
(A2aˆ) (A2bˆ) (A2aˆ) (A2bˆ)
Variation 1 (N1min)
0.0% p.a. 5 4 5 4
1.2% p.a. 5 4 4 4
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 3
Variation 2 (αt≥10)
0.0% p.a. 6 4 6 3
1.2% p.a. 5 4 5 3
5.0% p.a. 4 3 3 3
Variation 3 (zt≥10)
0.0% p.a. 6 5 5 6
1.2% p.a. 5 4 5 5
5.0% p.a. 3 3 3 3
aAll entries expressed as multiples of the 1990 NPV of the costs of the policy program A.
Scenario 1: e9 subject to a binding contract
Scenario 2: e9 revised by the first group
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Chapter 4
Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation has analyzed household decisions regarding fertility, schooling and child
labor, and how they affect economic growth. In all three essays, we consider altruistic
parents who decide simultaneously about the number of children they will raise and the
schooling these children will enjoy. Capital markets being non-existent by assumption,
there is a trade-off between consumption in old age, which rises with both the number
of children and their schooling, and consumption while young, which is decreasing in
schooling and either decreasing or increasing in fertility, depending on the costs of raising
children and the productivity of child labor. Aggregate economic growth is driven by
population growth and by human capital accumulation. Each individual’s level of human
capital depends on three factors, namely, the amount of time she spent at school while
young, her parents’ level of human capital, and the productivity of the educational sector
in transforming schooling into human capital. In the first and the third essay, output is
produced using a single input, namely, labor in the form of human capital. One draw-
back of this assumption is that the population growth rate in all steady-states depends
on the level of child-raising costs only, and population can grow without bound if raising
children is not too expensive. In the second essay, therefore, we assume that two inputs
are required in production, namely, labor and the fixed factor land.
In the first two essays, we analyzed potential steady states and the effects of govern-
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mental intervention on economic growth. In both essays, we have shown that multiple
steady-states can exist, as one might expect from a reading of the recent literature on
child labor. A low-level stationary state, or poverty trap, will exist if the educational
technology is not very productive and raising children is expensive. Similarly, a high-level
stationary state or a growth steady state will exist if the educational technology is suffi-
ciently productive. Poor parents generally choose too little schooling for per capita income
to grow, particularly when land plays no role in production or when land is abundant. If
land is scarce, even poor parents may choose to have few but well-educated children, as we
show in the second essay. Yet appropriate government intervention can induce economic
growth, even if the society is stuck in the poverty trap. We have analyzed three instru-
ments, namely, lump-sum transfers, taxes and subsidies on child-raising activities, and
school-attendance subsidies. Even without outside help, it is possible to construct policy
programs which lead to all households escaping the poverty trap after a finite number of
periods if the educational technology is sufficiently productive. In general, however, such
programs will also lead to persistent inequality. This result holds independently of the use
of land in production. In the second essay, in which land plays a central role, the range
of ’sufficiently productive’ educational technologies is wider than in the first essay. The
intuition is that if land plays a role in producing output, the fertility rate of the those who
pay taxes will be equal the fertility rate of those who receive a subsidy in their respective
steady states, and both will be at replacement levels, so that the size of the groups will
remain constant over time. If, however, land plays no role in production, rich families will
generally have fewer children than poor families, and their human capital accumulation –
driven by the productivity of the educational technology – must compensate for this effect.
The model developed in the first two essays has been extended and applied in the third,
empirical, essay to assess the long-run economic costs of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kenya.
The central difference between the models in the first two chapters and the model in the
third chapter is the possibility of premature adult mortality, either before the children
reach school-going age, or before the parents start enjoying old-age consumption. Simi-
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larly, some of the children will themselves die as adults after completing their education
and before they have started to finance their parents’ old age. If premature adult mortal-
ity rates rise, our calibration for Kenya yields the result that parents will reduce fertility
and also, in general, schooling. As a result, both per capita and total GDP, as well as
population and the young adults’ level of human capital are significantly lower by 2040,
the last year for which we make projections, due to the epidemic. These results confirm
the findings in Bell et al. (2004), in which the path of fertility is assumed to be exogenous,
but dependent on the presence or absence of the epidemic.
We also analyze the effects of a policy program, which is fully financed by foreign grants,
aimed at reducing mortality rates, and show that individuals are always better off if the
program is undertaken. Using the individual gains from the policy intervention, it is pos-
sible to show that implementing the program is socially profitable. However, it turns out
that families first increase fertility somewhat when the policy program is undertaken, and
may reduce it later, so that the total population size can be lower when the program is
undertaken compared to the case without a governmental intervention. This effect does
not appear in Bell et al. (2004), fertility being fixed in that analysis.
To summarize, the present dissertation has contributed to the literature on child labor,
fertility and economic growth with the first two essays, while the third essay contributes to
the growing literature that assesses the macroeconomic effects and costs of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. The analysis in the first two chapters had two aims. The first aim was to develop
a model in which both fertility and schooling decisions are endogenous, and to analyze
the effects of these decisions on economic growth. We have drawn upon the frameworks
developed in Raut and Srinivasan (1994), which describes the dynamic of economies where
fertility decisions are endogenous, and Bell and Gersbach (2001), who analyze child labor.
We have shown that multiple steady-states are possible, in accordance with the litera-
ture. The second aim was to analyze fiscal measures and policy programs, in contrast
to the recent literature on child labor and fertility (Baland and Robinson (2000), Hazan
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and Berdugo (2002)), which has focused on regulatory interventions. That fertility is
endogenous gives households more flexibility in responding to taxes and subsidies. When
school-attendance subsidies are introduced, for example, parents react to them by increas-
ing schooling when fertility is exogenous. If fertility is endogenous, however, they might
even reduce fertility when such a subsidy is introduced, with an accompanying further
increase in education. As a consequence, the subsidy is even more efficient, and policy
programs aimed at reducing child labor need less resources if they use school-attendance
subsidies than in the case where fertility is exogenous.
In the third essay, we assess the long-run effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on Kenya’s
economy and people. In contrast to the results derived in the early literature on HIV/AIDS
(e.g. Bloom and Mahal (1997)), we show that the epidemic’s effects are strong, confirming
the general results derived in Bell at. al (2004), and other recent contributions, but con-
tradicting Young’s (2005) findings for South Africa. We show that families reduce fertility
when mortality rates rise, which is a key result in Young’s (2005) Solovian framework.
Yet, though we agree that frameworks in which fertility is fixed do not capture the full
effects of epidemic, we do not arrive at his results that adjustments to fertility outweigh
those to schooling - for Kenya, at least.
Future research should strive to construct a sounder theoretical basis for the analysis
of mortality in the context of decisions on schooling and fertility, thereby combining the
empirical findings of the third chapter with the model developed in the first two. To my
knowledge, the only theoretical paper addressing premature adult mortality in the context
of child labor and fertility is Chakraborty and Das (2005), who assume that household
spending on health can reduce the mortality risks, which is arguably rather restrictive
in the case of a communicable disease like HIV/AIDS. On the empirical side, additional
research is needed to address the issue of what becomes of orphans. In the third essay, we
have assumed that orphans are taken in by surviving couples, and treated like their own
children. However, this form of pooling is likely to break down if the number of orphans
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becomes very large. Evidence from Kenya suggests that many orphans grow up alone,
particularly in urban areas. Public interventions outside the health sector, for example,
in the educational sector, are also worth analyzing, as are combined programs. For ex-
ample, Mexico’s Oportunidades Program and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program offer poor
households cash transfers conditional on their children’s school attendance and visits to a
health clinic. Similar programs can be set up in the context of HIV/AIDS, for instance,
combining school-attendance subsidies with investment in health infrastructure. Although
such complex programs are more challenging to analyze than simple programs targeting
only the health sector, they might prove to be significantly more efficient in mitigating
the economic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
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